Experimenting with the governance of plants as intellectual property: limitations, possibilities, and the Ecuadorian experience by Jefferson, David James
  
  
Experimenting with the Governance of Plants as Intellectual 
Property: Limitations, Possibilities, and the Ecuadorian Experience  
David James Jefferson 
MA (Psychology), JD (Law) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at 
The University of Queensland in 2019 
T.C. Beirne School of Law 
  
  
   
1 
 
Abstract 
This thesis explores the limitations and possibilities for the making of intellectual 
property laws for plants. The analysis is grounded in the contention that in recent 
years, a particular logic – understood here as a certain set of assumptions about the 
purpose of legal regimes – has come to dominate the way that lawmakers think about 
how to structure relationships between people, institutions, and plants. Thus, the 
dominant form of intellectual property for plants has materialised in systems that grant 
“plant breeders’ rights.” These regimes are predicated on a number of conventions, 
including that new plant varieties should be conceived as marketable technologies, 
that innovative activities undertaken by private actors to create plants with favourable 
traits should be incentivised, and that investment in breeding activity should be 
rewarded via exclusive commercial exploitation rights.  
The plant breeders’ rights model has influenced the way that different social actors 
think about how different uses of plants should be regulated, and about the meaning 
and purpose of intellectual property. Nevertheless, many options remain accessible 
for governments to design innovative legal frameworks for the regulation of 
relationships between people, institutions, and plants. This is true even where certain 
international legal instruments have to some extent limited the formal legal space 
available for domestic experimentation.  
Using a case study format focused on recent lawmaking projects in Ecuador, this 
thesis recounts how rationalities alternative to the conventional plant breeders’ rights 
model have manifested in new legislative and regulatory frameworks in that country. 
The methodology employed centres on doctrinal analysis of Ecuadorian and 
international legal regimes, and a socio-legal approach involving ethnographic 
fieldwork in Ecuador that occurred over the course of approximately seven months, in 
2016 and 2018. The conclusion extrapolates several lessons from the Ecuadorian 
experience, which could be used to inform future initiatives for the making of novel 
intellectual property laws for plants in other countries.  
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Part 1. Plants and Intellectual Property: A Doctrinal History 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades or so, there has been a growing interest in 
intellectual property and its relationship to the creation and use of plants. Several 
factors help to explain this growing interest. Across the world, the fundamental nature 
of agriculture is changing, as evidenced by the advent of many new technologies, 
including widely accessible genetic methods for the creation of new varieties of plants. 
These shifts are occurring in the context of the need to produce food for a burgeoning 
human population while farming faces multifaceted challenges from climate change, 
development of land, and urbanisation. Simultaneously, historically marginalised 
groups of people including peasants and indigenous populations have gained both 
political visibility and new legal rights. These achievements have obviated the need to 
provide greater protections for customary forms of agriculture, even while 
industrialised techniques spread in many countries where smallholder farming is still 
common. Intellectual property for plants is implicated in all of these undercurrents in 
one way or another.  
Debates between scholars, government officials, and members of civil society 
over how to best legislate the issue of intellectual property for plants tend to fall into 
two general categories. On one side are actors who express pessimistic views about 
the inclusion of plants as part of the subject matter protected as intellectual property, 
construing these laws as impediments to the broad accessibility of seeds and other 
planting material. The other camp is comprised of people who support intellectual 
property for plants based on particular legal rights or economic development theories. 
Both of these groups tend to conceive of conventional forms of intellectual property for 
plants as fixed categories, in which little space exists for innovation in lawmaking.  
In contrast, the viewpoint that this thesis presents is not dichotomous. The 
thesis tells a story about lawmakers who have encountered the means to be creative 
in unexpected places. It recounts how, in areas of the law that are often assumed to 
be fixed and static, room can still be found for experimentation. This stands in 
distinction to the perspectives that have characterised many prior studies of intellectual 
property for plants, which generally have implied that new ideas are unlikely to surface 
when countries design and enact laws that grant intellectual property for plants.  
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The analysis that this thesis conducts is grounded in several key observations. 
First, the discussion recognises the fact that over the past two decades or so, 
numerous social actors have expressed the need to find local solutions when 
designing intellectual property laws that cover biological subject matter, especially 
plants. As the products of agricultural research have become increasingly privatised, 
commodified, and monetised, new varieties of plants are now conceived in proprietary 
terms. The ability to obtain exclusive exploitation rights over these “goods” has 
become progressively more important to the entities that create plants with improved 
traits, because many new varieties command significant market value. Meanwhile, 
plant breeding today is a highly specialised science, due in part to the fact that 
advanced techniques for molecular level trait selection, and genetic modification and 
engineering have opened up new possibilities for “innovation” to create varieties with 
favourable characteristics. The conceptualisation of plant breeding as technological in 
essence has enabled the application of the logic of invention to its creations, which 
historically were conceived as products of nature rather than of human ingenuity.    
Meanwhile, discontent about these attributes of the nature of modern 
agriculture has arisen in many parts of the world. As multinational seed enterprises 
become increasingly consolidated and the genetic diversity of commonly cultivated 
crop varieties progressively narrows, civil society and government actors alike worry 
ever more about the economic, environmental, and social consequences of 
industrialised agriculture. Simultaneously, in many countries advocates for indigenous 
and traditional rural communities have achieved greater political and legal recognition. 
Many of these groups overtly oppose the extension of a rationality of proprietary rights 
to plants, especially crops that are cultivated for human consumption. Civil society 
actors who hold these views often express the belief that seeds should circulate 
without restrictions, free from encumbrances owned by private entities and individuals.    
In this context, a second key observation drives the inquiry that the thesis 
undertakes. That is, in recent years legal instruments that set the terms for proprietary 
relationships surrounding the use of different kinds of plants have proliferated. On the 
one hand, many countries have adhered to international regimes that require the 
enactment of domestic legislation to recognise intellectual property protection for new 
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varieties1 of plants. While representatives of territories in which industrialised 
agriculture is commonplace originally envisaged these frameworks, developing 
countries now also regularly adopt intellectual property laws for plants.  
However, in many developing countries customary farming systems remain 
widespread. In these parts of the world, movements advocating for the rights of 
indigenous and local farming communities, the conservation of agrobiodiversity, and 
food sovereignty2 have gained traction. As a result, new national and international laws 
have been enacted to grant protections for different types of plants outside of the realm 
of intellectual property. The convergence of these trends means that many countries 
are now obligated, based on a variety of international commitments, to implement 
multiple laws that differentially conceive of relationships between people, institutions, 
and plants. 
The most prominent international instrument to set minimum standards for 
domestic intellectual property laws – including those that cover plants – is the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”). The 
TRIPS Agreement mandates that all World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Member 
States must offer a system through which new plant varieties can be protected as 
intellectual property. However, the TRIPS Agreement also affords countries a measure 
of flexibility to experiment with locally tailored laws to regulate plants as intellectual 
property. For the purposes of this thesis, the exceptions, ambiguities, and lacunae in 
the TRIPS Agreement and other international agreements are referred to as “formal 
legal space.” This term is employed to recognise the space to experiment with local 
solutions that has been officially inscribed in legal instruments, and which therefore 
should be construed as real rather than speculative.    
The existence of a formal legal space for the making of intellectual property 
laws for plants is evident in Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, which stipulates 
                                            
1 According to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (1991), a 
variety may be understood as “a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known 
rank, which…can be defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype 
or combination of genotypes; distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least 
one of the said characteristics and; considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being 
propagated unchanged.” Art. 1(vi).  
2 The concept of food sovereignty may be understood as “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally 
appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to 
define their own food and agricultural systems.” Declaration of Nyéléni. (27 February 2007). Sélingué, 
Mali. Retrieved from https://nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290.  
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that these regimes may take the form of patents, an “effective sui generis3 system,” or 
any combination thereof. In practice, the official recognition in TRIPS of the validity of 
sui generis forms of intellectual property for plants means that WTO Member States 
are free to design norms that consider all of the factors relevant to the ways that 
agriculture is practiced within their borders. Countries including India, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and more recently, Ecuador, have taken advantage of this formal legal 
space to develop customised national intellectual property laws for plants.  
The aim of this thesis is to explore this kind of legal experimentation – what it 
is, and how it has operated – in Ecuador. The Ecuadorian experience is invoked to 
illustrate the possibilities for lawmaking that continue to exist, and to serve as a model 
for how legislators, regulators, legal scholars, and members of civil society might begin 
to rethink conventional norms of intellectual property for plants. The thesis recounts 
how lawmakers in Ecuador responded to the need to find local solutions during the 
process of designing a new intellectual property law for plants from 2014 to 2016.  
The Ecuadorian case study demonstrates that notwithstanding the availability 
of a formal legal space, which offers lawmakers some flexibility and choice in 
designing new laws to regulate plants as intellectual property, nonetheless a certain 
logic has come to dominate the way that lawmakers think about experimental 
legislation. The proliferation of a uniform, standardised way of thinking has had the 
effect of limiting the production of creative, local solutions, even in the absence of 
formal constraints. In both Ecuador and other countries throughout the world, 
legislators and other social actors have come to conceive of intellectual property for 
plants narrowly. The dominant paradigm has internalised the precepts of one particular 
model of intellectual property for plants, which is the system of “plant breeders’ rights” 
embodied in the Convention of the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (“UPOV Convention”).  
This limited conceptualisation prioritises and promotes a particular form of 
agriculture, and more broadly a bounded way of thinking about how different people 
and institutions relate to plants. Specifically, it is assumed that exclusive exploitation 
rights must be awarded to developers of new varieties of plants to provide an incentive 
                                            
3 From Latin, sui generis may be translated as “of its own kind.” In the context of the making of 
intellectual property laws for plants and against the backdrop of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization, sui generis means 
an alternative to the provision of patent protection for new plant varieties.   
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to these actors to invest in breeding. According to this standard, plant varieties are 
understood as inventions, as technologies created through human ingenuity, and as 
marketable products destined for commercialisation. Even where countries are not 
members of the UPOV Convention, the logic of plant breeders’ rights now dominates 
imaginaries for lawmaking, such that non-UPOV intellectual property laws are viewed 
as deviations from the mainstream.  
However, this need not be the case. This thesis argues that although it is true 
that opportunities for experimentation with locally tailored intellectual property laws for 
plants are in some ways formally bounded by international legal obligations, new 
paradigms may still be developed. This means that space remains available for the 
inscription of alternative rationalities to regulate relationships between people, 
institutions, and plants. Innovative options can be located in domains beyond 
intellectual property legislation, including administrative regulations to implement plant 
breeders’ rights laws; seed laws; systems of protection for traditional knowledge; and 
regimes governing access to genetic resources and equitable benefit sharing. As the 
case study of Ecuador demonstrates, it is now necessary to transcend the model of 
plant breeders’ rights to imagine new futures that would consider the needs of the 
multiplicity of actors who participate in national agricultural sectors. 
 
Thesis Overview and Structure 
This thesis argues that a proprietary logic has come to dominate the legal 
imaginaries that structure relationships between people, institutions, and plants. This 
is especially the case for new plant varieties, which are conventionally understood as 
discrete and homogenous goods designed to circulate broadly in world markets. 
Concomitant with the narrowing of the way in which the practice of plant breeding and 
development is conceived is the recent proliferation of legal regimes that regulate 
plants as a form of intellectual property. As discussed above, the TRIPS Agreement 
provides a threshold standard, as the first international legal instrument that formally 
required signatories to enact systems for the regulation of plants as intellectual 
property. Although the terms of the TRIPS Agreement unequivocally state that plant 
varieties must be protected as intellectual property, the Agreement affords parties 
substantial latitude to develop local sui generis legislation.  
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However, subsequent to the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
situation has become more complicated. Today, numerous bilateral and multilateral 
free trade agreements not only reinscribe the TRIPS Article 27.3(b) requirement, but 
also increase the minimum standards to which countries must adhere to regulate 
plants according to the rationality of intellectual property.4 Meanwhile, additional 
international regimes whose terms govern the ability to access and use certain types 
of plants have also entered into force over the last two decades or so. Prominent 
examples include the Convention on Biological Diversity (1993) and its Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization (“Nagoya Protocol,” 2014). Another relevant 
framework is the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (“Plant Treaty,” 2004), which is administered by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations.  
In the context of this complex international legal landscape, it is unsurprising 
that prior analyses have focused on exploring the formal policy space or “flexibilities” 
that remain available in international treaties for the making of intellectual property 
laws that govern the uses of plants. Throughout approximately the past two decades, 
numerous analyses have been conducted to understand how TRIPS and other 
international agreements might affect the form that national legislation may take. One 
of the areas of particular interest has centred on the ways that treaties affect the ability 
of countries to create laws that grant a form of “plant variety protection”5 that would be 
appropriately tailored to the realities of local agricultural sectors. The findings of such 
research typically support conclusions that multilateral treaties such as the TRIPS 
Agreement – frequently coupled with subsequent, bilateral trade agreements that 
increase the TRIPS minimum standards – now saturate the intellectual property policy 
space in many world regions. It has been commonly argued that this situation limits 
                                            
4 See, e.g., Drahos, P. (2001) BITs and BIPs. The Journal of World Intellectual Property 4(6), 791-
808. 
5 Note that the terms “plant variety protection,” “plant variety rights,” and “plant breeders’ rights” are 
often used interchangeably. In the present thesis, the term “plant variety protection” is used broadly to 
represent all types of systems designed to grant intellectual property for plants. In contrast, the term 
“plant breeders’ rights” is used to designate regimes that are based on the model established by the 
UPOV Convention.  
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the potential of individual countries to design innovative and locally situated 
approaches to govern the uses of different types of plants.6  
In addition to the various academic studies of how plants are conceptualised as 
intellectual property, policymakers and civil society activists have regularly conducted 
their own analyses to argue against the imposition of international minimum standards 
on domestic legislative imaginaries. Such works generally contend that external 
regimes that mandate minimum standards are detrimental to national interests. This 
may be the case especially in developing countries, where certain local priorities are 
viewed as irreconcilable with the logic of intellectual property. Therefore, some 
governments have developed alternative legal instruments to counterbalance plant 
breeders’ rights laws, including policies designed to safeguard customary agricultural 
practices, to conserve national agrobiodiversity, and in some cases, to foment food 
sovereignty.7  
Notwithstanding the pessimism with which some scholars and civil society 
actors view the contemporary situation, a few prominent experts claim to have 
identified “unused policy space”8 that remains latent yet available for customising 
intellectual property laws within the context of a multitude of treaty obligations. The 
quest for this hidden policy space, these lacunae in which lawmakers might innovate, 
has inspired cautiously optimistic analyses. The central question that unites such 
endeavours is how can parties to international agreements mitigate the potential 
adverse effects of minimum intellectual property standards through a variety of 
strategic actions? Areas of possible experimentation may include scrupulous study of 
the vacuums remaining in treaty texts, creative interpretation of vague language, and 
exploitation of alternative legislative or administrative options to accomplish national 
policy goals. 
This thesis builds on prior analyses of formal policy space for the regulation of 
plants as intellectual property, to create a broader understanding of the limitations and 
                                            
6 See, e.g., de Beer, J., Baarbé, J., & Ncube, C. B. (5 May 2017). The Intellectual Property Treaty 
Landscape in Africa, 1885 to 2015. openAIR African Innovation Research, Working Paper No. 4. 
7 See, e.g., The Crucible Group. (1994) People, Plants, and Patents: The Impact of Intellectual 
Property on Trade, Plant Biodiversity, and Rural Society. Ottawa: International Development 
Research Centre. 
8 See Correa, C.M., with contributions from Shashikant, S. and Meienberg, F. (2015) Plant Variety 
Protection in Developing Countries. A Tool for Designing a Sui Generis Plant Variety Protection 
System: An Alternative to UPOV 1991. Working paper published by the Association for Plant 
Breeding for the Benefit of Society (APBREBES) and its member organisations: Berne Declaration, 
The Development Fund, SEARICE and Third World Network. 
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possibilities for lawmaking at the national level. The case study format of the thesis, 
which is grounded in recent experiences of policy formation in Ecuador, provides a 
basis for understanding how these dynamics have played out in reality. In addition to 
describing how Ecuadorian lawmakers felt constrained in their ability to innovate, the 
thesis also identifies examples of playfulness, where government officials successfully 
embedded domestic policy goals in creative legislation.  
In so doing, the thesis explores dynamics that were both external and internal 
to the national political realm in Ecuador. Relevant external factors included the 
exceptions, ambiguities, and lacunae that exist in the TRIPS Agreement and other 
international legal instruments, which Ecuadorian lawmakers considered and that 
other countries could exploit to construct imaginative domestic legislation. 
Furthermore, in contrast to many prior studies, the thesis demonstrates that at least in 
the Ecuadorian case, numerous factors other than international obligations affected 
the way that lawmakers conceived of intellectual property for plants.  
Implicit to previous work in this area is the assumption that if a country is not 
required to give effect to the terms of a particular treaty, then it will not do so. For 
example, if a country is not a member of the TRIPS Agreement or the UPOV 
Convention, then it is presumed that the country will not recognise intellectual property 
for plants in the form of plant breeders’ rights. However, this hypothesis does not 
consider that numerous pressures beyond treaty obligations may operate to erect 
parameters that circumscribe the possibilities for lawmaking in a given territory. 
Internal dynamics, while generally not mentioned in studies of formal policy space, are 
frequently at least as important to consider as the scope of international agreements. 
Relevant internal forces that may shape the way in which a particular country regulates 
plants as intellectual property include the relative influence of various actors in the 
national agricultural sector, as well as the particular social and political paradigms 
under which the country operates.  
While external and internal influences may have different sources, it is notable 
that both have been shaped by a particular set of assumptions. According to the 
conventional logic, new plant varieties should be conceived as technologies produced 
by human ingenuity, the creation of which should be rewarded through the grant of 
exclusive (proprietary) exploitation rights. This exclusivity then affords right holders a 
temporary market monopoly, which allows for the recuperation of the investment 
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expended during the development of the new variety. In other words, the plant 
breeders’ rights model for conceptualising plants as intellectual property has become 
the global standard. The rationality of this paradigm has co-developed with a form of 
agriculture that is increasingly industrialised and market oriented in many parts of the 
world. Commensurately, other ways of thinking about agricultural plants and systems 
are conceived as antiquated, impoverished, or as deviations from this norm.  
Rather than reify this dynamic, the thesis argues that notwithstanding the formal 
legal obligations that national governments have assumed both in Ecuador and 
elsewhere, lawmakers remain free to generate alternative imaginaries to structure 
relationships between people, institutions, and different types of plants. Thus, 
countries could pursue different sets of policy options, depending on the formal legal 
space that is available to them and the nature of their domestic agricultural sectors. 
The recommendations that the thesis develops are based on the categorisation of 
countries into two general groupings.  
The first of these includes territories that are “legally unbound.” Such countries 
enjoy broad formal legal space in which to create innovative domestic legislation, 
either because they are not Member States of the World Trade Organization, or 
because they are WTO signatories that are classified as “least developed countries.” 
Importantly, this latter group of nations has been granted a transition period during 
which they are not required to implement systems of intellectual property protection as 
required by the TRIPS Agreement until 1 July 2021.9 It is also notable that legally 
unbound countries are not members of the UPOV Convention.  
The second category of countries includes “legally bound” territories. These 
States are subject to different types of formal legal obligations, some of which are 
more restrictive than others. For instance, countries that are only obligated to adhere 
to the TRIPS Agreement enjoy relatively broader formal legal space than those which 
have undertaken commitments under additional treaty regimes. The sources of these 
obligations may include bilateral trade agreements or multilateral treaties such as the 
UPOV Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Nagoya Protocol, 
and the Plant Treaty.  
                                            
9 World Trade Organization. (16 October 2013). Responding to least developed countries’ special 
needs in intellectual property. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e.htm. 
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Pursuant to this broad categorisation, Chapter 1 of the thesis characterises the 
formal legal space as it existed in 2018, by elaborating a typology of countries to 
illustrate how national governments may differentially approach the regulation of 
relationships between people, institutions, and different types of plants, including 
according to the logic of intellectual property. Chapter 1 explores various international 
instruments that relate to this subject matter, including the TRIPS Agreement, the 1978 
and 1991 versions of the UPOV Convention, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Plant 
Treaty. Furthermore, Chapter 1 unpacks the multiplicity of regional and bilateral trade 
agreements that mandate how intellectual property laws for plants should structure the 
rights and interests of various actors.  
Chapter 1 also surveys factors beyond treaty obligations that may influence 
how countries choose to regulate the ability of actors to access and use different types 
of plants. These factors could include internal dynamics such as the nature of the 
domestic agricultural sector in a given territory, national paradigms and strategies for 
development, local social, cultural, and political dynamics, and the characteristics of 
the country’s research and development infrastructure for plant breeding, among 
others. Finally, Chapter 1 briefly introduces the case study in which the analysis of the 
thesis is grounded. The country of focus is Ecuador, a territory that is legally bound to 
several international agreements but has recently experimented with re-imagining its 
national system of intellectual property for plants.  
Chapter 2 builds upon the typology of countries developed in the first chapter, 
by exploring two primary “conventional” approaches to the regulation of plants as 
intellectual property. These alternatives track the language of the TRIPS Agreement, 
aligning with the general categories of patents and sui generis laws that grant 
intellectual property protection for plants. The analysis elaborated in Chapter 2 is 
grounded in one overarching question: based on its external obligations, can a given 
country choose not to use a particular system or a part thereof to regulate plants as 
intellectual property? If the answer to this query is yes, then the country in question 
can employ a variety of legislative strategies to grant intellectual property for plants. In 
order to understand the nature of these laws and the way that they might be 
customised to fit the situation of a given society, Chapter 2 investigates patents and 
sui generis forms of intellectual property for plants in detail. 
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Finally, Chapter 2 presents two broad, generalizable options for how countries 
could regulate plants as intellectual property, while simultaneously addressing other 
important policy goals related to the access and use of diverse types of plants by 
different social actors. Essentially, governments could consider either (1) adopting a 
unified law to address all relevant issues; or (2) enacting parallel laws, thereby 
separating intellectual property standards from all other objectives. Both of these 
options could be informed by several extant, “less conventional” legislative solutions 
to the regulation of plants according to alternative logics, such as seed laws, systems 
for the protection of traditional knowledge related to plant genetic resources, and 
regimes designed to advance food security or food sovereignty. Furthermore, 
countries could explore the option of retooling conventional legal frameworks at the 
administrative, rather than the legislative level. Such an approach would involve 
designing regulatory regimes that simultaneously fulfil international obligations and 
respond to internal dynamics.   
Subsequent to laying the foundation for analysis in Part 1, the second part of 
the thesis develops the case study of Ecuador, as a means to explore both the 
limitations and possibilities of lawmaking. Ecuador is a small, yet culturally and 
geographically diverse developing country located in the Andean region of South 
America. The country is a member of the World Trade Organization and it is therefore 
legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement. Ecuador has also taken on several other 
international commitments related to regulating the relationships between people, 
institutions, and plants. Through the Ecuadorian case study, the thesis recounts the 
story of a nation that has recently attempted to re-imagine the meaning and purpose 
of intellectual property within its borders, in part through a conscious attempt to exploit 
the exceptions, ambiguities, and lacunae in international agreements. The form that 
the new Ecuadorian intellectual property law for plants has taken also reflects the 
relevance of certain internal dynamics that shaped the legislative process.  
Chapter 3 of the thesis unpacks the making of the new Ecuadorian intellectual 
property law for plants, an analysis that considers various contextual factors that 
inspired the legislative reform and the aspirations with which the new regime is 
imbued. Subsequently, Chapter 4 examines the extent to which the new Ecuadorian 
system for the regulation of plants as intellectual property is novel and experimental, 
versus the extent to which it tends to conform to the conventional logic. This chapter 
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also explores how Ecuador has embedded issues related to the governance of 
relationships between people, institutions, and plants in other recently enacted legal 
regimes, including the national seed law and the framework of protections for 
traditional knowledge.  
Chapter 5 extrapolates several lessons from the Ecuadorian case study that 
could inform future lawmaking projects in other countries. For instance, rather than 
adopt one of the standardised options described in Chapter 2 of the thesis, Ecuador 
has elected a third approach. The Ecuadorian strategy involves regulating 
relationships between people, institutions, and plants through multiple legal 
frameworks. Together, these regimes endeavour to respond simultaneously to the 
needs of actors in the domestic agricultural sector and uphold the country’s 
international obligations.  
Following the analysis of the Ecuadorian case study, Part 3 offers a series of 
conclusions. Foremost, it is argued that by narrowly focusing on how to design 
systems to grant plant breeders’ rights – whether based on a perceived need to comply 
with international treaty obligations, a desire to serve certain local interests, or other 
reasons – lawmakers may obscure or neglect other important policy goals. As a result, 
alternative ways of thinking about how people, institutions, and plants interrelate may 
be marginalised. However, notwithstanding the extent to which the logic of plant 
breeders’ rights has come to dominate imaginaries for the creation of intellectual 
property laws for plants, opportunities for experimentation remain available. The 
discussion that follows is dedicated to illuminating some of these options, towards the 
end of rendering alternative rationalities more readily available.   
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Chapter 1. Defining the Formal Legal Space: A Typology of Countries 
 As the introductory section of this thesis has argued, throughout the world a 
proprietary logic has shaped imaginaries for the making of laws to regulate plants as 
intellectual property. One important explanation for this is found in the recent 
proliferation of international legal instruments that require many territories to develop 
intellectual property laws for plants. Depending on the obligations to which a particular 
country is subject, it may be located in a typology of two general categories. These 
are (1) legally unbound countries, which are territories that can regulate plants as 
intellectual property in any way that they wish. Importantly, as long as they are legally 
unbound, these countries may also choose not to include plants as the subject matter 
of intellectual property.  
The second broad category includes (2) legally bound countries. Such 
territories are subject to one or more international obligations that require the granting 
of proprietary rights to individuals or entities that develop new varieties of plants. 
Legally bound countries may be further categorised according to the international 
obligations that they have individually assumed. The typology of countries and the 
obligations to which they are subject in relation to the regulation of plants as intellectual 
property are elaborated in Table 1 and Figures 1-3. 
 
Table 1: Typology of Countries with Obligations to Protect Plants as 
Intellectual Property 
Category of 
Country 
Subcategory of 
Country 
Obligation(s) Source of 
Obligations 
Legally Unbound  Non-WTO & Non-
UPOV 
None. None. 
WTO observer & 
Non-UPOV 
None (at present). None (at present). 
WTO member 
classified as “least 
developed” & Non-
UPOV 
By 1 July 2021, 
protect new plant 
varieties through 
(a) patents or (b) a 
sui generis 
system. 
TRIPS Agreement 
Art. 27.3(b). 
Legally Bound WTO member not 
classified as “least 
developed” 
Protect new plant 
varieties through 
(a) patents or (b) a 
sui generis 
system. 
TRIPS Agreement 
Art. 27.3(b). 
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Category of 
Country 
Subcategory of 
Country 
Obligation(s) Source of 
Obligations 
Member of WTO 
and UPOV 1978 
Protect new plant 
varieties with 
system of 
breeders’ rights 
outlined in UPOV 
1978, but not with 
patents. 
TRIPS Agreement 
Art. 27.3(b). 
UPOV Convention 
(1978). 
Possibly other 
trade agreements. 
Member of WTO 
and UPOV 1991 
Protect new plant 
varieties with 
system of 
breeders’ rights 
outlined in UPOV 
1991, and possibly 
also with patents. 
TRIPS Agreement 
Art. 27.3(b). 
UPOV Convention 
(1991). 
Possibly other 
trade agreements. 
Member of WTO 
and/or UPOV with 
additional treaty 
obligations 
Depending on 
specific 
obligations, may 
include protecting 
plant varieties as 
IP; creating a 
system for access 
to plant genetic 
resources; and 
providing a system 
for benefit sharing. 
Possibly TRIPS 
and the UPOV 
Convention, plus 
the CBD, and/or 
Nagoya Protocol, 
and/or the 
ITPGRFA. 
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Figure 1: Legally Unbound Countries  
 
 
Figure 2: Legally Bound Countries 
 
Non-WTO Member
30%
WTO Observer
29%
"Least Developed" 
WTO Member
41%
Legally Unbound Countries (63 total)
Non-WTO Member WTO Observer "Least Developed" WTO Member
WTO Member
35%
Member of WTO & 
UPOV 1978
10%
Member of WTO & 
UPOV 1991
55%
Legally Bound Countries (143 total)
WTO Member Member of WTO & UPOV 1978 Member of WTO & UPOV 1991
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Figure 3: Overall Characterisation of Countries 
 
 
In 2018, there were sixty-three legally unbound countries in the world. This 
grouping included nineteen non-members of the World Trade Organization, eighteen 
WTO observers, and twenty-six current WTO members that were classified as least 
developed countries. The first set of legally unbound countries, that is, those that were 
not members or observers of the World Trade Organization, enjoyed the broadest 
latitude in relation to the regulation of plants as intellectual property. These territories 
were under no present or future legal obligation to provide a form of intellectual 
property for plants.  
In contrast, while the second and third set of legally unbound countries were 
not subject to any current requirement to regulate plants as intellectual property, they 
will ostensibly be subject to the terms of the TRIPS Agreement in the future. For World 
Trade Organization observers, the Article 27.3(b) obligation will be triggered when 
these countries accede to the Organization. Meanwhile, WTO members that as of 
2018 were classified as least developed countries are obliged to become TRIPS 
compliant by 1 July 2021. A list of the legally unbound countries in each subcategory 
is provided in Table 2.  
Unbound
31%
Bound
69%
Proportion of Legally Unbound to Legally Bound Countries 
(206 total)
Unbound Bound
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Table 2: Categories of Legally Unbound Countries (63 Total) 
Non-WTO Countries WTO Observers WTO Members 
Classified as “Least 
Developed” 
1. Andorra 
2. Bahamas 
3. Comoros 
4. Curacao 
5. Eritrea 
6. Holy See (Vatican 
City) 
7. Kiribati 
8. Kosovo 
9. Marshall Islands 
10. Micronesia 
11. Monaco 
12. Nauru 
13. North Korea 
14. Palau 
15. Palestinian 
Territories  
16. San Marino 
17. Sint Maarten 
18. Turkmenistan 
19. Tuvalu 
 
 
1. Algeria  
2. Azerbaijan  
3. Belarus 
4. Bhutan  
5. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
6. Ethiopia  
7. Equatorial Guinea  
8. Iran  
9. Iraq  
10. Lebanese Republic 
11. Libya  
12. Serbia  
13. Somalia  
14. South Sudan  
15. Sudan  
16. Syrian Arab 
Republic  
17. Timor-Leste 
18. Uzbekistan  
 
1. Afghanistan 
2. Angola 
3. Bangladesh 
4. Benin 
5. Burkina Faso 
6. Burundi 
7. Cambodia 
8. Central African 
Republic 
9. Chad 
10. Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
11. Djibouti 
12. Guinea 
13. Guinea Bissau 
14. Haiti 
15. Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic 
16. Madagascar 
17. Mali 
18. Mauritania 
19. Myanmar 
20. Nepal 
21. Niger 
22. Senegal 
23. Solomon Islands 
24. Togo 
25. Vanuatu 
26. Yemen 
 
  At sixty-three, the number of legally unbound countries is significant. However, 
as of 2018, a far larger quantity of legally bound countries existed. Specifically, there 
were fifty territories that, (1) were full members of the World Trade Organization, (2) 
were not classified as “least developed countries,” and (3) were bound to the terms of 
the TRIPS Agreement but not to additional multilateral international obligations. 
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Meanwhile, fifteen10 countries were obligated to adhere to both the TRIPS Agreement 
and the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention. A further fifty-seven territories had 
signed the 1991 version of the UPOV Convention. However, this number is somewhat 
misleading, given that two of the UPOV 1991 signatories were intergovernmental 
organisations, namely the European Union (EU) and the African Intellectual Property 
Organization (ARIPO). These groups are comprised of twenty-eight11 and nineteen 
Member States, respectively, meaning that as of 2018 the true number of countries 
that were bound to the terms of UPOV 1991 was seventy-eight. Lists of the territories 
classified as legally bound are provided in Tables 3-5.  
 
Table 3: Countries Bound Only to TRIPS (50 total) 
WTO Only Countries 
1. Antigua and 
Barbuda 
2. Armenia  
3. Bahrain  
4. Barbados  
5. Belize  
6. Brunei Darussalam  
7. Cabo Verde 
8. Cameroon 
9. Congo  
10. Côte d’Ivoire 
11. Cuba  
12. Dominica 
13. Egypt  
14. El Salvador 
15. Eswatini 
(Swaziland) 
16. Fiji 
17. Gabon  
18. Grenada  
19. Guatemala  
20. Guyana  
21. Honduras  
22. India  
23. Indonesia  
24. Jamaica  
25. Kazakhstan  
26. Kuwait 
27. Liechtenstein 
28. Malaysia 
29. Maldives 
30. Mauritius 
31. Republic of 
Moldova 
32. Mongolia 
33. Nigeria  
34. Pakistan  
35. Papua New 
Guinea  
36. Philippines  
37. Qatar  
38. Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
39. Saint Lucia 
40. Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines  
41. Samoa  
42. Saudi Arabia  
43. Seychelles  
44. Sri Lanka  
45. Suriname  
46. Tajikistan 
47. Thailand 
48. Tonga 
49. United Arab 
Emirates 
50. Venezuela  
 
                                            
10 Although Italy and Portugal are also formally members of UPOV 1978, because these countries are 
also part of the European Union, they are ipso facto bound to the terms of UPOV 1991.   
11 Note that following the 2016 “Brexit” vote, the United Kingdom in the future will cease to be a 
member of the European Union. However, at that time the United Kingdom will still have obligations 
under UPOV 1991, as the country independently joined the Convention on 3 January 1999. UPOV. 
(2016). Members of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. Status on 
October 13, 2017. UPOV Publication No. 423. Retrieved from 
http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/pub423.pdf.  
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Table 4: Countries Bound to UPOV 1978 (15 total) 
UPOV 1978 Countries 
1. Argentina 
2. Bolivia 
3. Brazil 
4. Chile 
5. China 
6. Colombia 
7. Ecuador 
8. Mexico 
9. New Zealand 
10. Nicaragua 
11. Norway 
12. Paraguay 
13. South Africa 
14. Trinidad and Tobago 
15. Uruguay 
 
Table 5: Countries Bound to UPOV 1991 (78 total) 
UPOV 1991 Countries 
1. Albania 
2. Australia 
3. Austria 
4. Azerbaijan 
5. Belarus 
6. Belgium 
7. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
8. Botswana 
9. Bulgaria 
10. Canada  
11. Costa Rica 
12. Croatia 
13. Cyprus 
14. Czech Republic 
15. Denmark 
16. Dominican 
Republic 
17. Estonia 
18. Finland  
19. France 
20. The Gambia 
21. Georgia 
22. Germany 
23. Ghana 
24. Greece  
25. Hungary  
26. Iceland  
27. Ireland  
28. Israel 
29. Italy  
30. Japan 
31. Jordan  
32. Kenya  
33. Kyrgyzstan  
34. Latvia 
35. Lesotho 
36. Liberia 
37. Lithuania  
38. Luxembourg 
39. Malawi 
40. Malta 
41. Montenegro  
42. Morocco 
43. Mozambique 
44. Namibia 
45. Netherlands  
46. Oman  
47. Panama  
48. Peru  
49. Poland  
50. Portugal 
51. Republic of Korea 
52. Republic of 
Moldova  
53. Romania   
54. Russian 
Federation  
55. Rwanda 
56. São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
57. Serbia  
58. Sierra Leone 
59. Singapore  
60. Slovakia   
61. Slovenia  
62. Somalia 
63. Spain  
64. Sudan 
65. Swaziland 
66. Sweden  
67. Switzerland  
68. The former 
Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 
69. Tunisia  
70. Turkey 
71. Uganda 
72. Ukraine 
73. United Kingdom  
74. United Republic of 
Tanzania 
75. United States of 
America 
76. Viet Nam 
77. Zambia 
78. Zimbabwe 
 
  
  
   
35 
 
 Before delving more deeply into the differences between the various 
international obligations to which countries may be subject, it will first be helpful to 
explore the history of how agricultural plants came to be conceptualised as the subject 
matter of intellectual property in the first place. Treaty regimes such as the TRIPS 
Agreement or the UPOV Convention may appear to be monolithic entities, and their 
signing to be indicative of watershed moments in the development of international 
jurisprudence. However, a more accurate interpretation would understand these 
treaties as discrete embodiments of a complex, historical interplay of a variety of 
economic, scientific, and social forces that continue to evolve notwithstanding their 
apparent closure. The following section will briefly tell the story of how legal 
mechanisms designed to grant intellectual property for plants have developed and 
globalised.   
 
1.1. Embodying Plants as Intellectual Property  
 The idea that plants should be the subject of proprietary rights began to develop 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the period of increased 
systematised breeding for improved agricultural and horticultural crops following 
industrialisation in North America and Europe, proposals began to be circulated that 
endorsed the idea of allowing individuals and organisations that develop new varieties 
of different plant species to exclusively exploit their commercialisation. For instance, 
in 1907 private plant breeders in Britain debated the idea of using copyright to protect 
new varieties as a means to encourage breeders to share the details of their 
experiments and the resulting knowledge with the public.12 Similarly, around the turn 
of the twentieth century, nurserymen and orchardists in the United States of America 
used innovative pricing strategies and trademarks in attempts to gain exclusive control 
over the sale of new trees and ornamental plants that they developed.13 
 Meanwhile, plant breeding became increasingly conceptualised as a science in 
the years following the rediscovery, in 1900, of Gregor Mendel’s work on the principles 
                                            
12 Charnley, B. (2013). Why Didn’t an Equivalent to the US Plant Patent Act of 1930 Emerge in 
Britain? Historicizing the Boundaries of Un-Patentable Innovation. In C. Lawson & J. Sanderson 
(Eds.), The Intellectual Property and Food Project: From Rewarding Innovation and Creating to 
Feeding the World (103-122). Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
13 Kevles, D. J. (2007) Patents, Protections, and Privileges: The Establishment of Intellectual Property 
in Animals and Plants. Isis, 98, 323-331. 
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of inheritance and the potential application of this theory to the genetic improvement 
of organisms.14 These laws of heredity provided a theoretical basis for the deliberate 
and calculated selection of desirable traits to obtain enhanced varieties of 
domesticated plants. The application of Mendelian genetics to scientific breeding 
represented one of several factors that culminated in the creation of the first formal 
intellectual property framework for plants, the 1930 United States Plant Patent Act.15  
 Other dynamics that contributed to the making of the 1930 Plant Patent Act 
included the proliferation of efforts to develop and market specific crop varieties in the 
United States, as well as the influence of powerful actors – including the commercial 
developers of new plant varieties – on the legislative process.16 Generally, it has been 
argued that three broad sets of causes converged in the creation of the United States 
Plant Patent Act. These comprise geographic (e.g., the rapid territorial expansion of 
American plant breeding), scientific (e.g., advances based on Mendelism and pure line 
theory), and social (e.g., influence of actors such as nursery owners) currents, which 
together resulted in the conceptualisation of that had been improved through human 
agency in proprietary terms.17  
 Although plants became protectable under the United States Plant Patent Act, 
applying the concept of invention to the reality of biological organisms was a fraught 
process. The essential problem with granting patents claiming plants as the subject 
matter of protection is that even if understood as inventions, plants “compress diverse 
economic, cultural, and legal contexts.”18 Thus, extending an individualistic conception 
of “inventorship” to plants can operate to obfuscate the various entanglements 
between different human and environmental influences that historically contribute to 
the genetic improvement of a given species.  
 In order to transform the concept of invention to conform to the realities of plant 
reproductive biology, the 1930 Plant Patent Act had to reconstitute the essential 
elements of the modern patent bargain.19 Thus, to comply with the modern 
                                            
14 Spiertz, H. (2014). Agricultural Sciences in Transition from 1800 to 2020: Exploring Knowledge and 
Creating Impact. European Journal of Agronomy, 59, 96-106. 
15 Townsend-Parnell Plant Patent Act of 23 May 1930, Pub. L. No. 245 (71st Congress). 
16 Fowler, C. (2000). The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its Creation. Journal of 
the Patent and Trademark Office Society, 82, 621-644.  
17 Charnley, supra note 12. 
18 Pottage, A. & Sherman, B. (2007). Organisms and Manufactures: On the History of Plant 
Inventions. Melbourne University Law Review, 31, 539-568: 541. 
19 The notion of the patent bargain holds that the basic purpose of patent law is not simply to protect 
the proprietary rights of an owner, but to “provide access to informational resources that are 
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patentability criteria of origination, description, and reproduction, plant inventions had 
to be transubstantiated into a textual form, whose description would enable the facile 
manufacture of the protected specimen.20 This rendering was enabled by the provision 
of protection in the Plant Patent Act solely for asexually reproducing plants, a fact that 
also constitutes the Act’s most significant limitation.  
 Perhaps as the result of both the conceptual tensions and concrete 
incompleteness of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, the United States today remains the only 
country in the world to provide a specialised plant patent framework. However, 
notwithstanding the difficulty of imagining mechanisms through which to govern 
improved plant varieties according to a proprietary logic, efforts to create plant 
intellectual property regimes did not dissipate following the enactment of the Plant 
Patent Act. To the contrary, the application of the rationality of intellectual property to 
plants continued to expand through an “ongoing dialectic of resistance and 
accommodation” involving numerous influences, institutions, and actors.21 In Europe, 
national level initiatives in the 1950s to enlarge patent laws so that they would cover 
plant varieties failed, but the underlying reasoning and interests continued to circulate 
and wield influence.22 Thus, in 1957 the first session of the Diplomatic Conference on 
the Protection of Plant Varieties was organised. 
 After several years of negotiations at this Diplomatic Conference, an 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV, for its 
initials in French) was adopted in 1961.23 This multilateral agreement established 
common principles and a generalised framework for the subsequent enactment of 
national or regional plant variety rights regimes. The 1961 UPOV Convention outlined 
a form of intellectual property that could be applied to all botanical genera and 
                                            
necessary to create an informed set of publics.” Murray, K. (2013). A Politics of Patent Law: Crafting 
the Participatory Patent Bargain. New York: Routledge. pp. 1.  
20 Id. at 567. 
21 Sanderson, J. (2017). Plants, People and Practices: The Nature and History of the UPOV 
Convention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 44. 
22 Id.  
23 Act of 1961/1972. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. 1 
December 1961. Note that UPOV 1961 was revised in 1972, though the sole substantive change to 
the Convention was the introduction of a five-class contribution system, through which the financial 
burden of the Union was to be divided among member States. Jördens, R. (2005) Progress of Plant 
Variety Protection Based on the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV Convention). World Patent Information, 27, 232-243. 
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species,24 but that would simultaneously prohibit the protection of already patented 
varieties with plant breeders’ rights.25  
 The initial members of UPOV were a group of thirteen European States, 
together with the European Economic Community, the United International Bureaux 
for the Protection of Industrial, Literary and Artistic Property – which later became the 
World Intellectual Property Organization – the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.26 The UPOV Convention has been subsequently revised three times, 
superficially in 1972, and substantively in 1978 (“UPOV 1978”) and 1991 (“UPOV 
1991”). In recent years, the number of signatories to the Convention has expanded 
substantially, and as of 2018, UPOV had 75 members.27  
 Given the difficulties of conceptualising plants as inventions, one of the most 
significant challenges faced during the making of the 1961 UPOV Convention was the 
delimitation of the subject matter eligible for protection. Ultimately, the Convention was 
structured around the notion of the plant variety, which itself needed to be conceptually 
defined for the purposes of the treaty. The fields of taxonomy and nomenclature 
provided an initial basis upon which the meaning of the plant variety was fixed, such 
that in UPOV 1961 the term referred to tangible objects in nature, produced by plant 
breeders.28 In other words, the subject matter over which rights were granted under 
UPOV 1961 focused on the end product of plant breeding, that is, improved varieties 
that were able to meet certain minimum criteria in order to be protectable.  
 The requirements for plant breeders’ rights originally outlined in UPOV 1961 
mandated that a variety must be new in a commercial sense,29 as well as distinct, 
                                            
24 UPOV 1961/1972. Art. 4(1). 
25 UPOV 1961/1972. Art. 2(1). 
26 The thirteen European States to become the original members of UPOV 1961 were Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Several non-governmental organisations also 
were among the founding members of UPOV, including the International Association of Plant 
Breeders for the Protection of Plant Varieties (ASSINSEL), the International Association for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (AIPPI), and the International Federation of Seed Trade (FIS). 
Jördens, supra note 23. 
27 These include 72 independent States and two intergovernmental organisations: the European 
Union and the African Intellectual Property Organization. UPOV (2016) Members of the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. Status on October 13, 2017. UPOV Publication 
No. 423. Retrieved from http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/pub423.pdf.  
28 Sanderson, supra note 21 at 116. 
29 For the purposes of UPOV, novelty means that at the time of application for protection in a member 
State, the new variety must not have been offered for sale or marketed for a set number of years. 
UPOV 1961 Art. 6(1)(b); UPOV 1978 Art. 6(1)(b); UPOV 1991 Art. 6. 
  
  
   
39 
 
homogeneous – later changed to uniform in UPOV 1991 – and stable in order to be 
protected (commonly abbreviated as the “DUS” requirements).30 These criteria have 
proven to be durable over time, as they have been reinscribed in each subsequent 
revision to the UPOV Convention since the 1961 version entered into force in 1968. 
Moreover, even some countries that have not acceded to the Convention have 
conceptualised plant varieties according to the parameters of DUS.31 The notions of 
distinctness, homogeneity/uniformity, and stability are defined only generally in the 
UPOV Convention. Therefore, it is expected that UPOV member States elaborate 
these concepts in sufficiently concrete terms in national level regulations to facilitate 
the realisation of a “DUS test”: a technical examination based on which plant breeders’ 
rights may be awarded.32  
 The origin of the concept of distinctness traces its source to laws governing 
certification and trademarks already in existence at the time of the making of the first 
version of the UPOV Convention, while also being influenced by the United States 
Plant Patent Act.33 In UPOV 1961, this criterion was met when “the new variety [is] 
clearly distinguishable by one or more important characteristics from any other variety 
whose existence is a matter of common knowledge at the time when protection is 
applied for.”34 The existence of common knowledge about the variety was to be 
established under the 1961/1972 and 1978 frameworks through reference to factors 
such as cultivation or marketing already in progress, entry in an official register of 
varieties, or inclusion in a reference collection or precise description in a publication.35 
Meanwhile, applicants could prove that their varieties were distinct through reference 
to morphological or physiological characteristics, provided that these were capable of 
precise description and recognition.36  
 The 1991 version of the UPOV Convention relaxed the criteria for distinctness. 
This requirement is defined in UPOV 1991 as being met by a variety that “is clearly 
                                            
30 A protectable variety must also be assigned a name or denomination enabling identification of the 
new variety. UPOV 1961 Art. 13; UPOV 1978 Art. 13; UPOV 1991, Art. 20.  
31 Examples include Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
See Adhikari, K. & Jefferson, D. J. (eds.) (2019, forthcoming). Intellectual Property Law and Plant 
Protection: Challenges and Developments in Asia. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (in prep). 
32 See UPOV (2002) General Introduction to the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability 
and the Development of Harmonized Descriptions of New Varieties of Plants. TG/1/3.  
33 Sanderson, supra note 21 at 118. 
34 UPOV 1961/1972, Art. 6(1)(a); UPOV 1978 Art. 6(1)(a). 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
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distinguishable from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common 
knowledge at the time of the filing of the application.”37 The rationale behind removing 
the qualifying phrase “important characteristics” from the definition was based on 
confusion surrounding the original formulation of distinctness. The former articulation 
suggested that a variety must be distinct from existing varieties “by some feature 
related to merit,” which was never the intention of the Convention.38 In fact, proposals 
to include a criterion for plant breeder’s rights protection based on “usefulness” were 
rejected at the Second Session of the UPOV Diplomatic Conference held in 1961, due 
to the difficulties associated with making qualitative determinations about the value of 
new plant varieties.39    
 Meanwhile, the requirement of homogeneity was originally included in UPOV 
1961 as an assurance that growers who purchase plant material could be confident 
that the variety would exhibit the characteristics for which it had been bred.40 Plants 
are variable by nature, so the homogeneity requirement was designed to limit variation 
to some acceptable amount, which is left unspecified in all versions of the UPOV 
Convention. The definition of homogeneity under the 1961/1972 and 1978 versions of 
UPOV required that a new plant variety be “sufficiently homogeneous, having regard 
to the particular features of its sexual reproduction or vegetative propagation.”41  
 Homogeneity was substituted by the term uniformity in UPOV 1991. Under the 
new formulation, a variety “shall be deemed to be uniform if, subject to the variation 
that may be expected from the particular features of its propagation, it is sufficiently 
uniform in its relevant characteristics.”42 UPOV guidance documents on conducting 
DUS testing clarify that the examination of uniformity may consider any obvious 
characteristic of a variety, and that the level of uniformity should be assessed in the 
                                            
37 UPOV 1991, Art. 7. 
38 Greengrass, B. (1991). Legislative Comment: The 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention. European 
Intellectual Property Review, 13(12), 466-475: 468. 
39 Heitz, A. (1991) The Nature and Rationale for the Protection of Plant Varieties. Seminar on the 
Nature of and Rationale for the Protection of Plant Varieties under the UPOV Convention. Organized 
by the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants in cooperation with the 
Government of the Republic of Hungary. Budapest, Hungary, September 19-21, 1990. pp. 38. 
40 Sanderson, supra note 33 at 117. 
41 UPOV 1961/1972 Art. 6(1)(c). See also UPOV 1978 Art. 6(1)(c). 
42 UPOV 1991 Art. 8. 
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context of the reproductive biology of the specific species to which the variety 
pertains.43  
 The final criterion, stability, was defined in UPOV 1961/1972 such that a variety 
needed to “be stable in its essential characteristics, that is to say, it must remain true 
to its description after repeated reproduction or propagation.”44 This definition 
remained unchanged in the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention. The sole 
significant change to the formulation of the stability requirement in UPOV 1991 was 
the substitution of the word “relevant” for “essential” in the description of the 
characteristics that must remain stable over time. As with the changes to the definition 
of uniformity in UPOV 1991, this revision may be understood as purely linguistic, with 
no change intended to the substance of the requirements for protection.45 As a 
practical matter, the requirements of homogeneity/uniformity and stability are linked, 
in that DUS examiners generally take stability for granted once uniformity has been 
established.46 
 The conceptualisation of the plant variety that has been popularised through 
the various iterations of the UPOV Convention – as well as through concomitant seed 
certification laws – focuses essentially on varieties that formal plant breeders develop. 
The conditions of novelty, distinctness, uniformity, and stability as requirements to 
obtain intellectual property protection operate to universalise the UPOV system, while 
ostensibly ensuring that exclusive rights only encumber plant varieties that are of high 
quality and markedly improved performance. This prioritisation does not recognise 
other types of plants, such as the crops that farmers develop either as traditional 
landraces47 or through participatory breeding programmes, which are typically more 
genetically heterogeneous.48 Wild-type plants are also expressly excluded from the 
conceptualisation of the variety, since UPOV considers these to not have been 
                                            
43 UPOV (2002) General Introduction to the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability and 
the Development of Harmonized Descriptions of New Varieties of Plants. Chapter 6. UPOV 
Publication TG/1/3. 
44 UPOV 1961/1972. Art. 6(1)(d). 
45 Greengrass, supra note 38 at 469. 
46 Janis, M. D., & Smith, S. (2007). Technological Change and the Design of Plant Variety Protections 
Regimes. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 82(3), 1557-1615: 1583. 
47 “Landraces” may be understood as “plant materials consisting of cultivated varieties that have 
evolved and may continue evolving, using conventional or modern breeding techniques, in traditional 
or new agricultural environments within a defined ecogeographical area and under the influence of 
local human culture.” Casanas, F., Simo, J., Casals, J., & Prohens, J. (2017). Toward an Evolved 
Concept of Landrace. Frontiers in Plant Science, 8(145), 1-7: 2. 
48 Louwaars, N., & Burgaud, F. (2016). Variety Registration. In M. Halewood (ed.) Farmers’ Crop 
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law. New York: Routledge.  
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intentionally improved by a human breeder. As the influence of the UPOV Convention 
has grown over the past two decades, so too has the notion of the plant variety as a 
standardised, easily identifiable and marketable construct.    
 The evolution of the plant variety as a discrete concept was facilitated and 
consolidated by advancements in genetics and molecular biology that beginning in the 
1970s and 1980s were increasingly applied to plant breeding practices. These 
evolving laboratory-based techniques included protocols for molecular marker based 
trait selection and genetic modification.49 Breakthrough innovations in plant genetic 
transformation coincided with a shift in the central locus of breeding activity in many 
industrialised countries, from the public to the private sector.50 As transgenic crops 
were granted initial regulatory approvals to be commercialised in many territories, the 
private seed industry became increasingly vertically integrated and dominated by a 
small number of transnational corporations, shifting away from a formerly competitive 
agribusiness sector that was predominantly comprised of small and frequently family-
owned businesses.51 
 These scientific and economic dynamics corresponded with and contributed to 
an expansion in the utilisation of different types of intellectual property laws to obtain 
exclusive rights over the uses of agricultural plants. Beginning in the 1980s, United 
States Supreme Court decisions clarified that in addition to the specialised plant patent 
regime, utility patents can be used to protect plants as intellectual property in that 
country.52 This development meant that even sexually-reproducing species of plants 
became eligible for patent protection in the United States, provided that they meet the 
standard requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and written description.  
 Meanwhile, in 1998 the European Union clarified that biotechnological 
inventions not confined to a particular plant variety could be patentable under the 
terms of the European Patent Convention.53 During this period, other industrialised 
                                            
49 Kloppenburg, J. R. (2004). First the Seed. The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-
2000. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 
50 Buttel, F. H. & Belsky, J. (1987). Biotechnology, Plant Breeding, and Intellectual Property: Social 
and Ethical Dimensions. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 12(1), 31-49. 
51 Howard, P. H. (2009). Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996-2008. 
Sustainability, 1(4), 1266-1287. 
52 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that a live, human-made micro-organism is 
patentable subject matter); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 
(2001) (holding that newly developed plant varieties fall within patentable subject matter and that 
neither the U.S. Plant Patent Act nor Plant Variety Protection Act limit the scope of this coverage).  
53 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (6 July 1998) On the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions. L 213/13. 
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countries also modified their patent statutes to permit plant breeders to obtain patent 
protection for new plant varieties, so long as other the other requisite eligibility criteria 
were fulfilled.54 Such was the case in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. In these and 
other industrialised territories, the range of patentable plant related inventions has 
today grown to encompass a broad range of subject matter, which may include new 
plant varieties; genetic components such as genes or chromosomes; reproductive 
material such as seeds, whole plants, cuttings or protoplasts; and plant products such 
as fruit, flowers, or oils. 
 Concurrent with the increased utilisation of patents to obtain proprietary rights 
for plants, plant breeders’ rights frameworks – especially as embodied in the UPOV 
Convention – began to proliferate worldwide beginning in the 1990s. Although these 
systems had already been in place in certain European and other industrialised 
countries for decades, it was only following the inclusion of the mandate contained in 
Article 27.3(b) in the TRIPS Agreement that developing countries in multiple world 
regions began to enact plant breeders’ rights legislation. Since TRIPS entered into 
force in 1995, numerous territories have joined the UPOV Convention or otherwise 
have enacted sui generis legislation to meet the Article 27.3(b) requirement.  
 Even the legally unbound least developed countries that are members of the 
World Trade Organization have begun to enact domestic plant breeders’ rights 
legislation – often modelled on the UPOV Convention – in anticipation of the need to 
become TRIPS compliant by July 2021.55 The fact that legally unbound countries have 
in some cases accepted the UPOV model without exploring the possibility of designing 
locally tailored legislation illuminates the extent to which the plant breeders’ rights 
paradigm has impacted the landscape of intellectual property for plants worldwide. 
This phenomenon is exemplified in the cases of Cambodia and Laos. Both countries 
are currently legally unbound, as least developed members of the World Trade 
Organization, and both enacted UPOV 1991 compliant plant breeders’ rights laws well 
                                            
54 Helfer, L. R. (2004). Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Varieties: International Legal Regimes. 
FAO Legislative Study No. 85. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. pp. 
42. 
55 In fact, many least developed countries already have sui generis plant breeders’ rights laws in place 
or have joined the UPOV Convention and will therefore be required to implement such legislation in 
the near future. Such States include Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Zambia. 
  
  
   
44 
 
in advance of when their governments will be obligated to uphold the TRIPS Article 
27.3(b) requirement.56 
 To date, numerous policy analyses have been conducted with the goal to 
identify the flexibilities or formal policy space that World Trade Organization Member 
States could exploit to interpret the Article 27.3(b) requirement in a way that would 
take into account the interests of diverse social actors.57 However, the fact that few 
countries have elected to exercise their ability to enact locally tailored intellectual 
property legislation to fulfil their obligations under TRIPS means that the usefulness of 
these studies is limited to a handful of countries that are listed in Table 2 above. This 
is because most countries have elected to join the UPOV Convention as a means to 
fulfil the TRIPS obligation.  
 The popularity of the UPOV model may be explained by numerous factors, 
including the additional obligations that other international instruments, such as free 
trade agreements regularly contain; a lack of clarity or awareness surrounding how to 
design a national intellectual property law for plants that would deviate from the UPOV 
model; or pressure exerted by external or internal actors on the lawmaking process. 
All of these possible explanations suggest that the growth of membership in the UPOV 
Convention has itself become reinforcing of the logic of plant breeders’ rights, a 
phenomenon that further limits imaginaries for innovative lawmaking at the national 
level.   
 On a practical level, this burgeoning membership in the UPOV Convention 
means that it is no longer sufficient to understand the nature of the TRIPS Article 
27.3(b) requirement alone. Instead, it has become increasingly necessary to explore 
the possibilities for experimental lawmaking that exist in the context of the UPOV 
Convention – especially its 1991 version, to which seventy-eight countries are 
currently bound. To date, no systematic analysis has been conducted to assess how 
                                            
56 Jefferson, D. J. (2019, forthcoming). The Proliferation of Plant Breeders’ Rights in Asia: Tracking 
the Spread of UPOV through Trade Agreements. In K. Adhikari & D. J. Jefferson (eds.) Intellectual 
Property Law and Plant Protection: Challenges and Developments in Asia. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
(Note that Cambodia enacted its Law on Seed Management and Plant Breeder’s Rights in April 2008, 
and Laos revised its national intellectual property law in 2011 to create a new system for plant variety 
protection based on UPOV 1991. Both frameworks entered into force more than 10 years before the 
TRIPS Article 27.3(b) requirement will take effect in these countries).  
57 See, e.g., Dhar, B. (2002). Sui Generis Systems for Plant Variety Protection: Options under TRIPS. 
Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva; Robinson, D. (2008). Sui Generis Plant Variety Protection 
Systems: Liability Rules and Non-UPOV Systems of Protection. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice, 3(10), 659-665. 
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national governments might customise the UPOV Convention toward the end of 
balancing the interests of diverse national stakeholders. The final section of Chapter 
2 and Chapter 5 of this thesis will attempt to fill this gap by providing specific policy 
recommendations that national governments could consider. However, it will first be 
necessary to explore the criticisms associated with the UPOV model as an intellectual 
property framework for plants, as well as to scrutinise prior proposals for alternative 
means to meet the Article 27.3(b) requirement.  
 
1.2. The UPOV Model for Intellectual Property in Plants 
 Notwithstanding – or perhaps, because of – the dominance of the logic of plant 
breeders’ rights in the landscape of intellectual property for plants, some social actors 
have criticised the UPOV system. Rather than centre on the UPOV Convention itself, 
critiques are often concerned with the applicability of this model to certain local 
contexts. Opposition to UPOV has also grown and consolidated over time as the 
Convention has evolved to expand the protections granted to right holders while 
reducing the available exceptions to exclusivity. One of the essential areas in which 
UPOV has developed pertains to the conceptualisation of the plant variety. While the 
notion of the plant variety in UPOV 1961 was derived fundamentally from horticultural 
and plant breeding knowledge and practices, the concept has been subsequently 
rendered increasingly political and legal.58  
 Thus, UPOV 1991 expanded the plant variety concept to provide protection for 
new categories of “essentially derived” and other varieties that are not clearly 
distinguishable from a previously protected variety.59 Meanwhile, the periods of 
protection for the breeder’s right were lengthened60 and the corresponding exceptions 
– allowing for the use of a protected variety without the authorisation of the breeder 
                                            
58 Sanderson, supra note 33 at 113. 
59 In addition to “initial varieties,” UPOV 1991 provides protection for “(i) varieties which are essentially 
derived from the protected variety, where the protected variety is not itself an essentially derived 
variety; (ii) varieties which are not clearly distinguishable in accordance with Article 7 [distinctness] 
from the protected variety and; (iii) varieties whose production requires the repeated use of the 
protected variety.” Art. 5(a). 
60 The minimum period of protection under UPOV 1991 is 20 years from the date of the grant of the 
breeder’s right (25 years for trees and vines), while the minimum period of protection under UPOV 
1978 was 15 years (18 years for trees and vines). 
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under certain circumstances – were curtailed.61 These changes have contributed to 
an increase in the number of genera and species eligible for protection, which in turn 
has driven the growth of the overall volume of breeders’ rights certificates that have 
been granted worldwide.62 The key differences between the 1978 and 1991 versions 
of the UPOV Convention are displayed in Table 6. As can be inferred from this table, 
the latter version of the UPOV Convention represents a substantial expansion of the 
scope of protection granted in comparison to the former.  
 
Table 6: Comparison of UPOV 1978 and UPOV 1991 
PROVISION UPOV 1978 UPOV 1991 
Botanical genera & species 
protected 
At least 5 upon entry into force; 
10 within 3 years; 18 within 6 
years; 24 within 8 years. 
At least 15 upon becoming 
bound; all genera and species 
within 10 years. 
Scope of protection Breeder’s authorisation 
required for:  
(i) production for 
purposes of 
commercial 
marketing;  
(ii) offering for sale;  
(iii) marketing. 
Breeder’s authorisation 
required for:  
(i) production or 
reproduction 
(multiplication);  
(ii) conditioning for the 
purpose of 
propagation;  
(iii) offering for sale;  
(iv) selling or other 
marketing;  
(v) exporting;  
(vi) importing;  
(vii) stocking for purposes 
mentioned in (i) to 
(vi). 
Material that may be protected • Plant varieties • Plant varieties 
• Harvested material 
• Products made directly 
from harvested 
material (optional) 
• Essentially derived 
varieties 
• Varieties that are not 
clearly distinguishable 
• Varieties whose 
production requires 
repeated use of the 
protected variety 
Exceptions • Acts done for non-
commercial purposes 
(implied) 
• Acts done privately 
and for non-
commercial purposes 
                                            
61 For instance, UPOV 1978 implicitly allowed farmers to save seeds for personal uses, but not resale. 
UPOV 1991 eliminates this “farmer’s privilege,” though it does grant discretion to national 
governments to decide whether seed saving should be permitted in domestic legislation. See UPOV 
1991, Art. 15(2).   
62 Jördens, supra note 23 at 241.  
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PROVISION UPOV 1978 UPOV 1991 
• Utilisation of the 
protected variety for 
creating other varieties 
or for the marketing of 
such varieties. 
• Acts done for 
experimental purposes 
• Acts done for the 
purpose of breeding 
other varieties 
• Use by farmers for 
propagating purposes, 
on their own holdings, 
the product of the 
harvest (optional). 
Period of exclusivity 18 years from date of issue 
(trees and vines) 
15 years from date of issue (all 
other species).  
25 years from the date of issue 
(trees and vines) 
20 years from the date of issue 
(all other species). 
Relationship with patent law A variety of the same botanical 
genus or species may be 
protected with either plant 
breeders’ rights or a patent. 
A variety of the same botanical 
genus or species may be 
protected with both plant 
breeders’ rights and a patent. 
  
 Following the expansion of the form of plant breeders’ rights granted according 
to the UPOV model, certain individuals and groups have increasingly voiced 
opposition to the idea that plants should be conceived as intellectual property in any 
form. Critics have responded to the adhesion of an increasing number of territories – 
including developing and least developed countries – to the UPOV Convention by 
declaring its provisions to be inappropriate for the forms of agriculture typically 
practiced outside of wealthy, industrialised nations.63 The 1991 version of the UPOV 
Convention has been especially derided as potentially limiting small-scale farmers’ 
practices of seed saving and exchange in customary farmer-to-farmer seed networks, 
which could possibly operate to curtail access to protected seeds and jeopardise 
farmers’ right to food.64 Governments of developing countries that have considered 
joining UPOV as a means to implement a sui generis system of intellectual property 
for plants have in some cases been met with fierce opposition from civil society 
actors.65 Based on concerns about the need to balance the rights of plant breeders 
                                            
63 See, e.g., GRAIN. (1998). Ten Reasons Not to Join UPOV. Global Trade and Biodiversity in 
Conflict, Issue 2, No. 2. 
64 Owning Seeds, Accessing Food: A Human Rights Impact Assessment of Plant Variety Protection. 
Factsheet published by Berne Declaration, Bread for the World – Protestant Development Service, 
Community Technology Development Trust (CTDT), Development Fund – Norway, Misereor, Searice, 
Third World Network. (January 2015).   
65 Such was the case with the “No to UPOV” campaign organised in Nepal beginning in 2003. Winge, 
T., Adhikari, K., & Andersen, R. (2013). Advocacy for Farmers’ Rights in Nepal. In R. Andersen & T. 
Winge (eds.) Realising Farmers’ Rights to Crop Genetic Resources: Success Stories and Best 
Practices. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.  
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with those of other national stakeholders, several proposals for sui generis alternatives 
to the UPOV model for plant breeders’ rights have been launched.66  
 In fact, non-UPOV sui generis intellectual property laws for plants – typically 
conceived under the rubric of “plant variety protection” – have already been 
successfully implemented in several countries, such as India, Malaysia, and 
Thailand.67 Typically, these laws are designed around the general aim of balancing 
the interests of multiple stakeholders in the national scientific, industrial, and 
agricultural domains. Sui generis plant variety protection laws have sought to realise 
this goal by generally following the UPOV model to grant protection to new, distinct, 
uniform, and stable varieties, while also recognising other types of protection. These 
have included mechanisms to safeguard farmers’ interests as the custodians and 
developers of native and local plant varieties, and protections for customary 
agricultural practices as means to conserve national agrobiodiversity.  
 Prominent examples of non-UPOV countries that have enacted national level 
sui generis intellectual property laws for plants include India, which ratified its 
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act in 2001,68 as well as Thailand69 
and Malaysia.70 In these territories, intellectual property is available for different 
categories of plants, which correspond to distinct stakeholders. For instance, the Thai 
Plant Varieties Protection Act (1999) recognises intellectual property for new varieties; 
local domestic varieties; general domestic varieties; and wild varieties, while also 
establishing a fund to support the conservation, research, and development of plant 
varieties in local communities. These real policy initiatives form the basis of one of the 
most prominent proposals for sui generis alternatives to UPOV, which was authored 
by Carlos Correa.71  
                                            
66 See, e.g., Correa supra note 8; Ravishankar, A. & Archak, S. (1999). Searching for Policy Options: 
Is CoFaB a Suitable Alternative to UPOV? Economic and Political Weekly, 34(52), 3661-3667; De 
Jonge, B. & Munyi, P. (2016). A Differentiated Approach to Plant Variety Protection in Africa. The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property, 19(1-2), 28-52. 
67 See, e.g., Kanniah, R. (2005). Plant Variety Protection in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines 
and Thailand. The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 8(3), 283-310; Lertdhamtewe, P. (2013). 
Plant Variety Protection in Thailand: The Need for a New Coherent Framework. Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law & Practice, 8(1), 33-42; Trustum-Behan, E., & Lawson, C. (2016). The Protection of 
Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act 2001 (In) and New Plant Varieties, Extant Varieties and 
Farmers’ Varieties: A New Form of Property? Australian Intellectual Property Journal, 27(2), 73-87. 
68 The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 of India (PPVFR Act). 
69 Plant Varieties Protection Act of Thailand, B.E. 2542 (1999). 
70 Protection of New Plant Varieties Act of Malaysia, Act 634 (2004).  
71 Correa, supra note 8. 
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 The model that Correa proposes could provide a useful template for lawmakers 
in the first subcategory of legally bound countries listed in Table 1 above. This grouping 
includes World Trade Organization Member States that have not yet implemented an 
intellectual property law for plants in accordance with the TRIPS Article 27.3(b) 
obligation. However, the Correa proposal – like other, earlier models for sui generis 
systems of intellectual property for plants – fails to address the fact that many World 
Trade Organization Member States are also bound by international obligations beyond 
the TRIPS Agreement. While the idea of implementing a truly unique, sui generis law 
to regulate plants as intellectual property may be feasible in legally unbound countries 
and in territories that are only bound to TRIPS, many countries are also obligated to 
uphold various overlapping bilateral, regional, and multilateral commitments. For 
instance, numerous national governments, ranging geographically from Latin America 
to Eastern Europe to Africa, have already independently joined UPOV.  
 For such nations, the relevant exercise is not to understand the nature of the 
formal policy space that exists under the TRIPS Agreement for the purposes of 
implementing sui generis legislation for the protection of plants as intellectual property. 
Instead, the pertinent task is to identify how the UPOV Convention may be customised 
to implement plant breeders’ rights while also appropriately taking into account the 
nuances of the national agricultural sector in a given country. The form that such a 
framework would take also depends on whether a country is bound to the 1978 version 
of the UPOV Convention – as is the case in many Latin American States – or UPOV 
1991 – as are, for example, the members of the African Intellectual Property 
Organisation (OAPI). However, it is also notable that countries may no longer join 
UPOV 1978,72 and as such, the 1991 version of the Convention has become the only 
relevant framework for countries that are considering accession to the Union in the 
future.  
 While many developing countries have independently adhered to UPOV, others 
have been required to ratify the Convention as the result of participation in 
intergovernmental organisations. Such is the case in the Andean Community, a 
regional body “voluntarily united with the objective of achieving integral, more 
                                            
72 In April 1999, the 1978 UPOV Convention officially ceased to accept new members. Deere, C. 
(2009). The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual 
Property Reform in Developing Countries. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 109. 
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balanced, and autonomous development”73 that is comprised of Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru. In 1993, the Andean Community enacted its Decision No. 345, 
which establishes a common regime for the protection of plant breeder’s rights.74 
Decision No. 345 amalgamates provisions from the 1978 and 1991 versions of the 
UPOV Convention. This example illustrates that even prior to the entry into force of 
the TRIPS Agreement, in certain territories the amount of formal policy space available 
for the making of domestic intellectual property laws for plants had already been 
reduced.  
 In the years since the TRIPS Agreement entered into force, many countries 
have executed bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements, whose provisions 
frequently include minimum criteria for national intellectual property laws to which 
signatories must adhere. Opponents have labelled these free trade agreements 
“TRIPS plus” regimes, because wealthy States have often required that developing 
countries implement intellectual property minimum standards that exceed those found 
in TRIPS, in exchange for enhanced market access.75 One common provision that 
many free trade agreements contain is the condition that parties join the UPOV 
Convention, which either implicitly or explicitly means compliance with UPOV 1991. 
For such countries, identification of the formal policy space available for the making of 
national intellectual property laws for plants depends not on an assessment of the 
formal policy space available in the TRIPS Agreement, but rather on understanding 
the extent to which experimentation is possible in the context of the need to comply 
with the UPOV Convention.  
 
1.3. Free Trade Agreements: The International Diffusion of Systems for Plant 
Breeders’ Rights  
 In some world regions, countries have enjoyed relatively broad latitude to shape 
their intellectual property laws for plants according to local needs. As of 2018, 
countries such as India, Thailand, Malaysia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka were not bound to 
                                            
73 Comunidad Andina. (2017) “Qué es la CAN?” Retrieved from 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/Seccion.aspx?id=189&tipo=QU&title=somos-comunidad-andina. 
74 Comunidad Andina. (1993) Decisión No. 345 sobre el Régimen Común de Protección a los 
Derechos de los Obtentores de Variedades Vegetales.  
75 Helfer, L. R. (2009). Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System. Perspectives 
on Politics, 7(1), 39-44. 
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the UPOV Convention, and they had also avoided entering into “TRIPS plus” free trade 
agreements. In these five countries, non-UPOV sui generis systems for the 
governance of plants as intellectual property had either already been implemented or 
were under consideration by the respective national legislatures.76 In contrast, many 
countries in the Latin American region were either already UPOV members or had 
signed free trade agreements with territories such as the United States, the European 
Union, or others. In most instances, the trade treaties entered into between wealthy 
countries and Latin American States contained terms that required adherence to 
UPOV 1991. These provisions provoked significant controversy.  
 For instance, protests erupted over the requirement that Chile implement a 
plant breeders’ rights law that would be compliant with UPOV 1991, which was 
included in a free trade agreement that the country executed with the United States in 
2004.77 Efforts to enact a national intellectual property law for plants began in Chile 
with the independent development and codification of the Regulation of the Rights of 
Breeders of New Plant Varieties Law in 1994.78 This framework was essentially 
modelled on the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention, and Chile formally adhered to 
UPOV 1978 in 1996.79 Subsequently, the country began to explore the possibility of 
negotiating trade treaties with relatively wealthier countries in the early 2000s. First, 
Chile and the European Union (“EU”) signed an agreement that entered into force in 
2003.80 This treaty granted Chile a measure of flexibility surrounding the development 
of national plant breeders’ rights legislation, requiring only that the country adhere to 
either UPOV 1978 or UPOV 1991.81  
 The accommodations under the EU-Chile free trade agreement were short-
lived, as another treaty, this time with the United States, was signed and entered into 
force in 2004.82 The United States-Chile agreement required the parties to “give effect 
                                            
76 Adhikari and Jefferson, supra note 31. 
77 Jefferson, D. J. (2014). Development, Farmers’ Rights, and the Ley Monsanto: The Struggle Over 
the Ratification of UPOV 91 in Chile. IDEA – The Intellectual Property Law Review, 55(1), 31-104. 
78 Ley No. 19.342 (17 de octubre de 1994) Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, available in 
English at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=807.  
79 UPOV Membership, supra note 27. 
80 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part. November 18, 2002. 2002 O.J. (L352)3, 
retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=879.  
81 Id. at Art. 170(a)(v). 
82 United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (January 1, 2004), retrieved from 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta.  
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to” UPOV 1991 prior to 1 January 2009.83 A similar agreement that Chile executed 
with Japan in March 2007 mirrored these terms, requiring adherence to UPOV 1991 
by 1 January 2009.84 A third free trade agreement, which was implemented between 
Chile and Australia and which entered into force in March 2009, required accession to 
UPOV 1991 by the same date as the other treaties: 1 January 2009.85 Finally, in March 
2018, Chile signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, a multilateral trade agreement between eleven States with borders on the 
Pacific Ocean. This Partnership states that each party will accede to UPOV 1991 by 
the date on which the agreement becomes binding, which was set to occur sixty days 
after ratification by fifty per cent of the signatories.86 
Notwithstanding these numerous overlapping obligations, the process of 
implementing a UPOV 1991 compliant plant breeders’ rights law in Chile has unfolded 
in a complicated and contentious manner. In response to Chile’s non-compliance with 
its obligations under the various trade agreements discussed above, in March 2009 
President Michelle Bachelet – then in her first term – introduced legislation in the 
national Congress whose purpose was to implement UPOV 1991.87 Eventually the 
legislature approved the text of UPOV 1991 under the administration of President 
Sebastián Piñera in May 2013,88 but the implementing regulations were never 
developed and therefore Piñera did not sign them before his term ended.  
In an ironic twist, President Bachelet – this time in her second term – withdrew 
the draft regulations from consideration by the Congress, for the stated purpose of 
analysing the impact of the proposed regime on Chilean agricultural communities, and 
                                            
83 Id. at Art. 17.1.3(a). 
84 Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Chile for a Strategic Economic Partnership, March 
27, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file_id=225073. 
Chapter 13, Article 162. 
85 Australia-Chile Free Trade Agreement, March 6, 2009. Retrieved from 
dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/aclfta/Documents/Australia-Chile-Free-Trade-Agreement.pdf. Article 
17.4(1)(c). 
86 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, incorporating the 
provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), February 4, 2016. Article 18.7(2)(d).  
87 Message of the President of the Republic to Initiate a Project in Accordance with the Approval of 
the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants of December 2, 1961, 
Revised in Geneva through the Act of March 19, 1991 (Message No. 1435-356). 
88 Senate of Chile, Bulletin 6355-01 (July 7, 2013), retrieved from http://www.senado.cl/proyecto-que-
regula-obtenciones-vegetales-surgen-dudas-en-materia-de-derechos-de-pequenos-
agricultores/prontus_senado/2013-07-30/121930.html.  
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on Chilean native seeds.89 To further complicate matters, Piñera was again elected to 
the presidency in 2017 after Bachelet’s second term ended. As of 2018, the regulatory 
framework that would implement the new Chilean plant breeders’ rights law was 
ostensibly still being reviewed, but no clarity had been provided as to how long the 
process might take. The delay provoked rebukes by the United States based on non-
compliance with the trade agreement between that country and Chile,90 while Chilean 
civil society organisations continued to condemn the implementation of a UPOV 1991 
based law.91  
A similar situation unfolded in Colombia surrounding the making of a revised 
national intellectual property law for plants. In 2006, Colombian authorities entered 
into a free trade agreement with the United States that required adherence to the 1991 
version of the UPOV Convention.92 Domestic legislation to institute a UPOV 1991 
compliant plant breeders’ rights regime was introduced in the national Congress and 
passed in 2012.93 However, before the new framework could be implemented, the 
Colombian Constitutional Court struck down the law as unconstitutional.94 The court 
held that the legislation had violated the fundamental right of indigenous and Afro-
Colombian communities to be previously consulted about legislative or administrative 
measures that would affect them directly, which the judges reasoned to include the 
impact of a UPOV 1991 based law on customary seed management practices, as well 
as on the “natural development of local biodiversity.”95  
Subsequently, the Colombian government initiated a process to revise the law 
according to the mandates of the Constitutional Court. As of 2018, it was still unclear 
                                            
89 See Double Citizen Triumph: Monsanto Law and UPOV 91 Convention Withdrawn, El Ciudadano 
(March 18, 2014), retrieved from http://www.elciudadano.cl/2014/03/18/103121/doble-triunfo-
ciudadano-ley-monsanto-y-convenio-upov-91-en-retirada-2.  
90 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service GAIN Report 
(November 2016) Agricultural Biotechnology Situation in Chile 2016. GAIN Report Number: CI1631. 
91 E.g., Sepúlveda, L. (1 de junio de 2016) La Ley Monsanto y el Acuerdo de las Transnacionales. El 
Clarin, retrieved from http://www.elclarin.cl/web/opinion/politica/19191-la-ley-monsanto-y-el-acuerdo-
de-las-transnacionales-el-tpp.html.  
92 Colombia FTA Final Text, Chapter 16, Art. 16.1(3)(c), Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Executive Office of the President, retrieved from http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text.  
93 Ley No. 1518, Congreso de la República de Colombia (13 de abril de 2012), retrieved from 
http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Normativa/Leyes/Documents/ley151813042012.pdf.  
94 Comunicado No. 50, Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (5-6 de diciembre de 2012), 
retrieved from 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/comunicados/No.%2050%20comunicado%2005%20y%2006%
20de%20diciembre%20de%202012.php.  
95 Id. 
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how the situation would be resolved. Consultations with indigenous and Afro-
Colombian groups were supposed to be held in 2017, but by late 2018, no reports on 
such dialogues had been made public. As with Chile, the United States government 
took notice of Colombia’s non-compliance with its free trade obligations.96 However, it 
was unclear whether external pressure would incite Colombian lawmakers to quickly 
pass a revised version of the plant breeders’ rights law that would conform to the 
standards of UPOV 1991. The United States included Colombia in its Special 301 
watchlist for several years due to non-compliance with UPOV 1991,97 and the 
Colombian government had not responded as of 2018.    
Another Andean country, Peru, has also experienced the impact of external 
forces on the making of a national law for the governance of plants as intellectual 
property. In April 2006, the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement was 
signed, and the Peruvian Congress approved the treaty in June 2006.98 Similar to the 
various trade agreements that the United States has executed with other countries in 
the region, the treaty with Peru required adherence to UPOV 1991 prior to 1 January 
2008.99 Peru did not meet this deadline. However, unlike its neighbours to the north 
and south, Peru did approve a UPOV 1991 compliant plant breeders’ rights framework 
in November 2011.100 Although the law was ultimately passed, news over the 
forthcoming implementation of a UPOV 1991-based regime sparked a lively national 
debate, in which numerous civil society organisations mobilised rural populations to 
protest against the legislation.101 Following Peru’s formal accession to UPOV 1991 in 
                                            
96 United States Department of State (2018) “Colombia: 2018 Investment Climate Statements Report,” 
retrieved from 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2018&dlid=28173
9. Office of the United States Trade Representative. 2018 Special 301 Report, retrieved from 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018%20Special%20301.pdf.  
97 Office of the United States Trade Representative. 2018 Special 301 Report, retrieved from 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special%20301%20Report%20FINAL.PDF; Office of 
the United States Trade Representative. 2014 Special 301 Report, retrieved from 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%202014%20Special%20301%20Report%20to%20Congress
%20FINAL.pdf;    
98 Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y Turismo del Perú. “Acuerdos Comerciales del Perú: TLC Perú-
EEUU.” Retrieved from 
http://www.acuerdoscomerciales.gob.pe/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog
&id=55&Itemid=78.   
99 Acuerdo de Promoción Comercial Perú-EE.UU., Art. 16.1(3)(c). 
100 Supreme Decree No. 035-2011-PCM. Approving the Regulations for the Protection of the Rights of 
Breeders of New Plant Varieties. Retrieved from 
http://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/text.jsp?file_id=244355.  
101 The Berne Declaration. (2015). Owning Seeds, Accessing Food. A Human Rights Impact 
Assessment of UPOV 1991 Based on Case Studies in Kenya, Peru and the Philippines. Retrieved 
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August 2011, controversy persisted over the new plant breeders’ rights law, with 
concerns centring on the potential impact that the regime could have on small-scale 
farmers, indigenous communities, and other marginalised groups.102 
As enacted, the Peruvian legislation contains an exception to plant breeders’ 
rights for individuals who save and sow protected seeds for personal use, within 
“reasonable limits” and so long as the “legitimate interests” of the breeder are 
safeguarded.103 This represents the utilisation of a formal policy space within the 
scope of UPOV 1991 Article 15.2, by recognising a UPOV compliant version of the 
farmer’s privilege in domestic law.104 As of 2018, the prospective impact of the new 
Peruvian plant breeders’ rights framework was difficult to assess, given that the it had 
not yet been fully implemented. However, one recent study that conducted an ex ante 
impact assessment of the Peruvian regime concluded that the new law could 
adversely affect small-scale farmers’ access to seeds through customary farmer-to-
farmer exchange networks.105 The study’s authors further argued that the law could 
undermine cultural rights, minority rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, women’s rights, 
as well as biodiversity and the right to food.106   
In Ecuador, the story is consonant with the histories of neighbouring countries 
in the Andean region. Beginning in 2004 Ecuador – along with Peru and Colombia – 
commenced negotiations with the United States of America (“US”) surrounding the 
possibility of executing a US-Andean regional free trade agreement.107 However, 
following two years and fifteen rounds of talks, the Ecuadorian authorities decided to 
pull out of negotiations towards the potential treaty. Among the reasons cited for the 
impasse were concerns over the trade of agricultural goods and the protection of 
intellectual property, especially pertaining to access to medicines and agrochemical 
products.108  
                                            
from https://www.publiceye.ch/fileadmin/files/documents/Saatgut/2014_07_10_Owning_Seed_-
_Accessing_Food_report_def.pdf. 
102 Id. 
103 Supreme Decree No. 035-2011-PCM, supra note 100 at Art. 16. 
104 Note that the Peruvian framework prohibits the exchange and sale of protected seeds by farmers 
while the use of harvested products (i.e., farm-saved seeds) is allowed so long as the seeds have 
been obtained on the farmers’ own holdings and are used on their own holdings. Id. 
105 The Berne Declaration, supra note 101. 
106 Id. 
107 The Office of the United States Trade Representative. “Peru and Ecuador to Join with Colombia in 
May 18-19 Launch of FTA Negotiations with the United States.” (3 May 2004). 
108 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). “TLC Ecuador – EEUU: 
negociación se complica por Ley de Hidrocarburos.” Puentes (11 April 2006).  
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While the participation of Ecuador in the US-Andean agreement stagnated, 
beginning in 2007 the country entered into a dialogue with the European Union 
surrounding a potential trade treaty.109 For years, disagreements over intellectual 
property beset the negotiations between Ecuador and the European Union. The fight 
reached a climax in January 2014, when Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa 
announced that negotiations would be suspended.110 However, talks restarted just two 
months later in March 2014, with Ecuador hopeful that the European Union would not 
cross the “red lines” the country’s leaders had traced around certain intellectual 
property concerns.111 
The tensions that the possible trade agreement provoked were felt by officials 
throughout Ecuadorian government, including in administrative agencies far removed 
from the treaty negotiations. Thus, the bureaucrats who had been charged with 
comprehensively revising the national system for intellectual property used drafting 
tactics to put pressure on the European Union to accede to Ecuador’s demands. 
According to officials involved with the making of the new intellectual property law, the 
strategy was to include strong or “radical” provisions – such as shortening the period 
of copyright protection or expanding the grounds for granting compulsory licenses for 
patented goods – so that Ecuadorian negotiators would enjoy greater bargaining 
leverage during talks with European Union representatives.112    
This approach saw some success. In early 2016, when the fate of both the 
European Union-Ecuador free trade agreement and the prospective new Ecuadorian 
intellectual property law were uncertain, officials leading the European Union 
Delegation in Ecuador confided that they were concerned over both the general tone 
as well as certain specific provisions of early drafts of the legislation.113 Ecuadorian 
media commentators fed this apprehension, arguing that Europe grants “a special 
importance [to] its intellectual property to gain a dominant position in technology and 
                                            
109 Coral, M. L. (2013). Ecuador-Unión Europea: Lógicas de Una Negociación Inconclusa. Friedrich, 
Ebert, Stiftung Foundation, retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/quito/10376.pdf.  
110 Rafael Correa: Ecuador no Firmará un Tratado de Libre Comercio con la Unión Europea, LibreRed 
(22 January 2014). Retrieved from http://www.librered.net/?p=31786.  
111 Ecuador y la UE Retoman Negociación con Expectativas en Propiedad Intelectual, Contratación 
Pública y Aranceles, Agencia Pública de Noticias del Ecuador y Suramérica (24 March 2014), 
retrieved from http://www.andes.info.ec/es/noticias/ecuador-ue-retoman-negociacion-expectativas-
propiedad-intelectual-contratacion-publica.  
112 Director level official from the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute (IEPI). (16 April 2016). 
Personal interview. 
113 Official with the European Union Delegation in Ecuador. (24 March 2016). Personal interview. 
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knowledge,” a perspective they deemed to be “absolutely incompatible” with the 
contemporary strategy in Ecuador which aspired to “democratise knowledge.”114  
Notwithstanding the fraught nature of the negotiation process, Ecuador and the 
European Union ultimately signed their free trade agreement in November 2016. 
Technically, the nature of the treaty was such that Ecuador agreed to adhere to an 
existing trade treaty that the European Union had previously finalised with Colombia 
and Peru.115 As with most of the free trade agreements executed between Latin 
American countries and relatively wealthier nations from other regions, the European 
Union-Ecuador agreement contains language related to adherence to the UPOV 
Convention. The plant breeders’ rights section of this agreement states that “[t]he 
Parties shall cooperate to promote and ensure the protection of plant varieties based 
on [the UPOV Convention], as revised on 19 March 1991.”116 However, this provision 
includes a footnote clarifying that “[a]t the moment of signature of this Agreement, 
[UPOV 1978] applies for Ecuador.”117  
The inclusion of this language is indicative of the fact that, according to 
Ecuadorian officials familiar with the negotiations, the language of the agreement was 
non-negotiable. Thus, the only area in which Ecuadorian negotiators were able to 
influence the final form that the text assumed was in the footnotes.118 In comparison 
to attempts to persuade other countries in the Andean region to adhere to UPOV 1991 
– as illustrated in the cases of Chile, Peru, and Colombia – the footnote in the 
European Union-Ecuador agreement appears to be a small but significant victory for 
the Ecuadorian negotiators. Few other Latin American countries have successfully 
secured an exception to the obligation to join UPOV 1991 that trade treaties regularly 
contain.  
Nevertheless, the ambiguity in the language about which version of the UPOV 
Convention is relevant for Ecuador means that it is unclear if, and if so, when the 
                                            
114 Serrano, A. (20 January 2014). “Por Qué Ecuador No Debe Firmar Un Acuerdo Comercial Con la 
UE?” Telesur. Retrieved from http://www.telesurtv.net/articulos/2014/01/20/por-que-ecuador-no-debe-
firmar-un-acuerdo-comercial-con-la-ue-5311.html.  
115 Ministerio de Comercio Exterior del Ecuador (n/d) “Acuerdo Comercial Ecuador – Unión Europea.” 
Retrieved from http://www.comercioexterior.gob.ec/acuerdo-comercial-ecuador-union-europea/.  
116 Trade Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and 
Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part. Art. 232.  
117 Id. at FN 72b. 
118 Director level official from the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute (IEPI). (16 April 2016). 
Personal interview. Contractor with IEPI involved with the making of the new intellectual property law 
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country might be required to revise its new intellectual property law for plants. 
Depending on how the free trade agreement with the European Union is interpreted 
and enforced, Ecuador might be required to reform its plant breeders’ rights legislation 
to ensure compliance with UPOV 1991. If this were to occur, certain provisions of the 
country’s current, UPOV 1978-based system would likely need to be revised. For 
instance, the exceptions to plant breeder’s rights protection119 and the duration of 
exclusivity granted to protected varieties120 specified in the extant framework would 
need to comply with Article 15(2) and Article 19(2) of UPOV 1991, respectively. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis will discuss these provisions in detail, focusing particularly on 
their compliance with the UPOV Convention.  
 The various overlapping international obligations to which Ecuador is subject 
in relation to the governance of plants as intellectual property are rendered visible in 
Figure 4. As can be seen in this diagram, the TRIPS Agreement establishes the 
general obligation to provide some form of intellectual property for plants. Meanwhile, 
Ecuador is also legally bound to recognise a form of plant breeders’ rights consonant 
with the UPOV Convention, based on its participation in both the Andean Community 
and the European Union-Ecuador free trade agreement. Together, these 
commitments circumscribe the formal policy space available to Ecuador to experiment 
with innovative approaches to intellectual property for plants.  
                                            
119 See, id. at Art. 15. 
120 See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (revised March 19, 
1991), Art. 19. 
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Figure 4: International Agreements that Affect Lawmaking in Ecuador 
 
 
The free trade agreements between the United States and the European Union 
on the one hand, and countries from the Andean region on the other, represent overt 
external forces that affect the form that national intellectual property legislation for 
plants can assume. Furthermore, negotiations towards trade agreements are often 
infused with covert influences, such as behind-the-scenes pressures that each party 
exerts as bargaining tactics. In some instances, non-legal forces do not operate in a 
clandestine manner, such that the existence of external pressure is obvious. This is 
the case in the Special 301 report that the United States publishes annually as a 
means to officially discredit its trading partners’ practices in relation to the protection 
of intellectual property.    
Dynamics that are internal to the negotiating parties’ respective governments 
also contribute to the obligations that free trade agreements establish. For instance, 
the effectiveness of local actors at influencing the legislative process can result in the 
adoption of a particular model of intellectual property for plants at the national level, 
which in turn can influence that country’s foreign policy. In countries whose agricultural 
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commercial breeders, lobbyists have been able to convince their political 
representatives that a system of plant breeders’ rights based on the UPOV Convention 
TRIPS
Requires intellectual property 
protection for new plant varieties.
CAN
Based on UPOV 1978 + 
some provisions from 
UPOV 1991
EU FTA
Requirement to ratify 
UPOV 1991 in the 
future?
UPOV 78
Establishes minimum standards 
for breeders' rights
  
  
   
60 
 
is in the national interest. In other countries, civil society actors have spearheaded 
popular mobilisations that have convinced their governments to officially reject the 
UPOV model.121  
Despite the nuances that differentiate free trade agreement negotiations from 
one case to the next, the basic story in Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador is 
remarkably similar. In fact, this narrative has become ubiquitous throughout the 
developed world. The United States has executed trade treaties with multiple other 
countries in Latin America,122 and with developing countries in other world regions.123 
Essentially all of these agreements have required adhesion to UPOV 1991.124 
However, as of 2018, several parties to the trade agreements with the United States 
had failed to meet the specified timeline to comply with UPOV 1991, a fact that 
illustrates the contentious nature of this framework.125  
The European Union has also signed numerous trade related treaties with 
developing countries. For instance, in October 2008 the European Union executed an 
Economic Partnership Agreement with a group of countries in the Caribbean region.126 
The “CARIFORUM” States that are party to this treaty are mostly small island nations 
and all are classified as developing countries.127 The European Union-CARIFORUM 
Agreement does not explicitly mandate ratification of or accession to the 1991 version 
of the UPOV Convention. However, the treaty does require that all parties “provide for 
the protection of plant varieties in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement” and that 
they “shall consider acceding to…UPOV (Act of 1991).”128  
                                            
121 Such was the case in Nepal, a country in which a “No to UPOV” campaign has been credited with 
the rejection of the UPOV Convention as a model for the national intellectual property law for plants. 
Winge, Adhikari, & Andersen, supra note 65.    
122 These countries include Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. 
123 These countries include Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. 
124 However, it should be noted that the text of the U.S.-Morocco FTA states that “[e]ach Party shall 
ratify or accede to…the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (1991),” 
leaving undefined the date by which such accession should occur. United States – Morocco Free 
Trade Agreement. Article 15.1(2)(e).  
125 These countries include El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Bahrain.  
126 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part. Official Journal of the European 
Union. (30 October 2008) L 289/I/3. 
127 The CARIFORUM States party to the agreement are: Antigua and Barbuda; the Bahamas; 
Barbados; Belize; Dominica; the Dominican Republic; Grenada; Guyana; Haiti; Jamaica; St. Kitts and 
Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; and Trinidad and Tobago. Id.  
128 Id. at Art. 149(2). 
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Thus, the European Union-CARIFORUM Agreement contains a measure of 
flexibility for parties to develop non-UPOV sui generis regimes that would satisfy the 
obligation under TRIPS to provide a form of intellectual property protection for plants. 
However, a similar formal policy space is not available in the free trade agreements 
that the European Union has signed with many other developing countries. Over the 
past two decades, the European Union has executed various kinds of commercial 
treaties with Albania,129 Algeria,130 Armenia,131 Azerbaijan,132 Bangladesh,133 Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,134 Egypt,135 Iraq,136 Jordan,137 Kosovo,138 Lebanon,139 
Macedonia,140 Moldova,141 Montenegro,142 and Serbia.143 All of these instruments 
require that the parties comply with UPOV 1991, typically within three to five years 
after the date on which the agreement enters into force.  
While the United States and the European Union are the territories that have in 
recent history been the greatest protagonists of the execution of bilateral and regional 
free trade agreements with developing countries, other wealthy nations have followed 
suit. For instance, Australia finalised a trade agreement with Chile in 2009 that 
required accession to UPOV 1991,144 and Australian delegates are currently involved 
in negotiations with Peru and Indonesia towards the execution of similar treaties. 
                                            
129 Note that the EU-Albania agreement mandates adherence to either UPOV 1978 or UPOV 1991 by 
31 December 2010. Albania became a member of UPOV 1991 on 15 October 2005. EU-Albania Free 
Trade Agreement (22 May 2006), Annex V, Art. 2(2)(d). 
130 EU-Algeria Association Agreement (1 September 2005), Annex 6, Art. 3. 
131 EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (9 September 1999), Art. 42(2). 
132 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (17 September 1999), Art. 42(2). 
133 EU-Bangladesh Cooperation Agreement (27 April 2001), Art. 4(5)(c).  
134 EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Agreement (1 June 2015), Annex VII, 
Art. 1.  
135 EU-Egypt Association Agreement (1 June 2004), Art. 37. 
136 EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (11 May 2012), Art. 60(2). 
137 EU-Jordan Association Agreement (1 May 2002), Art. 56. 
138 EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement (1 April 2016), Art. 77(3). 
139 Note that the EU-Lebanon agreement mandates adherence to either UPOV 1978 or UPOV 1991 
by 1 March 2008. However, as of 2017 Lebanon was still not a UPOV member, and as a practical 
matter the option to join UPOV 1978 in the future does not exist, as UPOV now only allows for 
accession to the 1991 version of the Convention. EU-Lebanon Free Trade Agreement (1 March 
2003), Annex V, Art. 2(2). 
140 EU-Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Agreement (1 April 
2004), Art. 71(3). 
141 Note that the EU-Moldova agreement mandates “protection of plant varieties rights, in accordance 
with the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants including the optional 
exception to the breeder’s right as referred to in Article 15(2) of the said Convention.” While this does 
not explicitly mention UPOV 1991, the reference to Article 15(2) corresponds to the 1991 and not the 
1978 version of the Convention. EU-Moldova Association Agreement (1 July 2016), Art. 317. 
142 EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Agreement (29 April 2010), Art. 75(4). 
143 EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Agreement (1 September 2013), Art. 75(4). 
144 Australia-Chile Free Trade Agreement (6 March 2009), Art. 17.4(1)(c).  
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Likewise, Japan has free trade agreements in place with Chile,145 Indonesia,146 and 
Vietnam147 that mandate the protection of plant varieties through frameworks that 
comply with UPOV 1991.  
A world map displaying the various bilateral and regional trade agreements that 
the United States has executed with other territories, especially developing countries, 
is available in Figure 5. A similar map showing the agreements finalised between the 
European Union and mostly developing countries appears in Figure 6. Finally, two 
other relevant free trade agreements that contain terms requiring adhesion to the 
UPOV Convention are displayed in Figure 7. It is notable that one of the regional 
agreements in this latter figure has not yet been signed, namely the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership. While this agreement was still under 
negotiation in 2018, its potential impact is significant, given that it would bind nearly 
every country in Asia to the 1991 version of the UPOV Convention.148  
 
Figure 5: United States Free Trade Agreements149 
 
                                            
145 Japan-Chile Economic Partnership Agreement (March 2007), Art. 162. 
146 Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement (August 2007), Art. 116. 
147 Japan-Viet Nam Economic Partnership Agreement (December 2008), Art. 90. 
148 Single Working Document on the Intellectual Property Chapter Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) Free Trade Agreement. (15 October 2015). Article 1.7(2)(j). 
149 Note that the United States has also executed free trade agreements that contain terms requiring 
adhesion to the UPOV Convention with Bahrain, Singapore, and Trinidad and Tobago. These 
countries are not highlighted in the Figure 5 map due to their small size.  
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Figure 6: European Free Trade Agreements150 
 
Figure 7: Other Free Trade Agreements151 
 
                                            
150 For the purposes of the map in Figure 6, “Europe” is considered to mean both the European Union 
(EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The agreements that these two blocs have 
with developing countries were consolidated and are visible in light green. Note that the EU and the 
EFTA have also executed free trade agreements that contain terms requiring adhesion to the UPOV 
Convention with Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Singapore, St 
Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. These countries 
are not highlighted in the Figure 6 map due to their small size. 
151 Note that the Brunei and Singapore are also parties to both the RCEP and the CPTPP. However, 
these countries are not highlighted in the Figure 7 map due to their small size. 
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Much of the criticism surrounding the 1991 version of the UPOV Convention 
has centred on the tension between granting proprietary rights to the creators of new 
plants and protecting other national interests such as customary agricultural practices 
and agrobiodiversity. While such conflicts frequently manifest in protests and debates 
over the execution of free trade agreements that regularly occur in developing 
countries, their existence is not usually acknowledged in the text of the agreements 
themselves. One exception to this trend is embodied in the United States-Central 
American Free Trade Agreement. In a footnote to the provision that requires each 
party to ratify or accede to UPOV 1991, the essential debate is laid bare: 
“The Parties recognize that the UPOV Convention 1991 contains exceptions 
to the breeder’s right, including for acts done privately and for non-commercial 
purposes, such as private and non-commercial acts of farmers. Further, the 
Parties recognize that the UPOV Convention 1991 provides for restrictions to 
the exercise of a breeder’s right for reasons of public interest, provided that 
the Parties take all measures necessary to ensure that the breeder receives 
equitable remuneration. The Parties also understand that each Party may 
avail itself of these exceptions and restrictions. Finally, the Parties understand 
that there is no conflict between the UPOV Convention 1991 and a Party’s 
ability to protect and conserve its genetic resources.”152 
This language appears extraordinary against the backdrop of the typically stoic 
text found in free trade agreement provisions requiring adhesion to UPOV 1991. 
Furthermore, the footnote in the United States-Central American Free Trade 
Agreement evidences one of the principal arguments of this thesis: that countries may 
still experiment with the available formal policy space to design locally adapted 
intellectual property laws for plants, even when they are members of the UPOV 
Convention. However, considerable uncertainty surrounds the nature of this space and 
how it may be utilised to ensure that diverse national interests are effectively 
safeguarded.  
Concomitant with the expansion and global extension of laws granting 
intellectual property for plants, in recent decades numerous other international treaties 
related to agriculture and plant genetic resources have entered into force. Several 
important frameworks have set standards for the protection of, for example, customary 
                                            
152 U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), Article 15.1(5)(a), FN 1 (emphasis added). 
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agricultural practices, access and use of biological and genetic resources, 
agrobiodiversity conservation, and the rights of indigenous and traditional peoples. 
Relevant multilateral instruments include especially the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (“CBD,” 1993) and its Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (“Nagoya 
Protocol,” 2014), and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (“Plant Treaty,” 2004).  
Like the TRIPS Agreement and the UPOV Convention, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Plant Treaty also impose important 
international obligations to which many national governments are legally bound. Thus, 
for many countries it has become critical to understand how the requirements related 
to creating intellectual property laws for plants that are contained in the TRIPS 
Agreement – and in many cases, the UPOV Convention – may be reconciled with the 
commitments undertaken through membership in the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol, or 
the Plant Treaty. The final section of Chapters 2 and Chapter 5 will elaborate potential 
policy solutions to this quandary. However, it will first be necessary to explore the 
nature of the international obligations beyond the TRIPS Agreement and the UPOV 
Convention that relate to the regulation of plants as intellectual property.  
 
1.4. International Obligations beyond TRIPS and UPOV  
As the rationality of intellectual property was increasingly extended to plants 
beginning in the 1980s, efforts to counter the perceived effects of this phenomenon 
developed in parallel. One of the first coordinated international efforts in this space 
crystallised in the form of a 1983 resolution of the Food and Agricultural Organization 
of the United Nations to adopt an International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources. The objective of this initiative was to “ensure that plant genetic resources 
of economic and/or social interest, particularly for agriculture, will be explored, 
preserved, evaluated and made available for plant breeding and scientific 
purposes.”153 
                                            
153 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (1983). International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources. Resolution 8/83, Art. 1.  
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One of the most significant aspects of the International Undertaking was its 
recognition of the “universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources are the 
heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction.”154 The 
reaffirmation that plant genetic resources should be treated as common heritage may 
be understood as a coordinated, institutionalised response to the changes that 
occurred throughout the twentieth century surrounding the governance of these 
resources.155 As described above, new scientific technologies developed especially in 
the 1970s and 1980s began to enable firms to derive greater value from plant genetic 
resources, a situation that was further enhanced by the broad expansion of the logic 
of plant breeders’ rights and its associated policies and practices. At the time of its 
adoption, the International Undertaking was intended to act as a counterweight to this 
trend towards the privatisation of planting material. The resolution controversially 
declared that signatory governments must make plant genetic resources available 
“free of charge” for the purposes of scientific research, plant breeding, or genetic 
resource conservation.156     
In practice, the International Undertaking’s commitment to the common 
heritage approach to the governance of plant genetic resources proved difficult to 
implement. As soon as the initiative was adopted, eight industrialised countries 
officially lodged reservations to its contents.157 The disquiet that representatives of 
these governments expressed centred on how the terms of the International 
Undertaking related to the free availability of plant genetic resources might affect the 
proprietary rights of plant breeders.  
The discrepancy was clarified in 1989, at which point the Food and Agricultural 
Organization Conference adopted an Agreed Interpretation of the International 
Undertaking. The compromise that the Agreed Interpretation recognised was that plant 
genetic resources would remain the common heritage of humankind, but that “plant 
breeders’ rights as provided for under UPOV…are not incompatible with the 
                                            
154 Id.  
155 Raustiala, K. & Victor, D. G. (2004). The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources. 
International Organization, 58(2004), 277-309.  
156 International Undertaking, supra note 153 at Art. 5.  
157 These eight countries were Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Ten Kate, K. & Lasén Diaz, C. (1997). The 
Undertaking Revisited: A Commentary on the Revision of the International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Review of European Community & International 
Environmental Law, 6(3), 284-292, 285.  
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International Undertaking.”158 Thus, countries that adhered to the International 
Undertaking “may impose only such minimum restrictions on the free exchange” of 
plant genetic materials “as are necessary for it to conform to its national and 
international obligations.”159 This language effectively rendered the International 
Undertaking as subordinate to national-level intellectual property laws, as well as to 
the UPOV Convention. The Agreed Interpretation also explained that “the term ‘free 
access’ does not mean free of charge.”160     
The notion that plant genetic resources are the heritage of humankind and 
consequently should be available without restriction was further limited in 1991 when 
the Food and Agricultural Organization Conference again amended the International 
Undertaking. The new Annex 3 endorsed the idea that nations have sovereign rights 
over their plant genetic resources.161 This principle of national sovereignty over the 
plant genetic resources located within the borders of particular countries laid the 
foundation for one of the most significant multilateral treaties of the latter part of the 
twentieth century, namely the Convention on Biological Diversity, which entered into 
force in 1993. A diagram of the different approaches that international instruments 
have taken to the allocation of ownership rights over plant genetic resources is 
provided in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Approaches to Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources162 
Mechanism 
for Allocating 
Benefits 
Ownership Approach 
 Common 
Heritage 
Property rights 
 Sovereign 
(state-
controlled) 
Private/ 
Community 
Market-Based Customary 
System 
 TRIPS 
Agreement 
 
                                            
158 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (1989). International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources. Resolution 4/89, Annex 1, ¶1.  
159 Id. at ¶2. 
160 Id. at ¶5. 
161 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (1989). International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources. Resolution 3/91, Annex 3, ¶1. 
162 This table has been adapted from Raustiala & Victor, supra note 155 at 285. 
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UPOV 
Convention 
Regulated 1983 
International 
Undertaking 
 
Plant Treaty 
(for the 35 
staple food 
crops specified 
in the 
agreement) 
1991 
Amendment 
to 
International 
Undertaking 
 
CBD 
 
Plant Treaty 
(public 
domain, not 
on list of the 
35 crops) 
Plant Treaty 
(improved 
plants, not in 
public domain) 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity formally originated in 1988 when the 
United Nations Environment Programme convened an Ad Hoc Working Group to 
explore the possibility of creating a binding legal instrument that would elaborate terms 
related to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. In its final form, 
the CBD reaffirms and expands the principle articulated in Annex 3 of the International 
Undertaking, namely that States have sovereign rights over their own biological 
resources.163 Furthermore, this Convention recognises three essential objectives, 
which are: (1) the conservation of biological diversity; (2) the sustainable use of the 
components thereof; and (3) the equitable sharing of benefits arising from the 
utilisation of genetic resources.164  
This latter objective was intended to address one of the major criticisms that 
emerged in the 1980s in response to the expansion of intellectual property for plants. 
The critique is captured in a 1989 annex to the International Undertaking, which 
acknowledged that the majority of plant genetic resources used contemporarily for 
breeding purposes “come from developing countries, the contribution of whose 
farmers has not been sufficiently recognised or rewarded.”165 Furthermore, “farmers, 
especially those in developing countries, should benefit fully from the improved and 
increased use of the natural resources they have preserved.”166 Against this backdrop, 
                                            
163 Convention on Biological Diversity. (1992). Preamble.  
164 Id. at Article 1. 
165 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (1989). International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources. Resolution 5/89, Annex 2, ¶b. 
166 Id. at ¶c. 
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the Convention on Biological Diversity recognises that individual countries have the 
authority to set the conditions based upon which their genetic resources may be 
accessed. However, the CBD also stipulates that at a minimum these should include 
mutually agreed terms, prior informed consent, and the fair and equitable sharing of 
any benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources.167 
While the inclusion of access and benefit-sharing provisions in the Convention 
on Biological Diversity was considered a victory by advocates for the interests of plant 
genetic resource providers, by 2007 only 39 of the then 189 Contracting Parties had 
endeavoured to enact domestic legislation that would implement the CBD.168 In 
response to this low level of implementation, an alliance of “Like Minded Mega-Diverse 
Countries” formed a working group at the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in Johannesburg in 2002. During this summit, the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation was elaborated, the essential aim of which was to establish an 
“international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources.”169  
Following the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Johannesburg 
Plan of Implementation was considered and adapted every two years in the biannual 
meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
These events took place in Kuala Lumpur (2004), Curitiba (2006), and Bonn (2008), 
and after each conference statements were issued that invited Parties to the CBD and 
other relevant stakeholders to participate in the process of negotiation and elaboration 
of an international access and benefit sharing regime. Finally, in 2010 at its tenth 
meeting, the Conference of the Parties agreed to adopt the “Nagoya Protocol on 
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from their Utilization.”170  
The Nagoya Protocol requires that its Contracting Parties enact domestic laws 
to ensure that the prior informed consent or approval, as well as the involvement of 
local indigenous or traditional rural communities, is obtained for access to genetic 
resources where these groups have the established right to grant access to such 
                                            
167 Convention on Biological Diversity. (1992). Article 15. 
168 Buck, M. & Hamilton, C. (2011). The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 20(1), 47-61, 48. 
169 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Article 44(o). 
170 Convention on Biological Diversity. (2010). COP 10 Decision X/1. 
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resources.171 Pursuant to this framework, access agreements executed between 
providers and recipients of genetic resources must contain terms related to benefit 
sharing, including where proprietary rights are implicated surrounding the utilisation of 
the resources in question.172 The Nagoya Protocol also recognises the importance of 
the traditional knowledge that is often associated with the use of plant genetic 
resources, and thus the Protocol includes this knowledge within the ambit of the 
access and benefit sharing regime.173 
Although the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol 
together form an international legal basis for the recognition of the contributions of 
indigenous and local communities to genetic resource conservation and use, these 
regimes do not specifically address how farmers may access and use plant genetic 
resources. Beginning with the 1989 amendment to the International Undertaking, the 
United Nations formally recognised the contributions that farmers have made 
historically as stewards and developers of plant genetic resources. The International 
Undertaking therefore endorsed the concept of “farmers’ rights,” defined as a set of 
guarantees “arising from the past, present, and future contributions of farmers in 
conserving, improving, and making available plant genetic resources.”174  
In 1997 a Global Plan of Action for the Conservation and Sustainable Utilization 
of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture was endorsed at the FAO 
Conference. This framework aimed to confirm the needs and the individual and 
collective rights of farmers “to have non-discriminatory access to germplasm, 
information, technologies, financial resources and research and marketing systems 
necessary for them to continue to manage and improve genetic resources.”175 
Furthermore, the Global Plan of Action endeavoured to promote a system for the fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture, which would also include the use of traditional knowledge, 
                                            
171 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity. (2010) Article 6. 
172 Id.  
173 Id. at Article 12. 
174 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (1989). International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources. Resolution 5/89, Annex 2, ¶d. 
175 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (1996). Global Plan of Action for the 
Conservation and Sustainable Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and the 
Leipzig Declaration, Article 9.  
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innovations, and practices relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of these 
resources.  
These objectives were eventually codified in the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (“Plant Treaty”), which was adopted in 
2001 and entered into force in 2004. The fundamental aim of this regime is to promote 
the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use 
thereof.176 Furthermore, the Plant Treaty contains provisions that both recognise the 
contributions of farmers and aim to safeguard their interests. The regime thus 
obligates signatories to establish mechanisms through national legislation in their 
respective jurisdictions to guarantee “farmers’ rights” in three specific domains.  
These are (1) the protection of traditional knowledge related to plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture; (2) the guarantee of equitable participation in any 
benefits arising from the utilisation of these resources by third parties; and (3) the right 
to participate in national level decision making surrounding matters related to the 
conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture.177 The Plant Treaty also recognises the implicit right of farmers to save, 
use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seed and propagating material “subject to national 
law and as appropriate.”178 Thus, the conceptualisation of farmers’ rights in the Plant 
Treaty contains four essential elements.179 However, it is important to note that the 
“implicit right” of farmers to save, use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seed is 
expressly limited in the Plant Treaty, such that this guarantee may be subordinated to 
domestic regimes that regulate plants as intellectual property.   
This limitation reveals why the governance of plant genetic resources has 
frequently been characterised as a “struggle” between plant breeders’ rights and 
farmers’ rights.180 Proponents of the formalisation of the concept of farmers’ rights 
have argued that the expansion of the subject matter of intellectual property to cover 
plants – especially according to the UPOV model for plant breeders’ rights – hampers 
                                            
176 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. (2004) Article 1. 
177 Id. at Article 9. 
178 Id.  
179 Andersen, R. (2013). Crop Genetic Diversity and Farmers’ Rights. In R. Andersen & T. Winge 
(eds.). Realising Farmers’ Rights to Crop Genetic Resources: Success Stories and Best Practices. 
New York: Routledge. 
180 Borowiak, C. (2004). Farmers’ Rights: Intellectual Property Regimes and the Struggle Over Seeds. 
Politics and Society, 32(4), 511-543. 
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the full realisation and implementation of the Plant Treaty. For instance, plant 
breeders’ rights legislation – especially when styled after UPOV 1991 – may curtail 
farmers’ ability to save, use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seed and propagating 
material.181 However, it should be noted that this is only the case for the seed and 
propagating material of protected plant varieties. In other words, plant breeders’ rights 
do not affect how farmers’ manage other types of plant varieties, such as those which 
are native, local, and wild-type.  
Nevertheless, the UPOV Convention has been criticised for other reasons, 
including its lack of recognition of traditional knowledge protections and access and 
benefit sharing provisions. Detractors contend that another fault of the Convention is 
that it does not advance farmers’ participation in decision making surrounding the 
governance of plant genetic resources as intellectual property.182 In response, the 
UPOV leadership has defended the Convention, by repeatedly reaffirming that the 
UPOV system is only concerned with new, distinct, uniform, and stable plant varieties 
that are protected with plant breeders’ rights. Moreover, UPOV representatives have 
reminded critics that farmers are not required to grow protected varieties and they 
have also contended that UPOV does not affect the advancement of farmers’ rights 
as enshrined in other legal regimes.183    
The uncertainty over how States can honour multiple, sometimes competing 
international obligations related to the governance of different kinds of plants has 
become increasingly acute. This is because in recent years countries have become 
bound not only to the TRIPS Agreement and the UPOV Convention, but also to the 
CBD, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Plant Treaty. For its part, as of 2018 the 
Convention on Biological Diversity had 196 parties. The United States remained the 
only country that was not a member of the CBD. Meanwhile, the Plant Treaty had 144 
parties in 2018, while the Nagoya Protocol had 105. These numbers indicate that for 
many countries, multiple sometimes overlapping, sometimes diverging interests and 
obligations are important to consider when designing systems for the regulation of 
                                            
181 De Jonge, B. (2016). Reconciling Farmers’ and Plant Breeders’ Rights. The Hague: Oxfam 
International. 
182 Id.  
183 Button, P. (2016). Overview of the UPOV Convention. Proceedings of the Symposium on Possible 
Interrelations between the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA) and the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV 
Convention). Geneva, 26 October 2016. 
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plants as intellectual property. A list of countries that are bound to the UPOV 
Convention and that also have obligations under the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol, 
and/or the Plant Treaty is displayed in Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Countries Bound to UPOV with Additional Obligations 
Country UPOV 
Version 
CBD Nagoya 
Protocol 
Plant Treaty 
Albania UPOV 1991 X X X 
Argentina UPOV 1978 X X X 
Australia UPOV 1991 X  X 
Austria UPOV 1991 X  X 
Azerbaijan UPOV 1991 X   
Belarus UPOV 1991 X X  
Belgium UPOV 1991 X X X 
Bolivia UPOV 1978 X X X 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
UPOV 1991 X   
Botswana UPOV 1991 X X  
Brazil UPOV 1978 X  X 
Bulgaria UPOV 1991 X X X 
Canada UPOV 1991 X  X 
Chile UPOV 1978 X  X 
China UPOV 1978 X X  
Colombia UPOV 1978 X  X 
Costa Rica UPOV 1991 X  X 
Croatia UPOV 1991 X X X 
Cyprus UPOV 1991 X  X 
Czech Republic UPOV 1991 X X X 
Denmark UPOV 1991 X X X 
Dominican 
Republic 
UPOV 1991 X X X 
Ecuador UPOV 1978 X X X 
Estonia UPOV 1991 X  X 
Finland UPOV 1991 X X X 
France UPOV 1991 X X X 
The Gambia UPOV 1991 X X  
Georgia UPOV 1991 X   
Germany UPOV 1991 X X X 
Ghana UPOV 1991 X  X 
Greece UPOV 1991 X  X 
Hungary UPOV 1991 X X X 
Iceland UPOV 1991 X  X 
Ireland UPOV 1991 X   
Israel UPOV 1991 X   
Italy UPOV 1991 X  X 
Japan UPOV 1991 X X X 
Jordan UPOV 1991 X X X 
Kenya UPOV 1991 X X X 
Kyrgyzstan UPOV 1991 X X X 
Latvia UPOV 1991 X  X 
Lesotho UPOV 1991 X X X 
Liberia UPOV 1991 X X X 
Lithuania UPOV 1991 X  X 
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Country UPOV 
Version 
CBD Nagoya 
Protocol 
Plant Treaty 
Luxembourg UPOV 1991 X X X 
Malawi UPOV 1991 X X X 
Malta UPOV 1991 X X X 
Mexico UPOV 1978 X X  
Montenegro UPOV 1991 X  X 
Morocco UPOV 1991 X  X 
Mozambique UPOV 1991 X X  
Namibia UPOV 1991 X X X 
Netherlands UPOV 1991 X X X 
New Zealand UPOV 1978 X   
Nicaragua UPOV 1978 X  X 
Norway UPOV 1978 X X X 
Oman UPOV 1991 X  X 
Panama UPOV 1991 X X X 
Paraguay UPOV 1978 X  X 
Peru UPOV 1991 X X X 
Poland UPOV 1991 X  X 
Portugal UPOV 1991 X X X 
Republic of 
Korea 
UPOV 1991 X X X 
Republic of 
Moldova 
UPOV 1991 X X X 
Romania UPOV 1991 X  X 
Russian 
Federation 
UPOV 1991 X   
Rwanda UPOV 1991 X X X 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
UPOV 1991 X X X 
Serbia UPOV 1991 X  X 
Sierra Leone UPOV 1991 X X X 
Singapore UPOV 1991 X   
Slovakia UPOV 1991 X X X 
Slovenia UPOV 1991 X  X 
Somalia UPOV 1991 X   
South Africa UPOV 1978 X X  
Spain UPOV 1991 X X X 
Sudan UPOV 1991 X X X 
Swaziland UPOV 1991 X X  
Sweden UPOV 1991 X X X 
Switzerland UPOV 1991 X X X 
The former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
UPOV 1991 X  X 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
UPOV 1978 X  X 
Tunisia UPOV 1991 X  X 
Turkey UPOV 1991 X  X 
Uganda UPOV 1991 X X X 
Ukraine UPOV 1991 X   
United Kingdom UPOV 1991 X X X 
United Republic 
of Tanzania 
UPOV 1991 X X X 
United States of 
America 
UPOV 1991   X 
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Country UPOV 
Version 
CBD Nagoya 
Protocol 
Plant Treaty 
Uruguay UPOV 1978 X X X 
Viet Nam UPOV 1991 X X  
Zambia UPOV 1991 X X X 
Zimbabwe UPOV 1991 X X X 
 
   As Table 8 shows, Ecuador – which is the focus of the case study developed 
in Part 2 of this thesis – is legally bound by the TRIPS Agreement and the 1978 version 
of the UPOV Convention, in addition to the possible future obligation to adhere to 
UPOV 1991 as mandated under the terms of the 2016 free trade agreement with the 
European Union. Meanwhile, Ecuador also ratified the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in 1993, acceded to the Plant Treaty in 2004, and ratified the Nagoya Protocol 
in 2017. As a result, Ecuador must balance a variety of international and national 
interests when establishing a national system of intellectual property for plants. For 
many other countries, the situation is analogous.  
Given the various formal legal obligations that many States have undertaken 
related to the governance of different types of plants, it is necessary to explore the 
various approaches that countries could take to regulate plants as intellectual property. 
Chapter 2 considers a series of “conventional” approaches to intellectual property for 
plants. This designation is derived from the language of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which requires that countries offer a form of intellectual property for plant 
varieties, either via a system of patents, a sui generis regime, or some combination of 
both.  
It should be noted that given the extent to which the UPOV Convention model 
of plant breeders’ rights has shaped intellectual property imaginaries, it may be 
unlikely that many governments would consider these conventional approaches. 
Nevertheless, they may be informative both to legally unbound countries – which have 
no formal obligation to implement a system based on the UPOV Convention – and 
legally bound countries. An understanding of these conventional approaches may 
provide inspiration for the imagination of truly innovative intellectual property laws for 
plants, which could alternately import and depart from conventional rationalities. 
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Chapter 2. Conventional Approaches to Intellectual Property for Plants 
 As Chapter 1 of this thesis has illustrated, a large number of countries are 
legally bound to a variety of international instruments, which limit how the access to 
and use of different types of plants can be regulated. As States accede to one or more 
of the treaty regimes described in the previous chapter, the overarching question for 
national governments becomes, is it possible not to use a particular system – or a part 
thereof – to regulate certain uses of plants? This question is particularly salient in 
relation to the regulation of plants as intellectual property. This is because one of the 
frameworks introduced in Chapter 1 – namely, the UPOV Convention – mandates a 
specific model for how plants should constitute protectable subject matter, namely the 
prototype of plant breeders’ rights.  
 In order to understand the lawmaking options that are available in a given 
territory, it is useful to return to the typology of countries elaborated in Chapter 1. 
Foremost, it is notable that States classified as legally unbound – that is, having no 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement or the UPOV Convention – may choose any 
of the options delineated in the third section of Chapter 2 and in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis. Furthermore, legally unbound countries may also elect not to regulate plants 
as intellectual property at all. Even if such an approach were taken, a nation that is 
legally unbound could still decide to develop laws for the governance of different types 
of plants outside of the realm of what is conventionally understood to be intellectual 
property. For instance, these countries could enact legislation related to access and 
benefit sharing pursuant to the Convention on Biological Diversity or the Nagoya 
Protocol; frameworks to establish standards for seed quality control; policies related 
to the conservation of agrobiodiversity; regimes designed to safeguard traditional 
knowledge related to plants, or laws designed to ensure food security or food 
sovereignty.  
 In contrast to legally unbound countries, the formal policy space in which legally 
bound countries must operate is significantly more limited. For members of the World 
Trade Organization not classified as least developed countries, the TRIPS Agreement 
outlines the essential minimum standards of intellectual property for plants. If a given 
country is obligated to adhere to TRIPS but has not assumed any additional 
commitments under the UPOV Convention, it may choose either Alternative 1 or 
Alternative 2, as elaborated in the first and second sections of Chapter 2, respectively. 
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That is, these governments may choose either to conceive of plant varieties as 
patentable subject matter, or to enact a sui generis intellectual property law for plants.  
 Meanwhile, countries that are signatories to the UPOV Convention – whether 
they joined independently or as the result of an obligation mandated by the terms of a 
free trade agreement – have a more limited set of options. Specifically, countries that 
are legally bound to the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention may only choose 
Alternative 2, and the sui generis system that they implement must conform to UPOV 
1978. In contrast, countries that are members of the 1991 version of the UPOV 
Convention may decide either to follow only Alternative 2 – by enacting a UPOV 1991 
based plant breeders’ rights regime – or to select both Alternative 1 and Alternative 2. 
This is because UPOV 1991 allows for plant varieties that are protected with plant 
breeders’ rights to also be patented.  
 In addition to the obligations that countries may have under the TRIPS 
Agreement or the UPOV Convention, many States have also taken on commitments 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Plant 
Treaty. Regardless of whether a country is classified as legally unbound or legally 
bound in relation to the provision of intellectual property laws for plants, it may have 
other legal obligations in relation to how national laws should regulate the usage of 
different types of plants. The final section of Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 of the thesis will 
develop a set of options that national governments could follow to actualise the terms 
of the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Plant Treaty, irrespective of whether their 
countries are categorised as legally bound or legally unbound. Meanwhile, the first two 
sections of the present chapter elaborate a set of options that domestic policymakers 
could consider as conventional approaches to legislate intellectual property for plants.   
 
2.1.  Alternative 1: Patents 
 Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement sets out general minimum standards that 
World Trade Organization Member States must meet in their respective national 
patent regimes. The international baseline for patent protection was expanded 
substantially under TRIPS, in that the Agreement mandates that “patents shall be 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
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technology.”184 This provision represented a significant change for many countries. At 
the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations during which the TRIPS Agreement was 
drafted, nearly fifty countries did not confer patent protection for inventions of any kind 
in certain fields, such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and food.185 As a result of 
differences between the patent systems of developed and developing countries at the 
time when the Agreement was finalised, and because of the implications associated 
with extending patent protection to both products and processes in all technology 
fields, the patentability criteria proved to be one of the most difficult parts of TRIPS to 
negotiate.186  
 Despite the fact that TRIPS states that patents must be available for inventions 
in all fields of technology, the Agreement allows signatories to exclude from patent 
protection plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants and animals.187 The rationale for this exclusion 
may be traced to the widespread uncertainty that surrounded new developments in 
the field of biotechnology at the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations.188 In 1994, 
many World Trade Organization Member States were unsure how to treat biological 
inventions, and jurisprudence was evolving rapidly and unpredictably, even in the few 
territories that at the time allowed for patents that claimed plant varieties to be 
granted.189 Thus, it was agreed that plants should constitute the subject matter of 
intellectual property, but the mechanism through which such protection should be 
instantiated was left undefined.  
 Due to the open nature of the language in the TRIPS Agreement in relation to 
the regulation of plants as intellectual property, it is important to explore the policy 
space that is available for each of the two general alternatives: patents and sui generis 
regimes. For more than two decades, scholarship has focused on the formal policy 
space that TRIPS offers World Trade Organization Member States to design patent 
                                            
184 TRIPS Agreement, Article 27.1. 
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laws that would respond to the needs of developing countries to protect public health 
and enhance access to medicines.190 However, few analyses have focused on the use 
of the formal policy space available in the TRIPS Agreement to create locally adapted 
patent laws for plants.  
Indeed, patents have been frequently dismissed as a means to meet the TRIPS 
requirement to provide a form of intellectual property protection for plant varieties. As 
one prominent expert has noted, “though the patentability of plant varieties is a 
possible option, it provides a more restrictive framework than the breeders’ rights 
regime.”191 However, it is important to recognise that the TRIPS Agreement does not 
compel governments to adopt any particular form of patent protection. This means that 
World Trade Organization Member States have “the option of including plant varieties 
within existing utility patent statutes and/or of enacting a separate statute applicable 
exclusively to plants.”192 As explained in Chapter 1 of this thesis, there is precedent 
for the latter type of framework. Although the United States remains the only country 
in the world to have enacted a dedicated plant patent law, other territories could 
consider designing similar regimes to meet their obligations under TRIPS Article 
27.3(b). 
 
Plant Patents 
 It may be tempting to dismiss the United States 1930 Plant Patent Act as 
irrelevant, as a relic of a past era with little bearing on modern agricultural science. 
The 1930 Plant Patent Act was passed nearly half a century before the emergence of 
biotechnological techniques for plant breeding such as molecular marker based trait 
selection, genetic modification, and genetic engineering. However, the plant patent 
system is still actively utilised today, even though the United States also offers two 
additional forms of intellectual property protection for plants.193 In fact, in recent years, 
plant patents have proven to be the most prevalent of the three forms of intellectual 
property available for plants in the United States, and the popularity of this regime has 
                                            
190 See, e.g., Correa, C. M. (2002). Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health. World Health Organization.  
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increased even after utility patents began to be granted for sexually reproducing plant 
species in that country in the 1980s.194 
 Although the United States Plant Patent Act of 1930 represented the first formal 
system of intellectual property for plants in the world – and despite the continued utility 
of this framework today – plant patents have not generally been taken seriously as a 
possible means for countries to meet the requirements mandated under TRIPS Article 
27.3(b).195 However, several reasons exist for why this option should not be dismissed 
outright. For instance, while utility patents were developed to protect inanimate articles 
of manufacture, systems granting plant-specific patents could be adapted to ensure 
that the form of protection is appropriately tailored of the realities of biological 
reproduction. Thus, governments could explicitly contemplate how to answer the 
question: where do natural processes end and invention begin?196 
 The United States Plant Patent Act represents an early example of lawmakers 
grappling to understand and legislate the concept of invention when the product of the 
creative process is a new type of plant. Such inquiries are ongoing today, as recent 
developments in the laws of territories such as the European Union have illustrated.197 
For its part, “[t]he Plant Patent Act of 1930 extended patents to plants, but it did so 
only by analogy, establishing a species of patent right that addressed plant inventions 
as exceptions or approximations to mechanical or chemical inventions.”198 Thus, in 
contrast to utility patents, the American plant patent system acknowledged that nature, 
not just human inventors, plays a key role in plant breeding.199  
This recognition resulted in a form of protection grounded in the precedent set 
by utility patents, but whose parameters were redesigned to accommodate the 
biological nature of plants. A specific example of this phenomenon is apparent in how 
                                            
194 Pardey, P. G., Koo, B., Drew, J., Horwich, J., & Nottenburg, C. (2013). The Evolving Landscape of 
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the Plant Patent Act altered the criteria for protection as intellectual property. Most 
notable among these modifications is the revised disclosure requirement contained in 
the Plant Patent Act. While the United States utility patent regime required that an 
invention be described sufficiently well to enable a person skilled in the relevant “art” 
to reproduce it, the Plant Patent Act rendered this requirement significantly less 
rigorous.200  
The result of relaxing the disclosure requirement was that “‘intellectual 
possession,’ or the ability to provide a recipe for the fabrication of the artefact, mattered 
less than the physical possession of the biological ‘means of production.’”201 In other 
words, while the history of modern patent law has been characterised by distinguishing 
between ideas and embodiments – or between the invention and the material artefact 
in which it is expressed202 – the United States plant patent system does not operate 
to disembody inventions from their tangible representations. Thus, the inquiry for plant 
patent protection was “not whether inventors could provide an enabling description but 
whether they could ‘identify and use the [invention] in the manner described in the 
patent.’”203 In the current iteration of the Plant Patent Act, the pragmatic effect of this 
provision is that plant patents may not be declared invalid for noncompliance with the 
disclosure requirement as long as the description is “as complete as is reasonably 
possible.”204 
In addition to the changes to the disclosure requirement, the United States Plant 
Patent Act also created a new criterion for patentability – distinctness. That is, plant 
patents were made available to anyone who “invents or discovers and asexually 
reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant.”205 The law does not define the 
meaning of distinctness for the purposes of evaluating applications for plant patents.206 
It only requires that the applicant describe the invention, in a single claim, which may 
also recite the principal distinguishing characteristics of the claimed plant.207 
Meanwhile, the specification of the plant patent application must contain a “complete 
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detailed description of the plant and the characteristics thereof” that distinguish it from 
“other related known varieties.”208 These distinguishing features do not need to be 
quantified, and there is no required number of distinct characteristics for a plant to be 
patentable.  
Subsequent to the enactment of the United States Plant Patent Act, the system 
that was codified in the 1961 UPOV Convention reinscribed the distinctness criterion 
as one of the key requirements for the grant of plant breeders’ rights. Additionally, the 
UPOV system requires that new varieties of plants be genetically uniform and stable 
in order for protection to be awarded. These conditions are notably absent from the 
United States Plant Patent Act. Therefore, plant patents could potentially offer a viable 
mechanism for the protection of new, yet relatively heterogeneous types of plants. 
Some measure of genetic variability is common in agricultural plants that have been 
developed in customary or informal settings, such as those that farmers improve 
through the practices of trait identification, selection, and crossing.209 By omitting the 
criteria of uniformity and stability, a locally adapted plant patent framework could 
enable countries to offer a form of intellectual property for different types of plants, 
thereby departing from the plant breeders’ rights model.  
There are certain other reasons for why plant patents could represent an 
attractive option for countries to balance the interests of diverse national stakeholders 
while still providing a form of intellectual property for plants. For instance, in the United 
States plant patents have a duration of twenty years from the date of filing of the 
application.210 This is also the minimum period of protection mandated under the 1991 
version of the UPOV Convention for most plant genera and species, though the term 
of the breeder’s right under this latter system is longer – at twenty-five years minimum 
– for trees and vines.211 Furthermore, given that sui generis plant patent regimes are 
not bound to minimum periods of protection as are plant breeders’ rights laws 
modelled on the UPOV Convention, countries could use this option to establish 
different durations of exclusivity for different types of plants.   
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Likewise, the scope of protection that plant patents grant in the United States 
is narrower in some respects than the rights conferred under the UPOV framework. 
For example, the Plant Patent Act was designed to protect the plant only, not its fruit 
or flowers; in other words, the law was intended to cover the plant only as “an 
instrument of reproduction.”212 In contrast, plant breeders’ rights as provided in laws 
modelled on UPOV 1991 must extend to harvested material, including entire plants 
and parts of plants that are obtained through the unauthorised use of propagating 
material of the protected variety.213 Thus, laws that would grant plant patents similar 
to those available in the United States may be better able than the UPOV Convention 
to ensure that exclusive proprietary rights do not unduly encumber broad access to 
food. 
Indeed, the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act – enacted soon after the 
onset of the Great Depression in the United States – suggests that the monopolisation 
of food was inapposite to the intention that gave rise to the law.214 The reluctance to 
allow patents that would cover food products has been cited as one of the principal 
rationales behind the most significant aspect of the Plant Patent Act: that it only applies 
to asexually (i.e., vegetatively) reproducing plants, and that it excludes tubers from 
protection. The majority of staple food crops are either sexually reproducing cereal 
grains (e.g., rice, maize, wheat, millet, sorghum) or tubers (e.g., potatoes, sweet 
potatoes, cassava, yams). In contrast to the Plant Patent Act, UPOV 1991 envisages 
a form of intellectual property for plants that extends to all botanical genera and 
species.215   
One final area of significant difference between the plant patent system in the 
United States and the UPOV Convention framework relates to how these regimes 
conceptualise infringement. Under the original 1930 Plant Patent Act, for infringement 
to occur, it was necessary for the right holder to demonstrate that there had been an 
actual, physical appropriation of the patented plant.216 In the current version of the Act, 
the scope of protection includes the right to exclude others from asexually reproducing 
the plant, and from using, offering for sale, or selling the plant so reproduced, or any 
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of its parts, or from importing the plant so reproduced.217 However, as the United 
States Federal Circuit court clarified in 1995, the independent derivation of a protected 
plant variety still does not constitute infringement, provided that no physical 
appropriation has occurred.218  
The scope of plant breeders’ rights under UPOV 1991 is broader than the rights 
provided by the U.S. Plant Patent Act, in that the UPOV Convention also grants the 
right to prevent third parties from conditioning protected varieties for the purposes of 
propagation, exporting, and stocking protected varieties for commercial purposes.219 
Additionally, according to UPOV 1991 the breeder enjoys the same set of rights for 
plant varieties that are essentially derived from the protected variety, varieties that are 
not clearly distinguishable from the protected variety, and varieties whose production 
requires the repeated use of the protected variety.220  
However, although the rights granted under the UPOV system are arguably 
more expansive than those associated with plant patents in the United States, the 
UPOV Convention also recognises several limitations to the breeder’s right that are 
not found in the Plant Patent Act. These include exceptions for acts done privately and 
for non-commercial purposes; acts done for experimental purposes; acts done for the 
purpose of breeding other varieties; and the saving and re-planting of protected 
varieties by farmers on their own holdings.221 While the United States plant patent 
system does not contain these exceptions, sui generis plant patent laws in other 
countries could recognise them in accordance with local legislative priorities.  
Due to the limitations of the scope of protection to asexually reproducing plants, 
the United States Plant Patent Act has predominantly been used to obtain rights over 
ornamental plants and fruit crops.222 Nevertheless, other countries could experiment 
with similar systems to grant a specialised patent that would cover all genera and 
species of plants regardless of their type of reproductive biology, thereby complying 
with the requirements of TRIPS Article 27.3(b). Such a framework could offer certain 
advantages over both UPOV based systems for plant breeders’ rights and utility 
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patents. For instance, unlike UPOV, plant patents could be granted based on the 
criteria of novelty, distinctness, and sufficient disclosure. At the same time, the 
disclosure requirement could be relaxed in comparison to utility patents, such that 
applicants would only need to provide a description of the plant that is “as complete 
as is reasonably possible” instead of being required to enable others to reproduce the 
invention. This kind of law could encourage a greater diversity of actors to protect the 
plant varieties that they develop, due to the absence of uniformity and stability as 
criteria for protection.   
Given that to date, a specialised regime to grant plant patents has only been 
implemented in one country, it is difficult to evaluate how such a framework would 
operate in territories outside of the United States. In the modern landscape of 
intellectual property legislation, the Plant Patent Act is an anomaly. Plant patents are 
not quite utility patents, not quite plant breeders’ rights, and significant confusion has 
surrounded the nature of this form of intellectual property.223 Yet, legally unbound 
countries and States that are bound only to the TRIPS Agreement could still consider 
plant patents as a means to regulate plants as intellectual property.  
Plant patents could fall into either of the two alternative forms of plant variety 
protection that are mandated under TRIPS Article 27.3(b). Conceptualised as a sui 
generis regime, plant patents could build on the example established by the United 
States Plant Patent Act by incorporating certain protections or exceptions for parties 
other than plant breeders, such as scientific researchers, farmers, and consumers of 
food. On the other hand, if conceived simply as patents, then a plant patent regime 
could take advantage of the formal policy space that remains available in the TRIPS 
Agreement surrounding the form that national utility patent legislation may take. 
Notwithstanding the various minimum standards that the TRIPS Agreement institutes, 
the extent and nature of the space within which to design laws granting utility patents 
remains relatively broad, as will be discussed in the following section.  
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Utility Patents 
Although the TRIPS Agreement mandates that countries which are legally 
bound to meet its minimum requirements may utilise patents as a means to establish 
intellectual property for plants, few governments have elected to do so. Instead, most 
States have opted to follow the UPOV Convention model of plant breeders’ rights, 
either wholly or in part. Due to this trend, as well as to the fact that scholars have 
generally rejected patents as a desirable form of intellectual property for plants, the 
literature has largely ignored this option. Nevertheless, it is worth exploring the nature 
of the formal policy space available under the TRIPS Agreement for the purposes of 
establishing intellectual property for plants.    
It has been argued that there are three major sources of flexibility that allow 
utility patent laws to be adapted to local needs while still remaining compliant with the 
TRIPS Agreement. The three areas in which this policy space is located relate to (1) 
undefined terms in the Agreement, (2) general limitations to the rights granted to 
patent holders, and (3) specific exceptions to the exclusivity granted.224 While some 
standards under TRIPS are rigid – for instance, the term of patent protection may not 
be less than twenty years from the date of filing225 – many important utility patent 
provisions may be adapted according to national policy priorities, economic 
development paradigms, and the interests of local stakeholders.  
 
Definitional Flexibilities 
The first major source of formal policy space within utility patent systems relates 
to the terms or criteria that are either undefined or vague in the text of the TRIPS 
Agreement. For instance, some ambiguity exists in relation to the definition of 
patentable subject matter. As discussed above, TRIPS Article 27.1 requires that 
patents must be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology, provided that they meet the specific requirements for patentability 
that TRIPS also establishes. However, the Agreement expressly enumerates certain 
subject matter that may be excluded from protection in national utility patent laws.  
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Foremost, countries that are legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement may 
exclude certain inventions from patentability when doing so is necessary to protect 
ordre public or morality, including to safeguard human, animal, or plant life or health 
or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.226 However, the criteria for 
determining whether an invention would jeopardise ordre public or morality are not 
elaborated. Instead, these concepts are left undefined, to be described based on local 
conceptualisations.  
The TRIPS Agreement also explicitly permits World Trade Organization 
Member States to exclude specific categories of inventions from patentability. One 
category of inventions that are able to be excluded includes plants and animals – other 
than microorganisms – and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals, other than non-biological and microbiological processes.227 As 
mentioned earlier, the fact that TRIPS allows countries to exclude plants and 
essentially biological processes for the creation of plants from patent protection grew 
out of the uncertainties surrounding the rapid development of new biotechnological 
techniques at the time when the Agreement was signed. The nature of this flexibility 
means that countries that are only legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement may elect 
to allow only plants but not essentially biological methods to be patented, or vice versa.   
In addition to the formal policy space that exists in relation to the definition of 
patentable subject matter, the TRIPS Agreement affords signatory countries space 
surrounding the elaboration of the requirements for patentability in their respective 
national frameworks. While the Agreement specifically requires that utility patents be 
granted based on the criteria of novelty, non-obviousness or inventive step, and utility 
or industrial application, a measure of latitude exists within each of these categories 
for local experimentation. For the purposes of utility patent protection, novelty does 
not mean new in the sense that the invention never previously existed. Instead, novelty 
requires that the invention be quantitatively different than the “prior art” – that is, the 
technical information disclosed by the patent must not have been previously available 
to the public.228 While this definition of novelty has become common, there are 
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significant differences in national utility patent laws in relation to how the concept of 
prior art is defined.229  
In some territories – including Australia, the United States, and several Latin 
American countries – inventors are afforded a twelve-month grace period, such that 
disclosures that they make during this time are not considered to form part of the prior 
art for the purposes of evaluating the novelty of their inventions.230 Other countries 
offer a more limited grace period. For instance, in China certain disclosures will not 
destroy novelty if they occurred within six months of the filing date of a patent 
application.231 Another difference is that in some national utility patent laws, 
information contained in prior patent applications does not undermine novelty, 
regardless of whether or not those applications have been published.232 This is the 
case in the United States and Europe. In other territories, the concept of prior art has 
been enlarged to also include precedents that have not been disclosed before the date 
of application, but which demonstrate that a third party had previously generated the 
same invention.233  
If a country elected to meet the obligation established in TRIPS Article 27.3(b) 
by expanding utility patent protection to cover plants, the formal policy space available 
for the novelty requirement could be useful as a means to protect the interests of a 
variety of actors in the agricultural sector. For instance, if a farmer could demonstrate 
that he or she had previously developed the same new plant variety that is claimed in 
a patent application – even though information about this variety was never published 
– the novelty of the claimed invention might be defeated. This means of patent 
invalidation could operate in a manner similar to prior cases, for instance when patents 
granted for plants with certain useful properties were annulled following the 
presentation of evidence that local communities had historically utilised the same 
plants for the same purposes. Examples of this phenomenon include the litigation of 
cases involving neem, turmeric, and basmati rice.234    
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Another example of a formal flexibility relates to the fact that some countries 
allow processes that are not novel per se but which use or produce a new product to 
meet the novelty requirement. The United States, for instance, employs this legal 
fiction to allow patents on secondary uses of known processes. However, developing 
countries could also take advantage of such a conceptualisation of novelty as a means 
to foster local innovation. After all, it may be easier and require fewer scientific, 
technological, and financial resources to identify new applications of known processes 
than to develop entirely new methods.235 On the other hand, some countries have 
elected to exclude reformulations or secondary uses from patent protection to prevent 
monopoly rights from extending beyond the initial twenty-year period of protection. 
This is usually done as a means to ensure that important inventions – such as 
pharmaceuticals – are not improperly encumbered.236 
The second essential condition that applicants for utility patents must 
demonstrate is the requirement of “non-obviousness” or “inventiveness.” TRIPS allows 
countries to incorporate either concept into their national utility patent laws and remain 
in compliance with the Agreement.237 However, “non-obvious” is not necessarily 
synonymous with “inventive,” at least according to how these criteria have been 
defined in national utility patent laws. Generally, a non-obviousness determination is 
based on considerations of the scope and content of the prior art; differences between 
the claimed invention and the prior art; and the level of ordinary skill in the relevant 
art.238 In contrast, inventiveness considers the extent to which the invention in question 
solves a technical problem, which may be understood as a more objective inquiry.239 
The option to require inventiveness instead of non-obviousness as a 
requirement for protection in utility patent legislation provides significant latitude for 
countries that are legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement. Essentially, requiring that 
an invention be sufficiently inventive to obtain protection is a means by which countries 
                                            
as a pesticide, medicine, and fertilizer). Litigation ensued, with civil society groups claiming that 
“biopiracy” of local plant genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge had occurred. 
Ghosh, S. (2003). Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge. Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 
17(1), 73-120.    
235 Id.  
236 Shadlen, supra note 224. 
237 Note 5 of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement states, “For the purposes of this Article, the terms 
‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of industrial application’ may be deemed by a Member to be 
synonymous with the terms ‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful’ respectively.” 
238 Correa, supra note 191. 
239 Id.  
  
  
   
90 
 
are able to limit the number of patent applications that their national patent offices 
receive, which may be desirable to ensure that resources are not wasted. 
Furthermore, governments can utilise the formal policy space surrounding the concept 
of inventiveness to ensure that patents are not granted for incremental improvements, 
which are the kinds of inventions that may be more easily created in places where 
scientific and technological resources are lacking.240 In the context of plant breeding, 
a high standard of inventiveness could ensure that monopoly rights are not granted 
over new varieties of plants whose distinctive traits only represent minor improvements 
over the characteristics of extant varieties. 
Several countries have experimented with different definitions of the 
inventiveness requirement to ensure that the patents granted within their borders meet 
certain minimum standards. For instance, in China, to be protected an invention must 
have “prominent and substantive distinguishing features and represent[] a marked 
improvement.”241 Likewise, in India, “inventive step” is defined as “a feature of an 
invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or 
having economic significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to a 
person skilled in the art.”242 Both of these definitions require that inventions can be 
quantifiably determined to be improvements over the prior art, rather than simply non-
obvious.  
Countries that are legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement may also elect to 
recognise either utility or industrial application as a requirement for patentability. Here 
again, TRIPS contains a formal legal space, such that World Trade Organization 
Member States may choose either criterion,243 even though in practice utility and 
industrial application have different meanings and implications. While the former 
concept considers whether the invention is operable and capable of satisfying some 
function of benefit to humanity, the latter is more pragmatic, based on a determination 
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of whether the invention can be manufactured or used in any form of industry, including 
agriculture.244  
Utility may be defined as requiring evidence that the claimed invention 
accomplishes a socially desirable goal. In contrast, industrial applicability may be 
understood as stricter, because the realisation of this goal should not be merely 
aspirational.245 In other words, industrial applicability may be defined pragmatically, 
such that national industries should be actually capable of producing the patented 
invention. In the agricultural context, this means that a high standard for industrial 
application could bar the protection of certain types of plants, for instance those which 
are developed through sophisticated biotechnological techniques in a country where 
the local industry does not have the capacities required to produce the claimed 
products.  
As with the concept of inventiveness, countries have diversely interpreted the 
meaning of industrial applicability. For instance, in India an invention has “industrial 
applicability” if can be (1) made, (2) used in at least one field of activity, and (3) 
reproduced with the same characteristics as many times as necessary.246 This 
definition requires not only that the invention can actually be used, but also that 
adequate capacity exists to reproduce it in sufficient quantities to meet national 
demand. If such a definition were applied to plants, it might require the existence of 
appropriate local capacity for multiplication of the protected variety in order to meet 
market demand.   
Another important concept that is undefined in the TRIPS Agreement is the 
notion of invention itself. Throughout the history of patent law, the concept of invention 
has been variously defined. Some conceptualisations have focused on subjective 
evaluations of who the inventor is or on the activity that inventors perform. Other 
renditions of the concept have emphasized particular characteristics of the process or 
product created (e.g., unexpected or surprising effects), or have required a more 
objective evaluation of the results that the inventor has obtained. However, no 
singular, universal conception of invention has emerged for the purposes of granting 
patent protection.247 There is even variability as to the entity responsible for defining 
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the notion of invention. Thus, countries that are bound to the TRIPS Agreement are 
free to delineate this concept statutorily, administratively, or based on judicial 
precedent.248 
In addition to these conceptual considerations, TRIPS leaves space for 
countries to define the notion of invention in the negative. That is, national 
governments may adopt a broad definition of the term “discovery” to narrow the 
meaning of invention, for example following the principle that products of nature are 
not patentable.249 According to this conceptualisation, subject matter such as gene 
sequences or other molecular components of plants might be considered discoveries 
rather than inventions, and therefore be excluded from patent protection.250  
This formal policy space has been utilised in many territories to variously define 
biological inventions. Although many developed countries have broadened the 
conceptualisation of invention to include biological materials, numerous developing 
countries have taken the opposite approach, excluding such materials from patent 
protection.251 Both strategies are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. If a country 
decided to use utility patents as a means to regulate plants as intellectual property, it 
could still elect to exclude DNA that has been isolated from a claimed plant from patent 
protection. This exclusion could operate as a means to ensure that researchers are 
not encumbered by third-party intellectual property when they employ biotechnological 
techniques to develop new plants.   
A further area of definitional flexibility in the TRIPS Agreement surrounds the 
disclosure requirement. This is a crucial condition for the grant of patent rights, since 
sufficiency of disclosure is supposed to be the key consideration given by the applicant 
as part of the metaphorical patent bargain.252 Despite – or perhaps in recognition of – 
the importance of the information disclosed in exchange for patent rights, the 
parameters of the disclosure requirement are not defined in the TRIPS Agreement.  
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Thus, countries that are legally bound to TRIPS can require that applicants for 
utility patent protection disclose the “best mode for carrying out the invention known 
to the inventor,”253 as is the case in the United States. Furthermore, national 
governments can limit protection to the embodiments of the invention for which the 
applicant has provided sufficient information to enable its reproduction.254 For 
biological inventions, the scope of patent protection may be limited to those materials 
which have been physically deposited with the national patent office.255 
Other possibilities could include the requirement that patent applicants disclose 
the country of origin of any biological or genetic material covered by the patent claims, 
and certify that the applicant has complied with the relevant rules governing access to 
such material.256 In the context of plant breeding, the requirement that patent 
applicants divulge the origin of genetic resources used to develop new plant varieties 
and demonstrate evidence that prior informed consent was obtained from the 
providers of the resources could operate as a means to protect the interests of local 
communities. Such a condition could be designed in a way that would comply with the 
TRIPS Agreement while also upholding national commitments to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Plant Treaty.257  
Relatedly, the disclosure requirement could be used as a mechanism to grant 
legal attribution for earlier contributions to the inputs used to create a particular 
invention, as is often the case with traditional or indigenous knowledge surrounding 
uses of genetic resources.258 Disclosures made in utility patent applications 
surrounding the use of traditional or indigenous knowledge to develop new plant 
varieties could enable the subsequent protection of this knowledge through other 
national legal frameworks. An example of such an interaction between systems for 
patents and traditional knowledge protection is found in the Ecuadorian intellectual 
property legislation that will be discussed in Part 2 of the thesis. Although there is 
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significant uncertainty as to how protection for traditional knowledge might be granted 
under the TRIPS framework,259 legally bound countries could still experiment with 
locally designed regimes to safeguard traditional knowledge, as Ecuador has done. 
As of 2018 no international consensus existed for how such knowledge should be 
legally protected, meaning that countries remained free to create legislation that would 
appropriately conform to national priorities and interests.   
In addition to the fact that certain important terms and concepts are left 
undefined in TRIPS, the Agreement also affords freedom to determine the limits of 
acceptable patent claims. For instance, countries can prohibit “functional” claims, 
according to which the subject matter is not described as a process or product, but 
rather in terms of the functions that the invention performs.260 Similarly, national laws 
can exclude “product-by-process” patents, where the claimed product is characterised 
by the process used for its procurement and not by the elements and structure of the 
product as such.261 This latter exclusion could be incorporated into a utility patent law 
that allows for the protection of plants as intellectual property. The prohibition would 
ensure that inventions produced by new plant breeding methods are not patented, if 
the new plant varieties produced would not independently meet the requirements for 
protection.   
Another option that countries which are legally bound to TRIPS could explore 
is to limit the number of claims that may be included in a single patent application. This 
could be a desirable strategy for developing countries, given that numerous studies 
have found evidence that “narrow” patents can create opportunities for local firms and 
innovators to invent around existing patents.262 Based on the precedent set by the 
United States Plant Patent Act, patent applications claiming plants could be limited to 
a single claim, in which the applicant would be required to describe the novel and 
distinctive features of the invention in reasonably sufficient detail. 
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In addition to the ambiguity surrounding patent claim drafting, the TRIPS 
Agreement does not specify how claims should be interpreted. This openness is a 
reflection of the fact that “[p]atent breadth…tends not to be a function of statute so 
much as of administrative and judicial practice (i.e., how patent examiners proceed, 
and what legal doctrines judges use in deciding infringement cases).”263 Nevertheless, 
it has been argued that national legislatures should delimit the parameters of the 
“theory of equivalents” to be used within their jurisdictions, that is, to define the 
conditions under which inventions that are not literally described in a claim may be 
deemed equivalent and therefore infringing.264 In so doing, governments could follow 
the example of countries such as Germany, where courts conduct an objective 
comparison of the elements that constitute the invention with those of the alleged 
infringer. Such a strategy has been argued to be advantageous for developing 
countries, because this approach weighs the protection of the inventor’s interests 
against the ability of third parties to make improvements to the protected subject 
matter.265  
 
Exceptions to Patent Rights 
A second major source of formal policy space within the TRIPS Agreement 
derives from the permissible exceptions to the otherwise exclusive private rights that 
patents provide. Exceptions may be classed into two broad categories.266 The first of 
these includes general exceptions, which are available to anyone at any time, and 
without the need to obtain government authorisation. General exceptions are not 
subject to time restrictions, and compensation need not be provided to the patent 
owner in exchange for use of the protected subject matter. Meanwhile, the second 
category includes specific exceptions, which require State authorisation and only apply 
to the party specified by government authorities. Specific exceptions are typically time 
limited, and compensation for the right holder is normally required.  
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Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement creates space for the various types of 
general exceptions that member countries may incorporate into their national utility 
patent laws. Specifically, Article 30 states,  
“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by 
a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate 
interests of third parties.”267  
This latter statement is especially important, since it reiterates the spirit expressed in 
the foundational objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, which proclaim that  
“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”268 
Read together, these provisions allow for the imagination of a variety of general 
exceptions to the exclusive rights that utility patents grant. Many countries have long 
incorporated such provisions into their national patent laws.269 Some examples include 
limitations on patent rights for: 
• Acts done privately and on a non-commercial scale, or for a non-commercial 
purpose; 
• Use of the invention for research; 
• Use of the invention for teaching purposes; 
• Experimentation on the invention to test it or improve on it (allowing for 
“inventing around”); 
• Experiments conducted for the purposes of seeking regulatory approval for 
the commercialisation of a product after the expiration of a patent; 
• Use of the invention by a third party that had used it bona fide before the date 
of application for the patent.270 
Several of these general exceptions could be invoked to balance the rights of 
developers of new plant varieties with the interests of other stakeholders. For instance, 
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an exception to the inventor’s exclusive rights for acts done privately and on a non-
commercial scale, or for non-commercial purposes could effectively inscribe a type of 
farmer’s privilege in patent law, thereby allowing farmers to save, re-plant, or 
exchange seeds without obtaining authorisation from the right holder. Likewise, an 
exception for third parties who had used the invention bona fide before the date of 
application of the patent could also ensure that farmers are not subject to patent 
infringement actions in certain situations. This could occur, for instance, where farmers 
collaborate with plant breeders in participatory breeding projects that lead to the 
development of patented varieties.  
Similarly, allowing for the use of plants protected with utility patents for 
investigative purposes or experimentation could encourage plant breeding by ensuring 
that research is not encumbered by the proprietary rights of third parties.271 This could 
in turn benefit public research institutions and local seed industries in developing 
countries, which may not have the resources to pay royalties to right holders for the 
use of plants that have been protected as intellectual property. Furthermore, an 
exception for experiments conducted for the purposes of seeking regulatory approval 
for the commercialisation of protected plants after patent expiration could foster the 
development of generic industries for biotechnological plants, by reducing regulatory 
hurdles for public research institutions and local seed industries.272 
In addition to these examples, another type of general exception available 
under the TRIPS Agreement concerns the exhaustion of patent rights. Countries that 
are bound to TRIPS are given autonomy under the Agreement to determine their own 
rules regarding exhaustion.273 Specifically, TRIPS states that “nothing in this 
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights.”274 This means that countries can elect to allow for “parallel imports” or “grey-
market imports,” which are goods legitimately produced under a patent in one territory, 
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and then imported into a second territory without the authorisation of the local owner 
of the patent rights.275 
The question of whether parallel imports are beneficial or harmful for national 
economic development is highly contested. On one side are arguments against 
parallel imports on the grounds that grey market products may inhibit innovation,276 
result in negative price discrimination effects for developing countries,277 or encourage 
free riding.278 In contrast, proponents of parallel imports invoke the concept of 
exhaustion as a mechanism to promote trade and the free movement of goods.279 
Under TRIPS, policymakers can examine the evidence offered in support of, and in 
opposition to, these divergent perspectives and decide for themselves whether or not 
parallel imports would benefit national policy goals. In the context of agriculture, 
governments could use the principle of exhaustion as a mechanism to enable grey-
market trade in patented seeds. If demand were sufficiently high for a particular type 
of crop, the prices for protected seeds could be lowered through enhanced competition 
from distributors that are not obligated to pay royalties to the right holder. Decreased 
prices could increase farmers’ access to improved planting material and in turn lower 
the prices that consumers pay for farm produce.   
In addition to these various general exceptions, the TRIPS Agreement also 
permits specific exceptions to patent rights to be granted when special circumstances 
occur. Two broad types of specific exceptions have been recognised in national patent 
laws. The first is government use, which enables State authorities to use patented 
inventions to protect national security or public interest. The second type includes 
compulsory licenses, the grant of which involves government intervention to 
temporarily render patent rights non-exclusive in order that the protected invention 
may be widely made and used.  
 Exceptions for government use and compulsory licenses have long been 
incorporated into national utility patent laws. When the TRIPS Agreement entered into 
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force in 1995, approximately one hundred countries already had some system of 
compulsory licensing in place in their respective national frameworks.280 The 
inscription of compulsory licensing provisions in national patent laws dates to at least 
1925, when the Paris Agreement was amended to allow countries to enact such 
mechanisms to prevent the abuse of patent rights.281 Today, compulsory licenses are 
so firmly established in international law as valid limitations on patent rights that no 
complaint has ever been submitted under the World Trade Organization dispute 
settlement rules against a country that granted compulsory licenses or government 
use.282  
Although the TRIPS Agreement affords parties broad latitude in designing 
compulsory licensing criteria, it also establishes a set of basic conditions that must be 
met for the grant of a non-voluntary license. These include the requirements that a 
case-by-case evaluation must be conducted; that third parties must first seek to obtain 
a voluntary license from the right holder (this requirement is waived in the case of 
national emergency); that the scope and duration of the license should be limited; that 
licenses must be non-exclusive and non-assignable; that the license must be primarily 
used to satisfy domestic market demand; and that the patent holder should be 
adequately remunerated.283  
It is notable that the TRIPS Agreement only establishes the general parameters 
of these requirements, leaving space for interpretation by national governments. For 
instance, TRIPS does not specify how much negotiation is required with the right 
holder before a compulsory license may be granted.284 Likewise, the meaning of 
“adequate remuneration” is not defined.285 TRIPS also “permits national-level 
interpretation and adjudication to be administrative, not necessarily judicial, which 
significantly increases the ease of requesting and acquiring compulsory licenses.”286 
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Furthermore, TRIPS does not specify on what grounds compulsory licenses 
should be issued.287 The Agreement does refer to five specific circumstances that 
could justify the issuance of a compulsory license, including (1) refusal to deal; (2) 
emergency and extreme urgency; (3) anti-competitive practices; (4) non-commercial 
use; and (5) dependent patents.288 However, the enumeration of these specific 
situations does not limit the ability of World Trade Organization Member States to grant 
compulsory licenses on other grounds, such as to protect the environment or for 
reasons of public interest.289 It is therefore also conceivable that governments could 
incorporate provisions on compulsory licensing for reasons of food security, or to 
invoke other justifications – for example, anti-competitive pricing – to ensure that 
patented plant varieties remain broadly accessible. This is because avoiding food 
shortages or mitigating the most severe effects of crop failure would surely be 
construed as national emergencies or as necessary to protect the public interest.     
In short, countries that are legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement could meet 
the Article 27.3(b) requirement by expanding the ambit of patents to cover new plant 
varieties. Compliance could be ensured through two general means: (1) by 
recognising plant varieties as patentable subject matter in the national utility patent 
law; or (2) by developing a specialised plant patent framework, as was done in the 
United States. Although scholars usually dismiss patents as a viable alternative to 
satisfy the Article 27.3(b) obligation, substantial formal policy space exists in the 
TRIPS Agreement for countries to engage in experimentation at the national level.  
Nevertheless, it is likely that the majority of countries that are legally bound to 
the TRIPS Agreement will continue to follow the recent global trend, by granting 
intellectual property protection for plants in the form of sui generis legislation. While 
one reason for this may be the broad perception that patents are an inappropriate 
means to recognise intellectual property for plant varieties, a likely parallel explanation 
is the impact that the template of plant breeders’ rights based on the UPOV Convention 
has had on lawmaking. However, while the UPOV model continues to proliferate 
worldwide, as Chapter 1 showed, a substantial number of countries are still only legally 
bound to the TRIPS Agreement or remain legally unbound. The following section will 
explore the nature of the formal policy space available under the TRIPS Agreement 
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for such countries to develop sui generis intellectual property laws for plants, which 
are not necessarily based on the UPOV Convention.  
 
2.2. Alternative 2: Sui Generis Systems  
In contrast to territories that are obligated to adhere to the TRIPS Agreement, 
the UPOV Convention, or other international instruments such as free trade 
agreements, legally unbound countries enjoy the ability to enact any system that they 
deem appropriate for the governance of plants as intellectual property. Alternatively, 
legally unbound countries can choose not to provide intellectual property for plants at 
all, or to offer only a limited form of exclusive rights. For both legally unbound countries 
and countries that are only legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement, the most attractive 
option for lawmaking may be to implement a sui generis system of intellectual property 
for plants.  
As discussed in previous sections, many World Trade Organization Member 
States have elected to follow the model of the UPOV Convention as a means to grant 
intellectual property for plants. This thesis has argued that this broad adoption of the 
UPOV model may be understood as an example of how the logic of plant breeders’ 
rights has proliferated in many parts of the world. Indeed, scholars have recognised 
that the UPOV Convention is regularly viewed as a standardised template for countries 
to enact systems for the regulation of plants as intellectual property in a manner that 
is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.290  
It is likely that the logic of plant breeders’ rights has proven to be durable for 
several reasons. These include the perception that joining the UPOV Convention will 
result in agricultural or economic development, as conceptualised according to the 
tenets of global free-market capitalism. Supporters of advanced scientific and 
technological approaches to plant breeding regularly argue that recognising breeders’ 
rights according to the UPOV model is the only effective means to encourage foreign 
plant breeders to introduce their improved varieties into new markets.291 The logical 
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conclusion of this argument is that if governments do not join the UPOV Convention, 
they deprive their farmers of the best germplasm, and by extension the ability to earn 
higher profits. Such perspectives implicitly assume that agriculture operates uniformly 
in all world regions, or alternatively that all countries aspire to the same industrialised, 
market-driven model.   
Notwithstanding the expansion of the UPOV Convention standard for plant 
breeders’ rights, it is notable that the TRIPS Agreement grants signatories broad 
latitude to develop local sui generis systems that may deviate significantly from the 
UPOV approach. Prior analyses have argued that there are four essential components 
that a sui generis intellectual property law for plants must have to comply with 
TRIPS.292 The first of these is that the law must apply to plant varieties from all species 
and botanical genera. Second, the law must grant an intellectual property right, which 
means that the right holder should have the exclusive ability to control particular acts 
with respect to protected plant varieties or at a minimum the right to remuneration 
when third parties engage in certain acts.293  
Third, sui generis regimes must adhere to the general TRIPS provision to grant 
national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment to all right holders. In other 
words, countries must ensure that non-nationals have the same advantages that their 
own citizens enjoy.294 A fourth criterion that prior studies have identified is that sui 
generis intellectual property laws for plants must follow the enforcement rules outlined 
in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement.  
In addition to these conditions, Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS specifies that sui 
generis regimes must be “effective.”295 Although the TRIPS Agreement does not 
provide any criteria for effectiveness, the term has been interpreted to mean that the 
law must provide for the implementation of juridical procedures so that owners of plant 
variety certificates may execute their rights.296 However, effectiveness in the TRIPS 
context does not depend on the requirements stipulated for intellectual property 
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protection, or on the level of protection granted.297 Therefore, an effective sui generis 
system may be understood as one that offers redress to right holders in the event that 
infringement occurs. Some scholars have taken this interpretation further, arguing that 
the only truly effective legal frameworks are those that can provide protection to the 
largest range of plant varieties possible. This argument holds that in addition to plant 
breeders’ rights, an effective system should provide a system of intellectual property 
protection for plants developed by actors other than professional breeders, such as 
individual farmers or local communities.298  
Apart from the few criteria that are explicitly or implicitly mandated by TRIPS, 
the Agreement grants World Trade Organization Member States broad discretion to 
design national sui generis intellectual property laws for plants. One of the most 
important areas that is left undefined in the TRIPS Agreement relates to the 
requirements that applicants must fulfil to obtain protection. As discussed in Chapter 
1 of the thesis, the UPOV Convention mandates that plant varieties must be new, 
distinct, uniform, and stable in order to receive protection. However, countries that are 
legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement but not to the UPOV Convention need not 
inscribe these criteria in their national intellectual property laws for plants.  
Many previous analyses have recommended that countries consider the 
enactment of alternative requirements for protection that would be less rigid than the 
UPOV criteria. The thresholds of uniformity and stability have been especially criticised 
as too difficult for many farmers or farming communities qua breeders to meet to obtain 
protection for the “local” varieties of plants that they develop. Local varieties – also 
regularly termed “landraces,” “heirloom varieties,” or “farmers’ varieties” – are 
frequently more genetically heterogeneous than varieties developed by professional 
breeders.299 Therefore, countries could consider replacing the criteria of uniformity and 
stability with “identifiability” or other, similar concepts as a means to provide intellectual 
property for local plant varieties that have been derived through customary 
methods.300 Alternatively, a sui generis regime could retain the distinctness, uniformity, 
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and stability requirements for plant varieties developed by professional breeders, while 
creating a separate category for genetically heterogeneous varieties that would be 
subject to different criteria.301 Thus, countries that are not legally bound to the UPOV 
Convention have substantial formal policy space for the definition of the requirements 
for plants to be protected as intellectual property.  
The TRIPS Agreement also provides broad formal policy space for sui generis 
intellectual property laws for plants to establish locally adapted criteria to exclude 
certain varieties from protection. Although the Article 27.3(b) obligation has been 
interpreted as requiring the recognition of protection for all botanical genera and 
species, specific varieties could be excluded based on several criteria. For instance, 
the law could prohibit cumulative protection, such that varieties of plants that have 
already been patented would not be eligible for registration under the sui generis 
regime.302 Such a restriction is already operative in countries that adhere to the 1978 
version of the UPOV Convention. 
Additionally, under TRIPS, a sui generis law could be deemed to not apply to 
either plant varieties that have merely been discovered (in any setting), or to varieties 
that have been discovered specifically in the wild.303 By selecting the latter option, 
countries could enable the protection of varieties that come into existence through 
natural mutations or other genetic variations, but which are developed under controlled 
conditions to have broad benefit. In other words, in order to be protectable, discovered 
varieties would need to be complemented by human intervention, such as through 
evaluation and propagation of the variety.304 This could encourage the development 
of varieties with improved traits, while also ensuring that exclusive rights are not 
granted over plant genetic resources that have not been subjected to a threshold level 
of intercession by a human actor, whether in a professional or a local agricultural 
setting. 
Furthermore, sui generis intellectual property laws for plants could exclude 
certain varieties from protection for the same reasons that the TRIPS Agreement 
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enumerates as exceptions to patent protection. These grounds for exclusion include 
to protect ordre public or morality; to safeguard human, animal, or plant life or health; 
or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.305 A sui generis framework could also 
prohibit the registration of certain varieties of plants for reasons that are not specifically 
enumerated in TRIPS, such as to guarantee food security or food sovereignty, based 
on the Agreement’s general objective to provide intellectual property protection “in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare.”306 These factors would all be 
subject to local interpretation, and it is clear that what constitutes concepts such as 
ordre public or morality in relation to the use of plant genetic resources differs 
significantly from country to country. For instance, in some territories the development 
and cultivation of genetically modified plants might be considered to violate ordre 
public,307 while in others transgenic plants have been welcomed. 
Legally unbound countries and countries that are only subject to the TRIPS 
Agreement could also embed additional conditions on the grant of protection in sui 
generis frameworks. For instance, parties who apply to obtain intellectual property 
protection for a new plant variety could be required to disclose the source of origin of 
the genetic material used to develop the variety, as well as to declare that prior 
informed consent was obtained from the country or community that provided the 
material.308 Such provisions could facilitate the implementation of other international 
obligations to which countries may be legally bound, for instance those which are 
mandated in the Convention on Biological Diversity,309 the Nagoya Protocol,310 or the 
Plant Treaty.311  
Moreover, a declaration of origin requirement could be used to prevent 
misappropriation and unauthorised exploitation of national agrobiodiversity – what is 
frequently termed “biopiracy” – or to ensure the equitable sharing of benefits derived 
from the commercialisation of plant varieties developed from locally sourced 
materials.312 The TRIPS Agreement also provides space for World Trade Organization 
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Member States to develop additional mechanisms to protect local communities that 
rely on customary agricultural practices. These protections could take the form of gene 
funds, mediation procedures for the protection of local interests, and registers of local 
plant varieties.313 
Another area in which the TRIPS Agreement provides a broad formal policy 
space for signatories to develop sui generis laws that could be appropriately tailored 
to the particulars of their national agricultural sectors relates to the scope of and 
exceptions to the rights granted. For instance, countries could limit protection to the 
vegetative or reproductive propagating material of plants and not to harvested 
material. This means that intellectual property would only extend to the inputs and not 
the outputs of farming.314 Similarly, countries could elect whether to include protection 
for plant varieties that are “essentially derived” yet sufficiently distinct from a protected 
variety.  
On the one hand, it has been argued that expanding the scope of intellectual 
property protection to cover essentially derived varieties could foster progress in plant 
improvement by incentivising the use of biotechnological tools while preventing 
“copycat breeding.”315 On the other, the protection of essentially derived varieties has 
been derided as a limitation on the historic “free access” of breeders to commercialise 
new varieties developed from protected varieties without being required to pay 
remuneration to any owners.316 Given that the concept of essential derivation remains 
contested more than two decades after its first formal embodiment in UPOV 1991,317 
it is significant that countries which are only legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement 
and not to UPOV 1991 still have the option to decide whether to protect essentially 
derived varieties in their sui generis frameworks.  
Under the TRIPS Agreement, countries can also adapt sui generis intellectual 
property laws for plants to the realities of local agricultural practices through calibration 
of exceptions to the rights granted to plant breeders, including via inscription of a 
“farmers’ privilege.” This concept refers to the recognition that farmers have historically 
relied on the ability to reproduce planting material – including from varieties that are 
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protected under intellectual property laws – for personal and non-commercial use 
without requiring permission from the right holder.318 Countries whose agricultural 
systems are predominantly characterised by customary practices could adopt a broad 
farmers’ privilege, while still offering sufficiently strong protection to encourage the 
importation of improved propagating material.319 Moreover, legally unbound countries 
and territories that are only subject to the TRIPS Agreement enjoy the ability to define 
“non-commercial use” in the context of the farmers’ privilege, such that under certain 
circumstances, farmers may be permitted to sell the propagating material of protected 
varieties as part of customary “over the fence” or “brown bagging” farming practices.320   
In addition to incorporating exceptions to proprietary rights for use by farmers, 
countries that are only legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement may also permit use 
without authorisation of the right holder in other circumstances. For instance, the 
scope of intellectual property protection could be deemed to not extend to activities 
conducted privately and for non-commercial purposes; research; or the breeding of 
other varieties.321 Similar exceptions are also available to countries that are members 
of the 1978 and 1991 versions of the UPOV Convention. 
In legally unbound countries and countries that are only subject to the TRIPS 
Agreement, exceptions to otherwise exclusive proprietary rights could be written to 
protect the interests of diverse national stakeholders, who might include plant 
breeders, farmers, and scientific researchers. For instance, in countries whose 
agricultural sectors are characterised by both customary farming practices and 
industrial agricultural production of non-food plants, the national sui generis law could 
allow the right holder to subject the use of a protected ornamental variety for 
propagating purposes to payment of equitable remuneration.322 Simultaneously, the 
regime could prevent the right holder from claiming compensation for similar uses of 
food crops.  
Furthermore, in countries that are not legally bound to the UPOV Convention, 
a broad formal policy space exists in relation to the way “plant variety” is defined for 
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the purposes of intellectual property protection. The UPOV Convention focuses solely 
on providing protection for plant varieties developed by professional plant breeders, 
which must be new, distinct, uniform, and stable. In contrast, sui generis systems in 
legally unbound countries or in countries subject only to the TRIPS Agreement can 
incorporate additional mechanisms to grant rights over different categories of plants. 
These could include landrace or local plant varieties, which may be understood as 
those which originate through the progressive application of knowledge developed by 
farmers over the course of generations.323  
In jurisdictions not legally bound to the UPOV Convention, another set of 
requirements could be written for the protection of local plant varieties. This category 
could be understood as containing plants that exist only in specific geographic areas 
and which therefore could be the subject of collective or community rights.324 Finally, 
in legally unbound or TRIPS-only countries, intellectual property could be allocated in 
relation to the use of the wild relatives of plant varieties, based on the value of these 
plants for cross-breeding or genetic resources conservation.325  
Sui generis intellectual property laws for plants in legally unbound countries or 
in territories subject only to the TRIPS Agreement could also be limited in an array of 
other ways in comparison to the model established by the UPOV Convention. For 
instance, the TRIPS Agreement provides no guidance in relation to the duration of 
time for which plant varieties should be the subject of exclusive rights. Under UPOV 
1978, plant breeders are granted eighteen years of protection for trees and vines, and 
fifteen years for all other species.326 UPOV 1991 lengthens these periods to twenty-
five years for trees and vines and twenty years for all other species.327 Both of these 
versions of the UPOV Convention are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. However, 
legally unbound countries and TRIPS-only territories need not follow these 
precedents. In other words, the duration of protection could be set at a longer or 
shorter period, or different lengths of protection could be granted for different 
categories of plant varieties.328  
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Furthermore, sui generis intellectual property laws for plants could subject any 
rights granted to exhaustion provisions, similar to those discussed above in relation to 
utility patents. This means that the exclusive protection conferred could be deemed to 
not extend to any material of a claimed plant variety that has been sold or otherwise 
marketed by the right holder or with his or her consent in the territory of the country in 
question.329 The inclusion of an exhaustion provision could ensure that the law allows 
owners of proprietary rights in plant varieties to only exercise their rights and receive 
remuneration once in every production cycle, rather than collect royalties multiple 
times based on a single sale.330  
Legally unbound countries and countries subject only to TRIPS could also 
inscribe a system of compulsory licenses in their sui generis regimes as a means to 
balance the interests of multiple stakeholders. As described earlier in relation to utility 
patents, TRIPS Article 31 provides for certain specific restrictions on compulsory 
licenses, including case-by-case evaluation, prior negotiation, limited scope and 
duration, non-exclusivity, and equitable remuneration.331 It is unclear whether sui 
generis systems for the protection of plants as intellectual property would need to 
comply with the provisions of Article 31. While some scholars contend that the 
application of Article 31 to Article 27.3(b) is clearly intended by the spirit of TRIPS, 
others hold that intellectual property laws for plants could contain much stronger 
compulsory licensing provisions than those associated with utility patents, while still 
satisfying the “effectiveness” criterion of Article 27.3(b).332  
In any case, as with patents, sui generis regimes could allow compulsory 
licenses to be granted in a variety of circumstances, including refusal to deal; 
emergency and extreme urgency; anti-competitive practices; for non-commercial use; 
and for reasons of dependency.333 Furthermore, scholars have argued that 
compulsory licenses could be granted to ensure broad access to plant varieties 
protected with intellectual property for reasons not specifically mentioned in TRIPS but 
that are implied in the Agreement. These could include for the purposes of protecting 
the environment or public interest.334 Following the same rationale, compulsory 
                                            
329 Id. at 173-74. 
330 Id.  
331 TRIPS Agreement, Article 31. 
332 The Crucible II Group, supra note 303 at 176. 
333 TRIPS Article 31.  
334 Correa, supra note 191 at 93. 
  
  
   
110 
 
licenses for protected plant varieties could also ostensibly be granted to ensure food 
security, given that the need to feed the population should fit within the definition of 
public interest in all countries. 
In recent years, efforts have been made to clarify and amalgamate the various 
policy options available to legally unbound countries and to territories that are only 
subject to the TRIPS Agreement, for the purposes of developing sui generis 
intellectual property laws for plants. For instance, Correa has generated a 
policymaking “tool” that specifically addresses the needs of developing countries, 
towards the end of providing an alternative to the UPOV 1991 model for plant breeders’ 
rights.335 This work draws inspiration from the sui generis laws that India, Thailand, 
and Malaysia have enacted and implemented. These three countries are all legally 
bound to the TRIPS Agreement but not to the UPOV Convention.  
Correa’s proposal explores numerous elements that developing countries could 
incorporate into sui generis laws for the regulation of plants as intellectual property. 
Most prominently, the proposed regime creates a typology that includes three 
categories of plant varieties: (1) new uniform plant varieties; (2) new farmer and other 
heterogeneous varieties; and (3) traditional farmers’ varieties.336 The first category 
would create a system of intellectual property for varieties developed by plant 
breeders, according to a model that approximates the 1978 version of the UPOV 
Convention. Meanwhile, the Correa model also proposes a means of protection for 
new farmer and other heterogeneous varieties, but based on laxer requirements than 
those that than new uniform plant varieties would need to meet. Thus, for the second 
category intellectual property would be granted based on the criteria of novelty, 
distinctness, and identifiability.337  
The right holder of a new farmer or other heterogeneous variety would have the 
right to receive remuneration, but not to exploit the protected variety exclusively. Thus, 
Correa’s proposal would not restrict the use of these varieties by third parties, but 
payment to the right holder would be required in the event that the variety were 
commercialised.338 Finally, intellectual property protection would be available for 
traditional farmers’ varieties, subject only to the criterion of identifiability.339 Traditional 
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farmers’ varieties would also receive a remuneration right, but payment would be 
made directly to a national Seed Fund. Income from this Fund would be used to 
support the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources, especially 
via on-farm conservation practices and through the establishment of community seed 
banks.340 
Similar proposals to the Correa model have examined how developing 
countries could implement a “differentiated approach” to the governance of plants as 
intellectual property. Like the Correa framework, these policy recommendations have 
specifically addressed the need to protect the interests of diverse stakeholders in 
countries whose agricultural sectors are characterised by small-scale and customary 
farming practices. For instance, De Jonge and Munyi recommended establishing 
different levels of protection for different crops in relation to different categories of 
farmers.341 Thus, a sui generis system of intellectual property for plants could allot 
special treatment to smallholder farmers, who could be defined based on metrics such 
as farm size or cropping area, actual production or production capacity, or profits or 
income.342  
The farmers’ privilege delineated under the De Jonge and Munyi model would 
exempt farmers who meet the definition of smallholder from infringing any proprietary 
rights granted to plant breeders, thereby allowing them to use, exchange, and sell the 
farm-saved seed of any protected varieties. In contrast, the activities of non-
smallholder farmers would not be exempted from the requirement to obtain 
authorisation from the right holder for commercial uses of protected plant varieties. 
Nevertheless, non-smallholder farmers would be allowed to use the farm-saved seed 
of certain crops on their own holdings while paying a reduced royalty to the right 
holder.343 
One important difference between the proposals launched by Correa and De 
Jonge and Munyi, respectively, is that the latter specifically considers options that are 
available to countries that are legally bound to both the TRIPS Agreement and the 
UPOV Convention. Conversely, Correa’s model – as with several other, older 
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proposals344 – is targeted towards legally unbound countries and territories that are 
only subject to the TRIPS Agreement. This is a significant distinction, because 
although the Correa model for a sui generis system of intellectual property for plants 
contains many interesting elements, this proposal is relevant to fewer and fewer 
countries with each passing year.  
As discussed in Chapter 1 of the thesis, over the course of the past few decades 
or so, many countries have either independently joined UPOV or entered into bilateral 
or regional free trade agreements that require adherence to the Convention. For such 
territories, the recommendations offered by De Jonge and Munyi could be of interest 
to aid in the design of sui generis intellectual property laws for plants. However, it is 
also important to recognise that the De Jonge and Munyi model does not include 
options for how countries that are legally bound to the UPOV Convention might 
reconcile their obligations under this treaty with commitments to implement the 
provisions of other international instruments, including the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Plant Treaty.  
The following section addresses this gap in the literature by offering two 
potential “standardised” options for how countries that are legally bound to the TRIPS 
Agreement and the UPOV Convention could square these obligations with other 
international commitments related to the regulation of plant genetic resources. These 
options are described as standardised because they do not take into account the 
various local factors that could influence how national laws related to intellectual 
property for plants, agrobiodiversity conservation, protection of customary agricultural 
practices, or other subject matter are designed and implemented. Instead, the 
following section outlines a series of general doctrinal considerations that countries 
should attend to when seeking to comply with international obligations surrounding the 
regulation of plant genetic resources. Subsequently, Chapter 5 will derive a series of 
lessons from the Ecuadorian case study, which demonstrate how lawmaking 
processes related to this subject matter have unfolded in one particular country.  
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2.3. Standardised Approaches to the Governance of Different Types of 
Plants 
 Chapter 1 of the thesis showed that as of 2018, there were only sixty-three 
countries in the world that were legally unbound. This means that these countries were 
not obligated under the terms of any international instrument to establish systems of 
intellectual property for plants. However, it is notable this group of legally unbound 
countries included twenty-six Member States of the World Trade Organization that 
were classified as least developed countries. Because these territories ostensibly will 
be required to comply with the TRIPS Agreement by 1 July 2021, it is expected they 
will soon convert into legally bound countries.   
Meanwhile, in 2018 a total of one hundred and forty-three countries were 
already legally bound to one or more international obligations that mandate minimum 
standards for the regulation of plants as intellectual property. Fifty of these territories 
were only obligated to give effect to the TRIPS Agreement, meaning that they could 
conceptualise plant varieties as patentable subject matter, develop a sui generis 
regime for the protection of plant varieties with intellectual property, or institutionalise 
some combination of both systems. An additional ninety-three countries had joined the 
UPOV Convention, and the vast majority (seventy-eight) were legally bound to UPOV 
1991. Limited options existed for these territories to develop innovative sui generis 
frameworks to protect plants as intellectual property, as they were required to enact a 
system to grant plant breeders’ rights that would comply with the relevant version of 
the UPOV Convention.   
Concomitant with the expansion of international agreements that set minimum 
standards for the regulation of plants as intellectual property at the national level, in 
recent years several other treaties related to governance of plant genetic resources 
have entered into force. Chapter 1 introduced these regimes, which include the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, a treaty that is concerned with the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological resources. Another relevant international instrument 
is the Plant Treaty of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
which covers agrobiodiversity conservation and the protection of customary farming 
practices. Finally, the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity sets 
standards for accessing and using plant genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge, as well as for equitable benefit sharing. Even as an increasing number of 
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countries become legally bound to the TRIPS Agreement and the UPOV Convention, 
many are also assuming other obligations under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the Plant Treaty, and the Nagoya Protocol.  
 Actors in the international system are aware of this dynamic, and it is for this 
reason that in 2018, representatives of the Union for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants on the one hand, and the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 
on the other, were engaged in talks designed to identify possible synergies between 
the UPOV Convention and the Plant Treaty.345 Much of the discussion centred on how 
the proprietary rights of plant breeders might be reconciled with policymaking goals 
related to customary agricultural practices, such that countries could honour their 
obligations under the UPOV Convention and the Plant Treaty simultaneously. 
However, it is difficult to ascertain whether good faith interactions between the 
administrators of these intersecting international agreements could actually result in 
concrete changes to either regime, towards the end of rendering each one more 
compatible with the other. The 1991 version of the UPOV Convention is structured 
such that its provisions at best may limit the implementation of the Plant Treaty, and 
at worst may actively impede the implementation of protections for practices such as 
seed saving and exchange in farmer-to-farmer networks.346  
In this context, it is important to trace how countries that are legally bound to 
multiple overlapping treaties may experiment with laws that would accomplish various 
policy goals that may not immediately appear compatible with one another. 
Specifically, it is important that governments understand how they might uphold 
obligations to establish intellectual property laws for plants – and thereby grant 
breeders’ rights protection consistent with the UPOV Convention – while also 
safeguarding other national interests. One concrete reason for this need for 
reconciliation is the likelihood that in many countries, farmers who rely on customary 
agricultural practices will interact increasingly with professional plant breeders.  
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Such collaboration may be necessary in many territories as a means to address 
important challenges such as the attainment of food security and adaptation to climate 
change. Some governments have already begun to promote interactions between 
farmers and professional breeders, for instance through programmes designed to 
foster the collaboration and exchange of seeds and related knowledge or to establish 
formal agreements between rural communities and scientific institutions surrounding 
the distribution of monetary and non-monetary benefits derived from collaborative 
activities, such as participatory plant breeding.347 Given the growing diversity of the 
forms of agriculture that are practiced in many countries, it is crucial that governments 
develop complementary rather than competitive approaches to regulate the access 
and use of different types of plants.  
The following sections consider two standardised options that countries which 
are legally bound to both the UPOV Convention and one or more additional obligations 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Plant Treaty, or the Nagoya Protocol, 
could pursue to legislate rights over plants according to the logic of intellectual 
property, while also fulfilling other policy goals. The situations of legally unbound 
countries and territories that are subject only to the TRIPS Agreement are also 
contemplated in this analysis. The two general, standardised options that governments 
could study are: (1) a unified law to cover all pertinent interests; and (2) separate 
frameworks, one for intellectual property and one designed to address other issues 
related to the uses of certain types of plants. In addition, countries could also consider 
implementing a plurality of laws to regulate the access and use of different types of 
plants. This third option will be discussed in Chapter 5, in the form of lessons learned 
from the Ecuadorian case study.      
 
Option 1: A Unified Law 
The first standardised lawmaking option that legally bound countries could 
consider is legislation that would (1) establish a system of plant breeders’ rights 
consistent with the UPOV Convention, and (2) simultaneously institutionalise other 
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goals related to the uses of certain types of plants. Although Option 1 may appear to 
be the most parsimonious, it might also be the most implausible. As discussed in prior 
sections of this thesis, the 1991 version of the UPOV Convention may operate to 
impede certain customary agricultural practices, such as seed saving or the exchange 
of planting material with other farmers.348 Therefore, for countries that are legally 
bound to UPOV 1991, it is unlikely that the creation of a unified framework pursuant 
to Option 1 would be viable. 
However, in comparison to the 1991 version of the UPOV Convention, UPOV 
1978 offers substantially more policy space for the realisation of other goals, especially 
in relation to farmers’ customary seed management practices.349 Although UPOV 1978 
ceased to accept new accessions following the entry into force of UPOV 1991, fifteen 
territories are still members of the earlier version of the Convention. Membership in 
UPOV 1978 is comprised of several Latin American States, a small number of 
industrialised nations such as New Zealand and Norway, and populous developing 
countries including Brazil, China, and South Africa.  
Many of these UPOV 1978 members are also bound to additional obligations 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Plant Treaty, or the Nagoya Protocol, 
meaning that their governments must weigh several competing priorities related to the 
regulation of different types of plants. Such countries could consider amending their 
current plant breeders’ rights laws to recognise other goals in a way that would not risk 
undermining UPOV 1978. Legally unbound countries and territories that are only 
subject to the TRIPS Agreement could also consider Option 1, given that they enjoy 
broad latitude surrounding how to conceptualise plants as intellectual property.  
As of 2018, none of the UPOV members had deviated substantially from the 
template law that the Convention provides. Nevertheless, the precedents set by 
certain non-UPOV countries for how to balance multiple interests related to the 
                                            
348 See, e.g., Correa, supra note 8; Berne Declaration, supra note 64; Louwaars, N. P., Tripp, R., 
Eaton, D., Henson-Apollonio, V., Hu, R., Mendoza, M., Muhhuku, F., Pal, S., & Wekundah, J. (2005). 
Impacts of Strengthened Intellectual Property Rights Regimes on the Plant Breeding Industry in 
Developing Countries. A Synthesis of Five Case Studies. Wageningen UR. Retrieved from 
https://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/LouwaarsCGN_Plants_05.pdf; De Schutter, O. (2009). 
Seed Policies and the Right to Food: Enhancing Agrobiodiversity, Encouraging Innovation. Report by 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (A/64/170). Presented at the 64th session of the UN 
General Assembly, October 21, 2009; GIZ Germany. (2015). The UPOV Convention, Farmers’ Rights 
and Human Rights: An Integrated Assessment of Potentially Conflicting Legal Frameworks. Retrieved 
from https://www.giz.de/fachexpertise/downloads/giz2015-en-upov-convention.pdf.   
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governance of different types of plants in a unitary framework may be informative. 
Worldwide, the most frequently studied example of an innovative sui generis 
intellectual property law for plants is the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ 
Rights Act, 2001 of India.350 The Indian regime creates a variegated system of rights 
over plant varieties, in which different categories of varieties are eligible for 
registration.  
Thus, the Indian law protects new plant varieties based on the same novelty, 
distinctness, uniformity, and stability requirements as those outlined in the UPOV 
Convention. Meanwhile, the regime also explicitly recognises that plant breeding is an 
activity that farmers and not just professional breeders regularly undertake. Thus, 
under the Indian law “a farmer who has bred or developed a new variety shall be 
entitled for registration and other protection in like manner as a breeder of a variety 
under this Act.”351 Additionally, the law allows for the registration of “extant 
varieties.”352 In order to receive protection, extant varieties must satisfy the 
distinctness, uniformity, and stability criteria, though they need not be novel. The 
testing protocol is also relaxed for extant varieties in comparison to new varieties,353 
which means that relatively more heterogeneous plant varieties – such as landraces 
– are more likely to meet the standards for protection.  
For new plant varieties, the breeders’ rights framework provided in the 
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act of India is similar to that of the 
1978 version of the UPOV Convention. Accordingly, the law provides an exclusive 
right to produce, sell, market, distribute, import, or export protected varieties.354 
                                            
350 The Indian legislation has been comprehensively studied by numerous scholars over the past 
seventeen years. For critical analysis of the law, see, e.g., Sahai, S. (2001). Plant Variety Protection 
and Farmers’ Rights Law. Economic and Political Weekly, 36(35), 3338-3342; Tripp, R., Louwaars, 
N., & Eaton, D. (2007). Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries. A Report from the Field. 
Food Policy, 32(3), 354-371; Dhar, supra note 57.    
351 The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 of India. Art. 39(1)(i).  
352 Under the terms of the Act, extant varieties include those which (1) have been notified under the 
Seeds Act of 1966; (2) are farmers’ varieties; (3) are varieties about which there exists common 
knowledge; or (4) are any other variety which is in the public domain. The Protection of Plant Varieties 
and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 of India. Art. 2(j). 
353 Specifically, testing for distinctness, uniformity, and stability for new varieties involves undergoing 
field trials in which the variety’s characteristics are compared with those of a suitable reference variety 
over two growing seasons in two locations. For farmers’ varieties, testing is only required for one 
season in two locations. Agrawal, R. C. (2019, forthcoming). Opportunities and Challenges Created 
by Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act in India. In K. Adhikari & D. J. Jefferson (eds.) 
Intellectual Property Law and Plant Protection: Challenges and Developments in Asia. Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge.  
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Farmers who choose to register new plant varieties are entitled to the same set of 
rights as any other breeder. Additionally, the Indian Act also establishes a specific set 
of “farmers’ rights” in relation to all types of plant varieties that the law recognises. 
These include the guarantee that farmers can save, use, sow, re-sow, exchange, 
share, and sell their farm produce, except in branded form.355 Farmers – both as 
individuals and at the community level – are also entitled to compensation if several 
situations occur. These include if after propagation, a registered new variety fails to 
perform as expected,356 or where a village or local community has contributed 
significantly to the evolution of a variety registered by a third party under the Act.357  
 The Indian legislation also institutes other protections for farmers, such as 
shielding them from innocent infringement of plant breeders’ rights,358 and exempting 
them from paying all fees associated with legal actions brought under the Act.359 
Furthermore, the Indian Act establishes systems related to accessing plant genetic 
resources and negotiating equitable benefit sharing that are consistent with the 
Nagoya Protocol and the Plant Treaty. For instance, the law creates a national Gene 
Fund, which is responsible for managing benefit sharing where farmers provide 
essential inputs resulting in new or essentially derived varieties that third parties 
register for protection.360 The Indian regime also requires disclosure of the source of 
any genetic material used for the development of a new variety, where the material 
has historically been conserved by particular tribal or rural communities.361  
Given these various provisions, the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ 
Rights Act of India offers a model for how a unified legal framework can regulate plants 
as intellectual property while simultaneously providing mechanisms through which 
other national goals may be achieved. The Indian law is expressly concerned with 
issues that are germane not only to the TRIPS Agreement, but also to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, the Plant Treaty, and the Nagoya Protocol. Furthermore, 
although India is not a member of UPOV, there are reasons to believe that a similar 
                                            
355 The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 of India. Art. 39(1)(iv). 
356 Id. at Art. 39(2).  
357 Id. at Art. 41.  
358 Id. at Art. 42. 
359 Id. at Art. 44. 
360 Id. at Art. 45(1)(a). 
361 Id. at Art. 40. 
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law, if developed by a UPOV 1978 signatory country, might be compliant with the terms 
of the Convention.  
In fact, the original version of India’s Plant Variety Bill was modelled on UPOV 
1978, reflecting the country’s intention to join the Union.362 While it is true that prior to 
the enactment of the final law, the initial Bill was modified to incorporate a chapter on 
farmers’ rights, the basic parameters of the intellectual property law for plant breeders 
were left unaltered. Subsequently, India made a formal request to join UPOV in 2002, 
one year after the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act was passed. 
At that time, the UPOV Secretariat apparently extended an oral offer to open an 
exception that would allow India to join the 1978 version of the Convention, which had 
formally ceased to accept new members in April 1999.363  
An initial examination of the Indian legislation by the UPOV Consultative 
Committee began in October 2002 and resulted in a number of observations on the 
compliance of the law with the UPOV Convention. The communications between the 
Indian government and the Consultative Committee were never made public, and 
therefore it is difficult to ascertain whether a regime such as the Indian Act with UPOV 
1978 would ever be formally recognised as compliant with the Convention. This is 
because negotiations between India and UPOV ceased in 2003 after the Indian non-
governmental organisation Gene Campaign filed a public interest lawsuit that 
challenged the government’s intention to join the Union.364 Thus, it is unclear whether 
UPOV would consider a law such as the Indian Act to be consistent with the 1978 
version of the Convention.  
Nevertheless, the experiences of other non-UPOV countries may prove to be 
illustrative. For instance, in Malaysia a national sui generis intellectual property law for 
plants, the Protection of New Plant Varieties Act, was passed in 2004. This regime 
recognises the role that farmers and public sector institutions play in plant genetic 
improvement, and the law expressly permits farmers – individually or collectively – as 
well as local communities and indigenous groups to file applications for plant variety 
protection.365 Meanwhile, although the plant varieties developed by professional 
                                            
362 Ranjan, P. (2009). Recent Developments in India’s Plant Variety Protection, Seed Regulation and 
Linkages with UPOV’s Proposed Membership. The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 12(3), 219-
243: 231. 
363 Deere, supra note 72 at 109. 
364 Id.  
365 Protection of New Plant Varieties Act, 2004 of Malaysia. Art. 13(d).  
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breeders must meet the UPOV-based criteria of novelty, distinctness, uniformity, and 
stability in order to receive protection,366 varieties that are bred, or discovered and 
developed by a farmer, local community, or indigenous group need only demonstrate 
novelty, distinctness, and identifiability.367 The periods of protection for these two 
categories of varieties are different, in that breeders’ varieties are granted exclusivity 
for twenty years, while farmers’ varieties are limited to a period of fifteen years of 
protection.368 
Furthermore, while the Malaysian Act does not incorporate an independent 
chapter on farmers’ rights in the style of the Indian legislation, the Act does endeavour 
to establish protections for customary agricultural practices. Thus, the Malaysian 
regime stipulates that the rights granted to plant breeders do not extend to any act of 
propagation by small farmers using the harvested material of a registered variety on 
their own holdings. Furthermore, the exchange among small farmers of “reasonable 
amounts” of the propagating materials of intellectual property protected varieties is 
expressly permitted. Finally, the Malaysian Act allows for the sale of farm-saved seeds 
of protected varieties in situations where a small-scale farmer cannot utilise these 
seeds on his own holding due to natural disaster or emergency, or any other factor 
beyond the farmer’s control.369  
While these provisions institute many of the elements of the Plant Treaty, the 
Malaysian Act also contains language that is consistent with the terms of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol. Thus, all applications for 
intellectual property in the form of plant breeders’ rights must be accompanied by a 
disclosure of the source of origin of the genetic material, or the immediate parental 
lines of the variety under consideration. The required documentation must also include 
the written consent of the authority representing the relevant local community or 
indigenous group in cases where the variety was developed using the germplasm of 
local and native plant varieties.370 
Although Malaysia is not a member of the UPOV Convention, in 2004 the 
country requested that the Union examine its Protection of New Varieties of Plants Act 
                                            
366 Id. at Art. 14(1). 
367 Id. at Art. 14(2).  
368 Id. at Art. 32. Note that both categories of varieties are eligible for a period of protection of twenty-
five years where the species in question is a tree or vine.  
369 Id. at Art. 31(1).  
370 Id. at Art. 12(1)(f). 
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for conformity with UPOV 1991. Generally, the UPOV Council found that the Malaysian 
law was consistent with the terms of UPOV 1991, incorporating “most of the substance 
of the 1991 Act.”371 However, with respect to the protection of farmers’ plant varieties, 
the Council noted that “a separate system of protection is introduced which should be 
clearly distinguishable from the breeder’s right.”372 Therefore, “it would be preferable 
to provide for a different name for this right and to deal with this separate system of 
protection in, for example, a new part of the Act.”373 This statement implies that UPOV 
would not object to the establishment of a mechanism for the protection of farmers’ 
plant varieties in the same legal instrument as a UPOV-compliant plant breeders’ 
rights regime, provided that the two categories of protection were clearly delineated.374  
The experience of countries such as India and Malaysia demonstrate that it is 
possible to integrate additional national policy goals into intellectual property laws for 
plants. The legal frameworks of these two territories are mostly concerned with 
complying simultaneously with the obligation under the TRIPS Agreement to regulate 
plants as intellectual property, and with the commitments that they have assumed 
pursuant to the Plant Treaty. The Indian and Malaysian laws are also to a certain 
extent concerned with issues of access and benefit sharing as outlined in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol.375 Other countries have 
also sought to assimilate their national intellectual property laws with these goals. 
 Some scholars have suggested that laws conceptualising plants as intellectual 
property could also accomplish goals such as (1) rewarding farmers for the historical 
conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources, or (2) regulating access 
to these resources, via the establishment of a national Seed Fund.376 Such a system 
could mandate that registrants for plant breeders’ rights contribute to the Seed Fund, 
which would then be partially redistributed to the individual farmers or the communities 
                                            
371 UPOV. Examination of the Conformity of the Protection of New Plant Varieties Act 2004 of 
Malaysia with the 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention. Document C(Extr.)/22/2. Twenty-Second 
Extraordinary Session of the UPOV Council (February 2, 2005). ¶50. 
372 Id. at ¶10. 
373 Id. 
374 Kanniah, R. (2019, forthcoming). Implementation of the Plant Variety Protection Laws of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines: Trends and Future Prospects. In K. Adhikari and D. J. Jefferson (eds.). 
Intellectual Property Law and Plant Protection: Challenges and Developments in Asia. Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge. 
375 Note however that at the time of writing of this thesis, Malaysia was not a party to the Nagoya 
Protocol. 
376 Correa, supra note 8 at 64. 
  
  
   
122 
 
from which the germplasm used to develop the new variety was sourced.377 The Seed 
Fund could also be used to support initiatives such as on-farm conservation of native 
and local plant varieties and the establishment of community seed banks.  
One country that has experimented with embodying this idea in its domestic law 
is Thailand, which established a government-administered Plant Varieties Protection 
Fund in its 1999 Plant Varieties Protection Act. In general terms, the Thai legislation 
represents an attempt to balance multiple policy goals, including those related to 
offering intellectual property for plants and to regulating access and benefit sharing. 
The Thai Act is based on both the 1991 version of the UPOV Convention and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Thus, the regime attempts to give effect to the 
benefit sharing provisions mandated under the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
its Nagoya Protocol, in part via utilisation of the Plant Varieties Protection Fund. 
The overarching purpose of this Fund is to support and subsidise activities 
related to conservation, research, and development activities for plant varieties that 
are registered under the national intellectual property law.378 In addition to delimiting 
the parameters for access and benefit sharing in Thailand, the regime requires that 
plant breeders accept a profit-sharing agreement where a “general domestic plant 
variety” or a “wild-type plant variety” or any part thereof has been used as source 
material with which to breed a “commercial variety.”379 Furthermore, the Thai Act 
provides an assortment of additional measures that are intended to serve the interests 
of diverse stakeholders in the national agricultural sector, and in parallel to uphold 
multiple international obligations. These include instituting a variegated system of 
intellectual property for new, local domestic, general domestic, and wild plant varieties; 
providing a broad exemption to plant breeders’ rights for farm-saved seed; and the 
requirement of disclosure of origin for the registration of new varieties.380 Through 
these various measures, the Thai Act operates to synthesise various international 
agreements, including the UPOV Convention (intellectual property for plant breeders); 
the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol (access to genetic 
resources and benefit sharing); and the Plant Treaty (recognition of farmers’ rights). 
                                            
377 Id. at 61. 
378 Plant Varieties Protection Act, B.E. 2542 (1999) of Thailand, § 54. 
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Although the Thai Act is innovative in its attempt to amalgamate various 
objectives, the provisions related to the Plant Varieties Protection Fund have been 
criticised by commercial breeders and farmers’ advocates alike. On the one hand, 
seed companies have argued that the Fund’s profit-sharing requirement has 
discouraged investment in the generation of improved plant varieties in Thailand, and 
has hindered the development of the country as a “seed hub.”381 On the other hand, it 
has been reported that the Plant Varieties Protection Fund does not effectively 
distribute the income received through the access and benefit sharing requirements 
of the Act, leaving local farming communities inadequately compensated for their 
contributions.382  
In part to address these criticisms, a draft amendment to the Thai Act was 
published in 2017. One of the key changes that this amendment proposed was that 
new plant varieties not based on existing Thai varieties (i.e., wild, local domestic, and 
general domestic varieties) would be exempted from the revenue sharing 
requirements that the Act currently mandates.383 If enacted, this change could have 
the effect of limiting the number of varieties that are subject to the requirements of 
obtaining prior informed consent and negotiating mutually agreeable terms for benefit 
sharing. Nevertheless, it appears that if the draft amendment were passed, the Plant 
Varieties Protection Fund would continue to be utilised as a means to meet Thailand’s 
obligations under the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Plant Treaty. 
Meanwhile, additional reforms that the amendment proposes would also bring 
Thailand into greater alignment with the UPOV Convention, of which the country is 
currently not a member.384 
                                            
381 Prasertsri, P. (2017). “Thai Plant Variety Protection Act Amendment Update.” United States 
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For its part, the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention is silent as to whether 
the establishment of a national Seed Fund as a mechanism to share benefits with 
farmers or local communities would be consistent with its system of plant breeders’ 
rights. The only relevant provision of UPOV 1978 is Article 6(2), which states that the 
grant of protection may not be made subject to conditions other than novelty, 
distinctness, uniformity, stability, and denomination. However, payments into a Seed 
Fund could be structured as requirements for the exercise rather than the grant of 
plant breeders’ rights. Thus, applicants would not be required to contribute to the Seed 
Fund as a condition for obtaining intellectual property protection. Instead, contributions 
would only need to be paid if the variety, once registered, were commercialised.  
Overall, Option 1 represents a viable strategy for countries that are legally 
bound to the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention and that are also subject to 
additional international obligations, such as those contained in the Plant Treaty or in 
the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Nagoya Protocol. Legally unbound 
countries and territories that are only bound to the TRIPS Agreement could also 
consider the option of enacting unified legislation to both regulate plants as intellectual 
property and accomplish other national goals related to the governance of certain 
types of plants. Although to date no such unitary regime has been tested in a country 
that is a member of the UPOV Convention, the experiences of non-UPOV countries 
such as India and Malaysia are illustrative, given that their governments have 
communicated directly with the UPOV Council on matters related to compliance.  
The following actions are recommended for countries that wish to follow Option 
1:  
• If the country is a member of the UPOV Convention, it should reinscribe 
the essential form of plant breeders’ rights that the version of the 
Convention to which it is subject establishes;  
• Furthermore, the country should: 
o Institute protections for customary agricultural practices such as 
exemptions from infringement of plant breeders’ rights for saving, 
using, re-planting, multiplying, exchanging, and selling (in non-
branded form) planting material obtained from protected varieties; 
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o Create a separate chapter in the law that would allow for the 
registration of different types of plant varieties, such as local and 
native landraces or wild-type plants; 
o Establish a mechanism to regulate issues of access to plant 
genetic resources and equitable benefit sharing, for instance via 
a national Seed Fund. 
 
Option 2: Parallel Laws 
The second standardised option that countries could consider to govern the 
uses of different types of plants is to enact two separate frameworks. The first of these 
would recognise plants as intellectual property. Depending on a particular country’s 
international obligations, this first law could reinscribe the UPOV-based system of 
plant breeders’ rights, or adopt sui generis rationalities. Complementarily, the second 
regime would unify all of the other policy goals that a country considers relevant to the 
regulation of various types of plants. These could include, for example, protections for 
customary agricultural practices and traditional knowledge, incentives to promote the 
sustainable use and conservation of agrobiodiversity, mechanisms for access to plant 
genetic resources and equitable benefit sharing with resource providers, and food 
security or food sovereignty. The precise subject matter to be included in the non-
intellectual property framework will also depend on whether a particular country is 
subject to obligations under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Nagoya 
Protocol, the Plant Treaty, or some combination of the three.    
For countries that are legally bound to the UPOV Convention, the first law that 
would be instituted under Option 2 is straightforward. That is, these governments 
would establish a framework that would be consistent with the version of UPOV to 
which they must adhere, taking advantage of the pertinent flexibilities provided in the 
Convention if so desired. Meanwhile, legally unbound countries or territories that are 
only subject to the TRIPS Agreement would have broader policy space. As such, these 
States could create locally tailored systems for the embodiment of plants as the 
subject matter of intellectual property, attending to the various considerations 
surrounding the conventional approaches discussed throughout Chapter 2. 
While this thesis has already focused extensively on the first relevant law to be 
introduced according to Option 2 – that is, a framework for the regulation of plants as 
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intellectual property – the structure of the second type of law has not yet been fully 
explored. Given that this legislation would amalgamate provisions from the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, the Plant Treaty, and the Nagoya Protocol, it would need to 
incorporate various elements. These include protections for customary agricultural 
practices (“farmers’ rights” in the parlance of the Plant Treaty), as well as a mechanism 
for access and benefit sharing. Although prior lawmaking projects have not generally 
considered these issues in a unified manner, some regional and national level 
initiatives provide insights.  
One prominent example is contained in the African Model Legislation for the 
Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the 
Regulation of Access to Biological Resources (the “African Model Law”). The 
development of this regime dates to the early 1990s, shortly after the conclusion of 
negotiations leading to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Early drafts of the 
African Model Law only dealt with issues of access and benefit sharing. Meanwhile, 
subsequent versions reflected the influence of international non-governmental 
organisations, because they also addressed concerns related to the protection of 
customary agricultural practices.385  
These various influences resulted in the development of the African Model Law 
into a comprehensive template for the integration of a variety of policy goals that 
related to the subject matter covered by the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
Plant Treaty, and the Nagoya Protocol. Subsequently, the Model Law further evolved 
such that when the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity386 finally 
endorsed the regime in 2000, it also contained a sui generis system to grant intellectual 
property to plant breeders. Thus, in its finalised form, the African Model Law also 
embodies a framework that would allow national governments to comply with the 
TRIPS Agreement.   
The final text of the African Model Law includes several specific objectives. The 
first two of these are (1) to “recognise, protect, and support the inalienable rights of 
local communities including farming communities over their biological resources, 
knowledge, and technologies”; and (2) to “recognise and protect the rights of 
                                            
385 Zerbe, N. (2007). Contesting Privatization: NGOs and Farmers’ Rights in the African Model Law. 
Global Environmental Politics, 7(1), 97-119, 110. 
386 This organisation was disbanded in 2002 by its last chairperson, South African President Thabo 
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breeders.”387 The regime conceives of these two primordial goals as complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive. Thus, in addition to providing a system of plant 
breeders’ rights similar to the framework established in the UPOV Convention, the 
African Model Law grants a variety of protections related to customary agricultural 
practices.  
Foremost, the African Model Law guarantees farmers’ ability to save, use, 
exchange, and sell farm-saved seed or the propagating material of farmers’ varieties, 
which are also eligible for registration.388 Farmers are further permitted to use 
breeders’ new plant varieties to develop farmers’ varieties,389 and to collectively save, 
use, multiply, and process farm-saved seed obtained from any variety protected under 
the framework.390 However, farmers are prohibited from selling the farm-saved seed 
of protected breeders’ varieties at industrial or commercial scales.  
The African Model Law also guarantees the protection of traditional knowledge 
related to plant and animal genetic resources.391 A further innovation of the regime is 
that it recognises that farmers’ plant varieties and animal breeds are eligible for 
protection according to the customary practices and laws of the concerned local 
farming communities. The African Model Law allows for the enforcement of these 
customary norms independent of whether they have been formally codified in national 
legislation.392  
In addition to relevant customary protocols, the African Model Law stipulates 
that the domestic laws of Member States must provide a form of “intellectual 
protection” for the plant varieties that farmers develop, in the form of a variety 
certificate. According to this system, farmers’ plant varieties do not need to meet the 
criteria of distinctness, uniformity, and stability to be registered.393 The conditions of 
the variety certificate entitle the community that owns the certificate to multiply, 
cultivate, use, sell, or license the protected variety exclusively, without prejudice to the 
rights of farmers from other communities.394   
                                            
387 African Model Legislation for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and 
Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources (“African Model Law”) (2000). 
Part I(a) and (b).   
388 Id. at § 26(1)(d). 
389 Id. at § 26(1)(e). 
390 Id. at § 26(1)(f). 
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The African Model Law also incorporates elements from the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol. Specifically, the regime entitles 
providers of genetic resources to obtain an equitable share of any benefits arising from 
the commercial use of plant and animal genetic resources.395 Furthermore, the 
framework requires legal mechanisms to be developed at the national level for 
individual farmers and rural communities to participate in making decisions on matters 
related to the conservation and sustainable use of plant and animal genetic 
resources.396 
The African Model Law thus represents an interesting example of how multiple 
policy goals related to the regulation of the access and use of different types of plants 
could be consolidated into a parsimonious legal framework. Since the regional 
endorsement of the African Model Law in 2000, however, the regime has largely 
stagnated. Some Member States of the Organisation of African Unity have 
incorporated certain provisions from the Model Law into national lawmaking projects, 
but the legislation has mostly been ignored.397 Nevertheless, the initiative could 
provide an interesting template that countries could study, where there is motivation 
to enact a comprehensive law to meet the various obligations established in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the Plant Treaty, and the Nagoya Protocol.  
However, it should be noted that many of the provisions included in the African 
Model Law would not be consistent with a UPOV 1991-based system of plant 
breeders’ rights. This is largely due to the restrictions that this version of the UPOV 
Convention places on farm-saved seed. In contrast, it is unlikely that UPOV 1978 
would limit the ability of its signatories to implement legislation inspired by the African 
Model Law. It is true that at the time when the African Model Law was adopted, the 
plant breeders’ rights section was heavily criticised by UPOV, based on the contention 
that public interest issues (e.g., food security, community rights) “should be separated 
from the commercial rights of breeders.”398 Nevertheless, this statement indicates that 
separation of these “public interest issues” from the system for granting proprietary 
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Smallholder Farmers’ Interests. Journal of Law and Policy, 7(3), 100-111: 103.  
398 Strba, S. I. (2017). Legal and Institutional Considerations for Plant Variety Protection and Food 
Security in African Development Agendas: Solutions from WIPO? Journal of Intellectual Property Law 
& Practice, 12(3), 191-205: 193. 
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rights to plant breeders could be a viable option for countries that are legally bound to 
the UPOV Convention.  
In other words, it might be preferable for many countries to separate their 
obligations under the UPOV Convention to legislate systems for plant breeders’ rights 
from other lawmaking priorities. In any case, whether or not governments are legally 
bound to the UPOV Convention, they could follow Option 2 by enacting two separate 
laws. One regime would recognise plants as intellectual property (whether or not 
according to the UPOV Convention model), while a second framework would govern 
a variety of other issues relevant to the regulation of the access and use of different 
types of plants. This latter law could include various provisions, such as:   
• A mechanism for the registration of different types of plant varieties, 
including those which have been newly developed by individual farmers 
or rural communities, as well as local and native landrace varieties, and 
wild-type plants. This system of protection could be based on different 
criteria for the protection of different types of plants, and it could establish 
a distinct scope of protection for each category.  
• Guarantees related to the use by farmers of the seed and other 
propagating material from intellectual property protected plant varieties 
for non-commercial purposes, including to save, use, re-plant, multiply, 
exchange, sell (in non-branded form),399 and conduct further breeding. 
Ideally, these provisions would be reinforced by a broad farmers’ 
privilege that would also be incorporated into the national plant breeders’ 
rights legislation. 
• Protections for traditional knowledge related to plant (and possibly 
animal) genetic resources for food and agriculture. Traditional 
knowledge rights could also extend to subject matter not related to 
agriculture. Protection could take the form of government-administered 
or community-based registries of traditional knowledge, as well as via 
mechanisms for prevention, enforcement, and sanctions for 
misappropriation.  
                                            
399 Note that UPOV 1991 countries would likely not be able to recognise the ability of farmers to 
exchange or sell protected breeders’ varieties, pursuant to the terms of the optional exception 
articulated in UPOV 1991 Article 15.2.  
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• Rules governing access to genetic resources and equitable benefit 
sharing. If a country is legally bound to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and its Nagoya Protocol or the Plant Treaty, then its domestic 
law should comply with these international obligations. Thus, protocols 
could be established for how to obtain free, prior informed consent from 
communities that manage relevant genetic resources; how to draft 
mutually agreeable terms for an access agreement; and how to 
negotiate the equitable sharing of both monetary and non-monetary 
benefits derived from the commercial exploitation of any plant genetic 
resources provided. The framework for access and benefit sharing could 
be partially structured around a national Seed Fund or Gene Fund, if 
desired. 
• Specification of the means through which individual farmers in particular 
and rural communities in general could participate in decision-making on 
matters related to the conservation and sustainable use of resources that 
are important for food and agriculture. The relevant subject matter 
should include, at minimum, plant genetic resources, but it could also 
extend to other types of resources that are of significant concern for 
farmers, such as land or water. Procedures for participation in decision-
making should include, at minimum, consultations prior to the enactment 
of any new law or regulation or the reform of existing regimes.   
 
The standardised approaches to the regulation of plants as intellectual property 
described in Chapter 2 may be attractive options for lawmakers to consider. Indeed, 
certain territories such as India have already experimented with Option 1. Others, 
including Nepal and Sri Lanka, are currently undertaking similar efforts. As for Option 
2, several countries have already implemented or are currently in the process of 
developing legislation to govern the uses of different types of plants, according to 
rationalities beyond plant breeders’ rights. These regimes have been most commonly 
oriented around the regulation of access and benefit sharing in relation to plant genetic 
resources. In contrast, fewer examples exist of systems that would allow for the legal 
inscription or registration of different categories of plants, including those developed 
by farmers.  
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Although these standardised approaches to lawmaking may be interesting for 
lawmakers to consider, in practice it is probable that countries will regulate the various 
issues related to the uses of different types of plants in multiple independent legal 
frameworks. This may be explained by several factors. Foremost, as discussed 
throughout the thesis, the plant breeders’ rights model – as embodied most 
prominently in the UPOV Convention – has come to dominate legal imaginaries for 
how countries regulate the ways that different actors may use plants. It is therefore 
likely that many governments will recapitulate recent trends, by continuing to enact 
intellectual property systems for plants based on the UPOV template, whether or not 
they are formal members of the Convention.  
Furthermore, among lawyers, government officials, and scholars alike, there 
exists a general lack of comprehension about how the various approaches and legal 
obligations related to the regulation of different types of plants intersect, overlap, and 
diverge from one another. Few systematic studies – let alone pragmatic legal 
frameworks – exist as precedents to elucidate how various policy goals related to the 
uses of different types of plants might be successfully amalgamated. Therefore, it is 
likely that many countries will adopt a patchwork of laws and regulations, which may 
or may not be designed according to some common, centralised strategy. It is for these 
governments that the case study of Ecuador, analysed in Part 2 of the thesis, will be 
especially informative.     
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Part 2. Experimenting with Intellectual Property for Plants: The 
Case Study of Ecuador 
Before delving into the Ecuadorian case study, it will be helpful to recall that the 
aim of this thesis is to explore the limitations and possibilities for the making of 
intellectual property laws for plants. Part 1 of the thesis has centred on characterising 
the various legal obligations related to the regulation of plants as intellectual property 
to which many countries are subject. Furthermore, Part 1 has described additional 
considerations that are relevant for the governance of different types of plants, 
including norms that have been embodied in legal frameworks outside of the realm of 
intellectual property. Following this global survey, Part 2 of the thesis recounts how 
experimentation with the regulation of plants as intellectual property has operated in 
one location, specifically Ecuador.    
In recent years, Ecuador has designed an ambitious agenda aimed at 
legislative reform in several domains. One initiative, commonly referred to as the 
“Ingenios Act”400 is organised around objectives that include redefining how knowledge 
is generated and transferred, and under what circumstances intellectual resources 
may constitute the subject matter of exclusive rights. The legal experiment embodied 
in Ecuador’s Ingenios Act centres on re-imagining how intellectual property is 
conceived and protected, in service of a comprehensive national development 
agenda. Ecuador is one of the smallest and most densely populated independent 
nations in South America, with a population numbering some sixteen million. However, 
notwithstanding the diminutive size of the country, the reconfiguration of the national 
system for intellectual property governance, in addition to other areas of legislative 
reform relevant to the access and use of different types of plants, mean that Ecuador 
is an important site of analysis.  
The Ecuadorian case study presented here is based on fieldwork conducted in 
Quito, the capital of Ecuador and seat of the country’s government, from January 
through July 2016, and again in October 2018. However, it should be noted that my 
engagement with Ecuadorian institutions in general and the Ingenios project in 
particular began in 2013, when as a lawyer with the Public Intellectual Property 
                                            
400 In its enacted form, this law is known as the Organic Code for the Social Economy of Knowledge, 
Creativity and Innovation. Registro Oficial, Órgano del Gobierno del Ecuador. (2016). Código 
Orgánico de la Economía Social de los Conocimientos, Creatividad e Innovación. Año IV – No. 899.  
  
  
   
133 
 
Resource for Agriculture I worked on a two-year project with the Ecuadorian National 
Institute for Agricultural Research. I visited Ecuador twice during this period, in October 
2013 and April 2014, when I collaborated closely with officials in the National Institute 
for Agricultural Research to develop an internal intellectual property policy. It was then 
that I first learned of the Ingenios project, which at the time was still undergoing internal 
revision at the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute.   
During fieldwork, I conducted semi-structured interviews in Spanish with 
approximately 40 individuals who had close connections to the Ingenios project. 
Interviewees included elected representatives in the National Assembly, directors of 
governmental and intergovernmental agencies – including the Ecuadorian Intellectual 
Property Institute and the National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, 
Technology and Innovation – as well as attorneys working in the private sector, 
industry representatives, foreign diplomats, entrepreneurs, academic researchers and 
scientists, journalists, and leaders of civil society organisations that represent 
indigenous and rural communities. Multiple interviews were conducted with some of 
these individuals. Particularly helpful contacts included a former director of the 
Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute and other officials from the Institute (which 
later became the National Service for Intellectual Rights), who were collectively 
responsible for overseeing the development of drafts of the Ingenios Bill before the 
text was formally submitted to the National Assembly. 
In addition to these interviews, I also had numerous informal conversations with 
actors involved in the making of the Ingenios Act as well as other national policies 
related to intellectual property, agriculture, and economic development. These 
dialogues occurred during frequent visits to the offices of government agencies 
including the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute / the National Service for 
Intellectual Rights; the National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology 
and Innovation; the National Institute for Agricultural Research; the Ministry of 
Agriculture; and Yachay. This latter institution was founded in 2014 but it expanded 
substantially during the course of my fieldwork, growing to fit its designation as the 
national “City of Knowledge.” The purpose of Yachay was to operate as a government-
sponsored hub for technological innovation and knowledge-intensive business 
development in the Imbabura province of Ecuador. While living in Quito in 2016, I 
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frequently travelled to the Yachay campus in Urcuquí, where I acted as a volunteer 
advisor for the Directorate of Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer.  
My fieldwork in Ecuador also included participation in numerous events in Quito 
related to the formation of the Ingenios Act, as well as agricultural and economic 
development policy in general. These included debates about the Ingenios Bill that 
were hosted by private sector entities (e.g., software companies and law firms) and 
the public academic sector; conferences on issues related to intellectual property, 
agriculture, food security, and food sovereignty; and pre-legislative consultations with 
groups representing indigenous and rural peoples in the National Assembly. 
Representatives of the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute were also present at 
many of these events, ostensibly to take the views expressed into consideration for 
the purposes of revising the text of the Ingenios Bill, which in 2016 was still under 
consideration in the National Assembly. I regularly sat with these representatives and 
spoke with them about the proposed revisions to the Ingenios text.  
The theoretical framework of participant-observation informed the fieldwork that 
I conducted in Ecuador. This methodology involves immersion in a particular setting 
and interaction with social actors towards the end of “document[ing] ‘practices,’ those 
moments when belief and action come together.”401 As a participant-observer in 
Ecuadorian governmental, academic, and civil society institutions, I was interested to 
investigate practices related to the making of laws whose purpose is to regulate plants 
as intellectual property. More specifically, I wanted to witness instances in which actors 
involved in the lawmaking process made decisions about the form that intellectual 
property for plants would take. I sought to document how these individuals theoretically 
and textually reconciled a variety of external and internal pressures that surrounded 
the making of the new law, and the assumptions that they made when thinking about 
intellectual property for plants.  
Anthropologists generally accept the idea that there is no absolute correct way 
to balance participation and observation in ethnographic research.402 Consistent with 
this notion, my fieldwork involved continuous navigation of a continuum between 
proximity and distance. The conversations that I had in government offices and 
                                            
401 Luker, K. (2008). “Field (and Other) Methods.” In Salsa Dancing into the Social Sciences: 
Research in an Age of Info-Glut. Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press. pp. 158. 
402 Musante, K. (2014). Participant Observation. In Bernard, H. R. & Gravlee, C. C. (eds.). Handbook 
of Methods in Cultural Anthropology. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 262. 
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legislative chambers in Quito and Urcuquí oscillated between articulations of abstract 
concepts and concrete exercises. Generally, discussions centred on the language that 
could be incorporated into legal texts such that Ecuador would fulfil its obligations 
under the TRIPS Agreement and the UPOV Convention, while simultaneously 
effectuating the goals of protecting other national interests such as customary 
agricultural practices and agrobiodiversity. In addition to these external factors, I 
frequently discussed with interviewees certain internal dynamics that shaped the form 
of intellectual property for plants that was embodied in the final version of the Ingenios 
Act. The notes that I compiled through interviews and participant-observation in 
Ecuador during the making of the Ingenios Act have informed the analysis presented 
throughout Part 2 of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3. The Making of a New Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Law 
In 2014, the National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology and 
Innovation of Ecuador announced that it was launching a project to formulate a new 
“Organic Code for the Social Economy of Knowledge, Creativity, and Innovation” (a/k/a 
the “Ingenios Act,” roughly translated as the Ingenuity Act).403 The Ingenios Act was 
passed in October 2016, following the approval of a significant majority of the National 
Assembly,404 and the final version of the text was published in the Ecuadorian Official 
Registry of Laws in December 2016. The Ingenios Act had not yet been fully 
implemented as of 2018. However, a presidential decree establishing a general 
regulatory framework was emitted in May 2017,405 and the National Service for 
Intellectual Rights was in the process of drafting the technical regulations as of late 
2018.    
The framework of the Ingenios Act encompasses four broad sections (called 
“Books” in the Act), comprising (1) the creation of a national system for science, 
technology, innovation, and ancestral knowledge; (2) provisions on “responsible 
research” and “social innovation”; (3) norms for the management of knowledge 
(including the various forms of intellectual property); and (4) financing and incentives 
for the national system of science, technology, innovation, and ancestral knowledge. 
Taken together, these components represent a comprehensive attempt not only to 
recreate Ecuador’s national legal framework for intellectual property, but also to 
redefine how intellectual property intertwines with other public initiatives, such as those 
governing higher education, research, innovation, and entrepreneurship. 
The project to restructure the Ecuadorian intellectual property system is far from 
a conventional or formulistic attempt at legal reform. Rather, it is the culmination of a 
series of social, cultural, political, and geopolitical tensions that have been unfolding 
at the national, regional, and global levels over the past several decades. As such, to 
understand the breadth of Ecuador’s intellectual property experiment requires a review 
of the socio-legal history of the country in particular and the Andean region generally. 
                                            
403 Código Orgánico de la Economía Social de los Conocimientos, Creatividad e Innovación del 
Ecuador. (9 de diciembre de 2016). Registro Oficial No. 899. (hereafter “Ingenios Act”).  
404 Asamblea aprobó el Código Ingenios, EL COMERCIO (11 October 2016), retrieved from 
http://www.elcomercio.com/tendencias/asambleanacional-aprobacion-codigoingenios-debate-
votacion.html (accessed 13 October 2016) (noting that the Código Ingenios was approved with a vote 
count of 88-22, with one abstention).  
405 Reglamento General al Código Orgánico de la Economía Social de los Conocimientos, Creatividad 
e Innovación. Decreto Presidencial No. 1435. (23 de mayo de 2017). 
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Of fundamental importance is a comprehension of how Ecuadorian lawmakers, 
embedded in this context, sought to restructure certain dynamics, including 
relationships between customary and industrialised agriculture, between local and 
international markets, and between modern scientific and traditional forms of 
knowledge.  
 
3.1. Contextualising the Ecuadorian Case Study 
The political history of Ecuador throughout the twentieth century was fraught 
with instability.406 Several successive military regimes ruled the country between the 
1960s and 1979, at which point Ecuador reinstated a constitutional democratic system. 
However, the return to democracy did not secure stability in the country, with continued 
unrest attributable in large part to economic issues. By 1998, the devastating 
environmental effects of the El Niño climactic phenomenon coupled with the 
precipitous fall in global crude oil prices led Ecuador to declare bankruptcy, which in 
turn provoked skyrocketing inflation. In 2000, President Jamil Mahaud converted 
Ecuador’s currency to the United States dollar, which resulted in further price 
increases. Subsequently, Mahaud’s successor President Gustavo Noboa imposed 
tough austerity measures, and concurrently several of the largest banks in the country 
collapsed.  
In the meantime, various social movements began to coalesce in the early 
2000s, comprised of groups that demonstrated in protest of fiscal austerity policies 
and governmental corruption, and in favour of the need to better recognise the rights 
of indigenous and traditional ethnic communities. In 2006, Rafael Correa was elected 
to the Presidency as a representative of the newly formed “Country Alliance” (Alianza 
País) party. One of Correa’s most significant campaign promises was to reform the 
Ecuadorian Constitution comprehensively. Correa upheld this promise and a new 
                                            
406 The information presented in this section on the political rise of Rafael Correa as President of 
Ecuador under the banner of the Citizen’s Revolution has been culled from various sources including 
a book written by Correa himself. Correa, R. (2012). Ecuador: De Banana Republic a la No 
República. Quito, Ecuador: Debate. Other relevant sources include Becker, M. (2011). Pachakutik 
Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield; 
Morales López, E. (2012). El Discurso Político de Rafael Correa (Presidente de Ecuador), Tonos 
Digital, 23. 
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Constitution was drafted in 2007, with significant popular participation via a national 
Constituent Assembly.  
The new Constitution, which the National Assembly enacted in 2008, mandated 
that a fresh wave of general elections be conducted in 2009. Correa, capitalising on 
the popularity of the 2008 Constitution, was elected again. He was then re-elected to 
a second consecutive term in 2013, which ended in May 2017. Subsequently, voters 
chose Correa’s former Vice President, Lenín Moreno, by a narrow margin in the 2017 
election to lead the country until 2021. The present moment thus represents the 
longest period of democratic political stability in Ecuador in recent history. Indeed, prior 
to the Correa presidency, the country had witnessed the arrival and departure of seven 
heads of state in ten years.  
At the time when he first took office, President Correa and the new political 
movement that he ushered into power, the “Citizens’ Revolution” (Revolución 
Ciudadana), represented a departure from traditional Ecuadorian politics. Prior to his 
first election, Correa had been a relative outsider to the national political arena. 
Although he had briefly held the position of Minister of Economy and Finance under 
President Alfredo Palacio, Correa had not occupied any other prominent political 
office. He was relatively young, from a middle-working class background, educated, 
with scholarship support, in universities in the United States and Europe. Although 
Correa did not himself grow up in an indigenous community, he appeared to 
understand rural poverty and he spoke Quichua, the most common indigenous 
language in Ecuador.  
Politically, Correa described himself as a “moderate leftist,” who advocated for 
“twenty-first century socialism.”407 This theory, which will be discussed in detail in later 
sections of the thesis, envisages a social structure that privileges human needs over 
financial capital, but that does not completely abandon free market capitalism. This 
new model for socialism has been described as centring around four essential “axes,” 
which are (1) sustainable use of nature; (2) privileging use value over exchange value; 
(3) democracy; and (4) multiculturalism.408 During the decade when Correa held the 
                                            
407 Gualdoni, F. (1 de octubre de 2007). “Correa dirige a Ecuador hacia el ‘socialismo del siglo XXI’ de 
inspiración chavista.” El País. Retrieved from 
https://elpais.com/diario/2007/10/01/internacional/1191189611_850215.html.  
408 Houtart, F. (2009). Socialismo del Siglo XXI: Superar la Lógica Capitalista. In A. Acosta & E. 
Martínez (eds.). El Buen Vivir: Una Vía para el Desarrollo. Quito, Ecuador: Ediciones Abya-Yala. 
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presidency in Ecuador, these concepts were officialised and variously inscribed in 
numerous new national laws and policies.       
The 2008 Constitution itself embodies many of the ideals that are associated 
with twenty-first century socialism, while also borrowing certain concepts and values 
from indigenous Andean cosmologies. The new regime consciously rejects prior Latin 
American and European constitutional models as colonialist. For instance, critics of 
previous Ecuadorian governments claimed that the internationalisation of Ecuadorian 
economy under the 1979 and 1998 Constitutions resulted in the reduction of national 
sovereignty while reinforcing “Western/modern/capitalist/liberal culture.”409 
Popular repudiation of the 1998 Constitution was galvanised through the 
construction of an “emancipatory social consciousness” in Ecuador, a process in which 
a great diversity of actors participated.410 The success of the constitutional reform in 
2008 – and indeed, of the Citizens’ Revolution itself – is attributable at least in part to 
the collaboration of stakeholders who had not typically worked together in the past. 
Thus, during the making of the new Constitution, peasant (campesino411) and 
indigenous peoples’ organisations found advocates from an array of backgrounds, 
including scholars, urban professionals, feminist groups, social leaders, old guard 
politicians, the Ecuadorian military, and university students.412  
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of social actors involved, the mobilisations 
spearheaded by indigenous and peasant activists were among the most important 
drivers that motivated the foundation of the Citizens’ Revolution and the making of the 
2008 Constitution. Civil society organisations including the Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador coordinated actions including street marches and 
protests, as well as participation in national politics to challenge the neoliberal 
economic and social reforms that were adopted throughout the 1990s.413 An issue that 
united diverse indigenous peoples’ and peasant movements was opposition to the 
                                            
409 Fernández, B. S., & Puente, F. (2012). Configuración y Demandas de los Movimientos Sociales 
Hacia la Asamblea Constituyente en Bolivia y Ecuador. Iconos, Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 44. 
410 Martínez Dalmau, R. (2009). El Proyecto de Constitución de Ecuador, Ejemplo del Nuevo 
Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano. Revista del Instituto de Ciencias Jurídicas de Puebla, 23, 264-
274: 269. 
411 In the context of Ecuadorian agriculture, the term campesino can be most accurately translated as 
peasant or rural folk. However, for the purposes of this thesis I will use the word campesino to 
interchangeably mean both peasant and smallholder farmer. 
412 Id. 
413 Becker, M. (2011). Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New Constitution in 
Ecuador. Latin American Perspectives, 38(1), 47-62. 
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“agroexport” model that the 1979 and 1998 Constitutions installed in Ecuador. This 
system was criticised for prioritising the allocation of public resources to support 
industrial agriculture, which opponents claimed marginalised smallholder farmers and 
customary agrarian practices.414  
Prior to the organisation of the 2007 Constituent Assembly during which the 
2008 Constitution was drafted, movements demanding greater rights for rural peoples 
gained increasing visibility in national politics. This recognition was further catalysed 
through the promotion of “buen vivir,” a concept that incorporated a series of 
campesino demands including those related to land and water rights, biodiversity 
protections, and food sovereignty. Buen vivir, translated as “good living” or “living well” 
– in contradistinction to “living better” – is a notion derived from indigenous Andean 
cosmologies in which human beings interact collectively and harmoniously with each 
other and with nature.   
Buen vivir became a key motivation for the constitutional reformation process 
that was undertaken during the 2007 Constituent Assembly. Alberto Acosta, the 
Ecuadorian economist who served as President of the Constituent Assembly, 
advocated for the inclusion of the concept in the 2008 Constitution to make explicit the 
intention to abandon the then-reigning orientation towards development through 
neoliberal economic policies.415 Subsequently, and throughout the Correa presidency 
Ecuadorian lawmakers repeatedly invoked buen vivir as an “ordering paradigm” that 
criticised standard international conceptions of development and economic growth 
and declared that such objectives should be checked by newly constitutionalised rights 
designed to protect marginalised groups, including smallholder farmers and 
indigenous peoples.416 In this context, buen vivir may be understood as a “complex, 
not lineal concept”417 that was translated from indigenous cosmology to official 
doctrine in Ecuador. 
In addition to the political dynamics that have embroiled Ecuador in recent 
history, economic shifts in the country provide an important backdrop to the Ingenios 
                                            
414 Rosero, F., Carbonell, Y., & Regalado, F. (2011). Soberanía Alimentaria, Modelos de Desarrollo y 
Tierras en Ecuador. Quito, CAFOLIS, FES/ILDIS, OXFAM, UPS.  
415 Becker, supra note 413. 
416 Gudynas, E. & Acosta, A. (2011). La Renovación de la Crítica al Desarrollo y el Buen Vivir como 
Alternativa. Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana, 16(53).  
417 Domínguez, R. & Caria, S. (2014) La Ideología del Buen Vivir: La Metamorfoses de una 
“Alternativa al Desarrollo” en Desarrollo de Toda la Vida. Pre-textos para el Debate, No. 2. Quito: 
Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, pp. 26. 
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experiment. Over the past century, various models for the interaction between the 
State and markets proliferated across the Andean region. These have included at least 
three distinct “moments,” including: “progress” or modernisation based on the 
extraction and exportation of raw materials; industrialisation overseen and directed by 
the State; and market reforms since the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s.418 Each of 
these eras was based on a different perception of the appropriate level of 
interventionist involvement that the State should have in the economy. On one hand, 
structuralism proposed an active role of the national government in regulating 
agriculture, industrialisation, social security, and the labour market. On the other, 
neoliberalism – with policies synthesized under the paradigm of the “Washington 
Consensus”419 – advocated for laissez-faire governmental policies, privatisation, and 
market self-regulation. 
However, in Ecuador neither structuralism nor neoliberalism was able to 
overcome the country’s historical model of “dependent integration into the global 
economy.”420 Thus, notwithstanding various attempts at national economic and fiscal 
reform, Ecuador’s participation in global markets has traditionally relied on exporting 
raw commodities with little value added, the prices for which are subject to market 
fluctuations and demand. In an attempt to upend this dynamic, the Citizens’ Revolution 
government under the Correa administration propounded a strategy of “sovereign and 
competitive integration into the world market.”421 This approach involved the rejection 
of many bilateral and regional free trade agreements, a deliberate transition towards 
a service-based economy, and the generation of scientific and technological capacity, 
as a departure from the extraction and exportation of natural resources.  
The general vision of the Citizens’ Revolution strategy was outlined in the 2008 
Constitution, which some scholars have lauded as a “legal-political manifestation of 
the creative intent of the Ecuadorian people,” and a contrast to the predominant 
                                            
418 Falconí, F. & Oleas-Montalvo, J. (2016). Citizens’ Revolution and International Integration: 
Obstacles and Opportunities in World Trade. (V.J. Furio, tr.) Latin American Perspectives, 43, 124-
142. 
419 See Williamson, J. (2009). A Short History of the Washington Consensus. In N. Serra & J. E. 
Stiglitz (eds). The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (describing the original 10 principles behind the Washington 
Consensus). 
420 Falconí & Oleas-Montalvo, supra note 418 at 128.  
421 Id. at 131.  
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historical Latin American model of non-democratic (“crillo”) constitutionalism.422 At its 
best, the new Constitution “affirmed national and popular sovereignty, strengthened 
the State, reformed the political system, and introduced a new model of 
development.”423 One important aspect of the 2008 Constitution is the legitimation of 
opposition groups, which have “gone from being opponents of the constitution to being 
political opponents.”424 Thus, the new Constitution intends to break the historical 
influence of elite interest groups in Ecuadorian politics, meanwhile recognising new 
categories of rights and installing novel procedures for popular participation in 
constitutional and legislative reform.  
Among the most significant new rights that the 2008 Constitution grants are the 
“fundamental and irrevocable human right to water” (Art. 12); the “right to secure and 
permanent access to healthy, sufficient, and nutritious food” (Art. 13); the “right to live 
in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment” (Art. 14); the right of persons to 
“construe and maintain their proper cultural identity” (Art. 21); and, perhaps most 
innovative of all, the express recognition of nature as “subject of those rights which the 
Constitution recognises.” (Art. 10). This provision effectively transforms nature from 
functioning as an “object of rights assigned by human beings to a subject of rights and 
therefore possessed of intrinsic value.”425 However, since nature is unable to enforce 
these rights on its own behalf, the Constitution delegates this responsibility to the 
State.426  
The 2008 Constitution also represents a significant shift away from the 
framework established under previous Ecuadorian constitutional models in matters 
related to customary and small-scale agriculture, including access to seeds and other 
planting material. The paradigm that the former 1998 Constitution promoted included 
“the right to a quality of life that assures health, food and nutrition […].” This model 
obligated the State to “guarantee the right to health, the promotion and protection 
thereof, by means of the development of food security.”427 However, the provisions of 
                                            
422 Martinez D., R. (2016). Democratic Constitutionalism and Constitutional Innovation in Ecuador: 
The 2008 Constitution. (V.J. Furio, tr.) Latin American Perspectives, 206, 158-174: 160. 
423 Ortiz, S. (2011). 30-S: La Vulnerabilidad del Liderazgo de la Revolución Ciudadana y de la 
Institucionalidad en Ecuador. Íconos: Revista de Ciencas Sociales, 39, 25-34: 26.  
424 Martinez, supra note 422 at 163 (emphasis in original). 
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the 1998 Constitution did not consider where, by whom, and through what means food 
is produced.  
In contrast, the 2008 Constitution embraces the idea of “food sovereignty” as 
“a strategic objective and an obligation of the State to guarantee that persons, 
communities, peoples and nationalities permanently achieve self-sufficiency 
surrounding healthy and culturally appropriate foods.”428 This new constitutional model 
conceptualises food sovereignty as independence or self-reliance surrounding the 
production of and access to food, which implies broad access to seeds and other 
planting material. The language related to food sovereignty in the 2008 Constitution 
was developed through the direct engagement of peasant and indigenous peoples’ 
organisations in the 2007 Constituent Assembly, during which groups such as the 
National Federation of Peasant, Indigenous, and Black Organisations and the Unitary 
Confederation of Rural Social Security Associations participated in numerous debates 
and round table discussions.429  
The promotion of peoples’ autonomy over local systems of food production is 
reinforced by the recognition in the 2008 Constitution of “the right to the secure and 
permanent access to healthy, sufficient and nutritious food; preferentially produced at 
the local level and in correspondence with [peoples’] diverse identities and cultural 
traditions.”430 Additionally, the 2008 Constitution enumerates a series of government 
obligations designed to realise the goals of food sovereignty by fostering self-reliance. 
These include, among other objectives, to promote smallholder production; to avoid 
the dependence on food imports; to promote the preservation and recovery of national 
agrobiodiversity and ancestral knowledge; and to ensure the free use, saving, and 
exchange of seeds.431  
Given the breadth of the reforms that the new constitutional regime undertakes, 
numerous subordinate legal frameworks have been subject to revision following the 
enactment of the 2008 Constitution. Many of these laws have been expressly designed 
to address the guarantees that the new Constitution enshrines surrounding issues of 
interest to indigenous and other campesino peoples in Ecuador, including small-scale 
farmers. For instance, a new Law for the Food Sovereignty Regime was passed in 
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2009. This legislation was designed to ensure that “the State will comply with its 
obligation and strategic objective of permanently guaranteeing to persons, 
communities, and peoples the self-sufficiency of healthy, nutritious and culturally 
appropriate food.”432 The new food sovereignty law established a series of 
governmental objectives including to promote sustainable food production; promote 
the association of small and medium producers to improve conditions in the 
production, storage, transformation, conservation, and commercialisation of food; 
incentivise the consumption of healthy, nutritious, and organic food; and promote 
democratic participation in lawmaking surrounding food sovereignty.433  
The Law for the Food Sovereignty Regime also created the quasi-governmental 
Plurinational and Intercultural Conference for Food Sovereignty (“COPISA” for its 
Spanish acronym). The purpose of this institution is to generate and manage debate 
towards the formation of new laws and policies related to agricultural production in 
Ecuador, through continuous engagement with civil society actors. Towards this end, 
COPISA was instrumental in drafting a bill that was eventually modified and enacted 
as the 2017 Law for Agrobiodiversity, Seeds, and the Promotion of Sustainable 
Agriculture. This law will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the thesis, but it is worth 
mentioning here that the principal objectives of the framework include to 
“[E]nsure the production, free and permanent use of seeds of quality and 
variety, through the promotion, scientific investigation and regulation of models 
of sustainable agriculture; respecting the diverse identities, knowledge and 
traditions for the end of guaranteeing the self-sufficiency of healthy, diverse, 
nutritious and culturally appropriate foods to achieve food sovereignty and 
contribute to Buen Vivir” (Art. 1).    
Taken together, the Law for the Food Sovereignty Regime and the Law for 
Agrobiodiversity, Seeds, and the Promotion of Sustainable Agriculture demonstrate 
that issues related to the governance of different types of plants have emerged as 
significant legislative priorities in Ecuador since the enactment of the 2008 
Constitution. In a similar way, the new constitutional regime precipitated discussions 
over how to reform the country’s intellectual property law in order that it would better 
align with the buen vivir philosophy institutionalised by the 2008 Constitution. In 2014, 
                                            
432 Ley Orgánica del Régimen de la Soberanía Alimentaria del Ecuador. Registro Oficial Suplemento 
583 (5 de mayo de 2009). Art. 1. 
433 Id. at Art. 3. 
  
  
   
145 
 
the Ecuadorian National Assembly declared that the “intellectual property law 
promulgated in 1998 is not in harmony with the rights and guarantees established in 
the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador.”434 The Ingenios project was formally 
launched immediately thereafter.  
 
3.2. Aspirations Underlying the Ingenios Project 
On its face, one of the most intriguing aspects of the Ingenios Act is its explicitly 
ideological language. The regime was designed to replace the 1998 Ecuadorian 
Intellectual Property Law because, according to the Preamble of the Ingenios Bill that 
was introduced in the National Assembly in June 2015, the former framework was “a 
hyper-privatist system of knowledge [management], in which solely the 
owners/merchants of the intellectual property corresponding to a few transnational 
monopolies have benefitted.”435 In contrast, the Ingenios Act “aims to radically modify 
the existing paradigms in the generation, use, utilisation, and distribution of 
knowledge, a public interest good.”436 The project was designed with the express 
intention to reconceptualise the meaning and purpose of intellectual property in the 
Ecuadorian context.  
Rather than embodying a narrowly focused reform, the Ingenios Act proposed 
a significant expansion of the normative context in which intellectual property is 
conventionally situated. Thus, the experiment encompasses a transformation of the 
entire national intellectual property legal framework, while being only partially 
concerned with intellectual property. Instead, the Ingenios Act describes itself as an 
attempt to reformulate the Ecuadorian economy, basing economic growth on the 
production, distribution, and transfer of knowledge, an exercise in which intellectual 
property constitutes one of various tools to be employed. The philosophical roots of 
this project are grounded in the concept of the “social and solidary economy.” This 
economic model may be defined as “a conception that endeavours to transcend the 
option between the capitalist market and the State as a central planner and regulator 
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junio de 2015), Draft submitted to the National Assembly (hereafter “the Ingenios Bill”). Oficio No. T. 
7137-SGJ-15-418. 
  
  
   
146 
 
of the economy.”437 In other words, the hope was to establish an economic system 
that would break the dichotomy between free market capitalism and State-centric 
socialism or communism. 
Additionally, the language used to frame the Ingenios project centred at least 
as much on redefining the terms of political engagement as it did on redrawing the 
boundaries of intellectual property. The idea was that in order to create a framework 
for a social and solidary economy based fundamentally on knowledge, democratic 
participation was required at all stages of legislative development. As an incarnation 
of this theory, the Ingenios Bill was drafted through a process of public scrutiny and 
feedback, and versions of the text were presented and debated in numerous 
community-level socialisation events, as well as online. The Ecuadorian officials 
responsible for the Ingenios project consciously analysed prior examples of the 
creation of “collaborative legislation” and “e-government,” based on which they 
designed a system for citizen engagement.438 This process will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
Given the significant political and economic intentions of the Ingenios Act, 
during the making of the law it was emphasized that the framework should be 
grounded in the 2008 Constitution. The Preamble of the Ingenios Act clarifies the 
relationship of the law with the new Constitution. This introduction cites the new 
constitutional right of persons “to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
traditional knowledge.”439 Additionally, the Preamble quotes the 2008 Constitution, 
declaring that it is the State’s responsibility “to facilitate and promote the incorporation 
of knowledge into society to achieve the objectives of the development regime; to 
promote the generation and production of knowledge, to foster scientific and 
technological research and empower traditional knowledge; [and] to ensure the 
diffusion and access to scientific and technological knowledge,” in addition to other 
duties.440  
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Ecuador: Abya-Yala. pp. 43. 
438 See Terán, L., Spicher, N., Ramírez, R., Pazos, R., & Ron, M. (2016). Public Collaborative 
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The Preamble further invokes the constitutional prohibition of “all forms of 
appropriation of collective knowledge…and appropriation of genetic resources,”441 
while reaffirming the right of persons to “the protection of the moral and patrimonial 
rights to which they are entitled for scientific, literary, or artistic productions that they 
author.”442 Thus, the Ingenios Act endeavours to strike a balance by preventing certain 
subject matter from being privatised as intellectual property, while also ensuring that 
exclusivity may be granted in relation to other productions. Finally, the Preamble 
makes explicit the intention of the Ingenios Act to establish a “social economy of 
knowledge, creativity, and innovation” whose primordial focus is the creation of value 
through the “intensive application of the generation, transmission, management, and 
utilisation of knowledge as a public interest good.”443  
The objectives of the Ingenios Act are wide-ranging and ambitious, seeking to 
embody a manifestation of the intention of the 2008 Constitution to redefine the terms 
for economic and social participation for Ecuador as a nation and for Ecuadorians as 
individual and collective citizens. As articulated in the Act’s Exposition of Motives, the 
new law endeavours to “generate instruments to promote an economic model that will 
democratise the production, transmission and appropriation of knowledge as a public 
interest good, thus guaranteeing the accumulation and redistribution of wealth in a 
manner that is just, sustainable and in harmony with nature.”444 Furthermore, the 
Ingenios Act aspires to “promote the development of science, technology, innovation 
and creativity to satisfy the needs and make effective the exercise of the rights of 
persons, peoples and nature.”445 The purpose of the Act is therefore to reify the 
political theory first crystallised in the new Constitution, particularly in relation to the 
democratisation of knowledge, equality and equity, and the promotion of individual and 
collective rights.  
Another goal of the Ingenios Act is to codify the Indigenous Andean worldview 
(cosmovisión) of buen vivir as an alternative to what the makers of the law have 
described variously as neoliberal, Western, or Northern models of economic 
development. Since the 2008 Constitution was adopted, government officials have 
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routinely cited buen vivir as the foundation of public policy and the guiding principle 
behind national development planning in Ecuador.446 René Ramírez, the Minister of 
the National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation 
during the presidency of Rafael Correa, described buen vivir as a “new pact of 
coexistence [that is formed] not only between members of the community, but between 
these persons and the environment.”447 This “new pact” seeks to reformulate the 
“productive matrix” of Ecuador, distancing the country from an economy based on 
exportation of commodities with little value added,448 instead fomenting a pattern of 
specialisation grounded in knowledge, science, technology, and “social innovation,” in 
conjunction with a strong policy of wealth redistribution.449 In so doing, the hope was 
to reduce poverty and inequality, while simultaneously improving the quality of life for 
the Ecuadorian population and promoting environmental sustainability.  
On its face, the language employed in the introductory sections of the Ingenios 
Act – as well as the characterisations of the law regularly provided by government 
officials – obviate the aspiration to reimagine the purpose of intellectual property in the 
Ecuadorian context. Even more ambitiously, the Act also endeavoured to redefine 
“development” and with it the total reconstitution of the national economic system. The 
enmeshment of intellectual property, development, and economics demonstrate that 
Ecuadorian lawmakers believed that by reconceptualising intellectual property – or at 
least by embedding intellectual property in a buen vivir framework – they could 
consequently reconfigure the economy. In so doing, the idea was to impel a 
development regime that “will have as objectives, among others, to improve the quality 
and hope of life, and to augment the capacities and potentialities of the population in 
the framework of the principles and rights that the Constitution establishes.”450  
One of the tenets of this “new pact” of buen vivir was to break the “cognitive 
dependency” that Ecuadorian officials believed that their country in particular and the 
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Andean region in general had experienced in relation to relatively wealthier States. 
Indeed, the Exposition of Motives of the Ingenios Act lamented, “our cognitive and 
technological matrix has been primarily dependent on the activities and goods 
produced in and by ‘developed’ countries.”451 According to the Ingenios Act, this 
dynamic was further compounded by the fact that the 1998 Ecuadorian Intellectual 
Property Law, through its “hyper-privatising system of knowledge,” “has limited the 
possibility to innovate, and has been unable to attract foreign investment.”452  
Because of the global dynamics identified in the Ingenios Act and the express 
desire of the law to install a new development model in Ecuador, the vision of the new 
national intellectual property framework comprised several objectives. These included 
democratisation in the use and enjoyment of the benefits of knowledge, and 
achievement of the greatest efficiency possible in the coordination of activities to avoid 
duplication of efforts. Furthermore, as stated in the Ingenios Act, the existing 
technological gap that Ecuador experienced in relation to certain “central” countries 
should be diminished. Returning to the language of the 2008 Constitution, a final 
intention of the Ingenios Act was to “promote the generation of knowledge under an 
open, social, democratic and inclusive system, focused on human beings, in the 
development of their potential and the exercise of their rights, within the framework of 
respect for the rights of their peers and of nature.”453  
While the philosophy underlying the Ingenios Act contained many ambitious 
aspirations, some Ecuadorians expressed concern that the actual provisions of the 
law belied its rousing language. Critics speculated that the contemporaneous 
intentions to conceive of knowledge as a public interest good on the one hand and to 
guarantee the protection of private intellectual property on the other, could lead to an 
impasse and possibly even counterproductive outcomes.454 Furthermore, it is notable 
that many of the more radical provisions of the Ingenios Bill were diluted or eliminated 
while the Ecuadorian National Assembly reviewed the project, through a series of 
political compromises.455 These inside negotiations, coupled with the external 
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pressures exerted by international obligations and forces internal to the Citizens’ 
Revolution government, operated to temper the most progressive parts of early drafts 
of the Ingenios Bill. This process moderated the imaginaries that the law actualises, 
such that they tend to conform to the conventional logic of intellectual property.    
Nevertheless, the manner in which the Ingenios Act was visualised, drafted, 
and publicised is itself unusual in the domain of intellectual property lawmaking. In an 
attempt to embody the “social innovation” that the project sought to foment, the 
Ingenios Bill was published on a Wikimedia site (called “WikiCOESC+i”) shortly 
following its inception, with drafts regularly revised and uploaded for public review.456 
The Wikimedia platform was selected as a tool for collaborative development of the 
early versions of the Ingenios Bill based on its consistency with the “spirit” of the new 
law.457 Officials touted the project as the first example of the collective construction of 
legislation in Ecuador, and as a space for “citizen encounter” through which the various 
proposals could be discussed in a cooperative, transparent, and democratic form. 
During the making of the law, the Ingenios Wiki page contained a video tutorial to raise 
awareness about the project, a list of aims, instructions for how to participate, and a 
link to create a user account.  
Once registered with the Wiki site, during the drafting period users could make 
comments, ask questions about the text, or submit suggested alternative language. 
Contributions were intentionally anonymised based on the idea that de-identification 
was “a fundamental part of the right to freedom of speech and expression,” which in 
turn was “inherent in the development of the democratic process.”458 However, one of 
the limitations of the Wikimedia platform was that users were only able to submit new 
comments to the draft Ingenios text, rather than respond to comments made by other 
users. This meant that dynamic debate was not possible between different users. 
Instead, a process of centralised curation was required, according to which comments 
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were compiled and then considered by the officials responsible for generating the draft 
law.459  
Notwithstanding this technical limitation, the Ingenios Wiki page garnered broad 
visibility. As of 2018, the statistics on the site reported that it had received more than 
seven million views, with nearly fifty-thousand edits submitted during the drafting of 
the Bill.460 According to officials involved with the project, eight versions of the Ingenios 
Bill were produced from the launch of the Media Wiki platform to the submission of the 
text to the National Assembly,461 although only two drafts were made directly available 
on the Wiki page. After the Ingenios Act was passed, a dedicated website was created 
for the law,462 on which several thematic videos were made available to explain how 
officials believe that the Act would address issues such as the protection of traditional 
knowledge, access to less expensive medications, and combating biopiracy.463  
In addition to the formal online presence of the Ingenios Bill, social media was 
also leveraged as a means to complement the Wikimedia platform and to raise 
awareness about the project. Beginning in early 2014, officials from the National 
Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation and the 
Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute began to utilise platforms including 
Facebook and Twitter to “socialise” the Ingenios Bill. Manifestations of these initiatives 
included event announcements posted to the Facebook page of the Ecuadorian 
Intellectual Property Institute, as well as tweets released on the dedicated Ingenios 
project Twitter account.464  
Likewise, numerous videos were uploaded to YouTube to explain the Ingenios 
project including clips entitled “What is the Ingenios Act?”465 and “New Ingenios Act in 
Ecuador Seeks Productive Transformation.”466 Other videos featured members of the 
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National Assembly, the Director of the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute, and 
President Correa. Finally, as the draft law wended its way through rounds of debates 
and pre-legislative consultations467 in the National Assembly in late 2015 and early 
2016, the Director of the Intellectual Property Institute and other governmental officials 
involved with the project participated in frequent live television and radio interviews, 
most of which were subsequently made available for viewing online.  
These virtual marketing and engagement campaigns were replicated in 
numerous real-world events. During the making of the Ingenios Act, officials from the 
National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation and the 
Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute convened more than five-hundred 
“sensitisation” (awareness-raising) talks in Ecuadorian universities, as well as debates 
and round-table discussions with key stakeholders from the public, private, and 
academic sectors. Importantly, when the officials who managed the Wikimedia 
platform realised that participants in the physical events were unlikely to submit 
comments online, they recorded citizens’ observations during the proceedings and 
subsequently added them to the Ingenios Wiki page.468  
 Socialisation events related to the Ingenios Act also transcended Ecuadorian 
borders. For instance, the Director of the Intellectual Property Institute visited the Latin 
American Faculty of Social Sciences in Argentina on several occasions to speak about 
the Ingenios Bill and to solicit feedback about the project.469 In 2016, the proposed law 
was discussed during conferences focused on innovation, the international patent 
system, and economic development at universities in Peru, Mexico, and Spain.470 The 
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Ingenios Bill was also included as a case study in a graduate research program 
focussed on investigating “cognitive capitalism” at the Sorbonne in France.471  
Together, these occurrences amounted to significant popular influence of the 
Ingenios project, or at least the appearance thereof. Many Ecuadorian experts from 
the public and private sectors alike, whether in favour of or in opposition to the Ingenios 
Act have touted the awareness-raising efforts as impactful and generally positive. For 
instance, the drafting and revision process mobilised the participation of sectors of the 
Ecuadorian population that have been historically unfamiliar with intellectual property 
and its implications, such as indigenous and community groups, farmers, 
tradespeople, and artists.472 Such participation was formalised through a process of 
pre-legislative consultations, in which members of indigenous and rural ethnic 
communities were invited to the National Assembly to share their perspectives about 
provisions of the Ingenios Bill that could impact them, such as how the law might affect 
customary agricultural practices and the protection of traditional knowledge. General 
public debates were also convened within the National Assembly, in which artisans, 
small-scale farmers, entrepreneurs, academics, and civil society representatives 
participated.  
The motivations and objectives of the Ingenios initiative are expansive and 
complex, consolidating decades of social and political undercurrents, economic 
theory, and criticisms of the capitalist economic notions on which intellectual property 
laws are conventionally based. Meanwhile, the drafting and revision process involved 
significant popular participation. However, conversations with the officials and 
consultants involved with the making of the Ingenios Act suggested that the extent to 
which Ecuadorian citizens’ comments directly influenced the final version of the law 
was probably limited. While all opinions and suggestions were considered, and 
although some resulted in changes to early drafts of the Bill,473 the form that the final 
version of the law assumed was shaped predominantly by other factors. These 
included the international treaty obligations discussed in Part 1 of this thesis, in 
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addition to internal dynamics emanating from within the Citizens’ Revolution 
government. The end result was a subtle transition from radical aspirations to relatively 
conventional legal imaginaries.  
The making of the Ingenios Act began with ambitious goals, which manifested 
the reformist vision of a small group of Ecuadorian officials who believed that they 
could reimagine intellectual property in the national context. Their objectives are 
embodied in early drafts of the text, including the version of the Ingenios Bill that was 
formally submitted to the National Assembly in June 2015. The version of the Ingenios 
Act that was ultimately adopted still contains certain innovative aims, such as to 
“generate a pluralist and inclusive vision in the utilisation of knowledge, granting 
supremacy to use value over exchange value” and to “develop forms of property for 
knowledge compatible with buen vivir, [including] public, private, communitarian, state, 
associative, and mixed.”474  
However, the way that intellectual property was ultimately imagined in the 
Ingenios Act generally conform to the standard rationalities of individual possession, 
free market economic exploitation, and linear developmentalism. This trend is evident 
in the section of the law that grants rights to plant breeders, which essentially 
capitulates the rationality of the UPOV Convention, seeking to incentivise innovation 
in plant breeding and the commercial exploitation of new varieties. The system of 
intellectual property for plants that the Ingenios Act creates will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4. Meanwhile, the next section explores the various external and internal 
forces that affected the making of the law, including Ecuador’s international obligations 
under the TRIPS Agreement, the UPOV Convention, and the 2016 free trade 
agreement with the European Union, as well as the policy agenda – both express and 
covert – of the Citizens’ Revolution government.  
 
3.3. Unpacking the Ingenios Act    
One of the more surprising aspects of the Ingenios Act is the fact that much of 
the corpus of the legislation is devoted to subject matter outside of the traditional ambit 
of intellectual property. The title of the law – “The Organic Code for the Social Economy 
of Knowledge, Creativity, and Innovation” – itself suggests that the Act seeks to erect 
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a system that goes far beyond delimiting guidelines for protectable subject matter or 
enforcement procedures. Structurally, the law is divided into four “Books” covering an 
array of topics, including the establishment of a national system for science, 
technology, innovation, and ancestral knowledge; and the regulation of responsible 
research and social innovation. It is not until Book III of the law that both conventional 
– for instance, patents, copyrights, and trademarks – and experimental – taking the 
form of, especially, protections for traditional knowledge – intellectual property 
provisions are presented. Thus, the organisation of the Ingenios Act is an expression 
of the lawmakers’ aspiration to transcend traditional narrow, techno-legal formulations 
of intellectual property, instead embracing a holistic approach that would contribute to 
the reconfiguration of the national economy.  
Curiously, the Ingenios Act is simultaneously a rejection and a reaffirmation of 
the conventional conceptualisation of intellectual property as a catalyst for the 
achievement of economic goals. The Ingenios Act explicitly seeks to distance itself 
from orthodox development theories that are seen as being representative of Western 
notions of linear, market-oriented progress towards economic prosperity. 
Nevertheless, the project still embraces intellectual property as a tool for transforming 
the “productive matrix” of the Ecuadorian economy. One of the essential tenets of the 
regime is the notion that “intellectual property rights constitute an exception to the 
public domain of knowledge and they shall respond to the social function and 
responsibility in conformity with that which is established in the Constitution and the 
Law.”475 Such language has attracted the attention of critics of the Ingenios project, 
who believe that this notion undermines the prevailing international conception of the 
nature of intellectual property.476  
The controversy seems to be largely related to the conflation of two distinct 
notions: first, that “knowledge is a public interest good” and second, that “intangible 
assets should be available to all, without restrictions, in the public domain.” However, 
these assertions are not synonymous. Proclaiming that knowledge is a public interest 
good does not automatically situate intellectual resources – whether these are creative 
works, patented products or processes, or new varieties of plants – in the public 
                                            
475 Ingenios Act, Art. 82. 
476 See e.g., Vela Descalzo, Ó. (17 de julio de 2016). “RIP Propiedad Intelectual.” El Comercio, 
Opinión. Retrieved from http://www.elcomercio.com/opinion/propiedad-intelectual-codigo-ingenios-
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domain. Furthermore, conceptualising knowledge as a public interest good does not 
exclude the possibility of granting private proprietary rights over subject matter that 
meets the requirements for protection that the law defines. There are many goods 
circulating in market economies that governments have classified as being in the 
public interest – for instance, medications or educational texts – but that still may be 
protected with intellectual property. 
The confusion on the part of critics of the Ingenios Act may also result from the 
fact that, notwithstanding the Act’s advocacy for the public domain, the law explicitly 
reiterates the importance of providing exclusive, proprietary rights to achieve certain 
goals. For instance, the Ingenios Act states, “intellectual property rights constitute a 
tool for the development of creative activity and social innovation.”477 This language 
reinscribes the narrative that many advocates for strong intellectual property protection 
have woven for decades, which the lawmakers who drafted the Ingenios Bill would 
likely consider to be representative of capitalist and neoliberal logics. At first glance, 
the tension between the desire to expand the ambit of the public domain and the 
expectation that private action can be strategically catalysed to achieve certain 
development goals may appear to be in opposition. However, this is one of the 
fundamental aspirations of the Ingenios project: to deconstruct the dichotomy between 
public domain and private rights.    
The Common Dispositions of the Ingenios Act express the intention to balance 
public and private interests surrounding access to knowledge, such that “knowledge 
constitutes a public interest good, [and] its access shall be free.”478 However, the same 
sentence recognises the existence of exclusive, proprietary rights, as the free 
circulation of knowledge “shall not have more restrictions than those established in the 
Constitution, treaties and international instruments and the Law.”479 The reference to 
international legal frameworks may have been inserted into the text as a direct 
response to critics who had alleged during initial public debates and sensitisation 
events that certain passages of the Ingenios Bill could have violated Ecuador’s treaty 
obligations, especially those imposed by the TRIPS Agreement.480 Indeed, the law 
explicitly states, “nothing foreseen in this Code shall be able to be interpreted as 
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478 Ingenios Act, Art. 4(i). 
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480 Partner attorney with an Ecuadorian intellectual property law firm. (16 February 2016). Personal 
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contrary to the principles, rights and obligations established in [the TRIPS 
Agreement].”481  
The Common Dispositions further set the basic terms of engagement with the 
new intellectual property system. Thus, “the acquisition and exercise of intellectual 
property rights shall ensure a balance between owners and users.”482 Likewise, 
Andean development philosophy is referenced, such that “the generation, 
transmission, management, use and utilisation of knowledge, creativity, technology, 
innovation, and traditional knowledge shall be oriented towards the realisation of buen 
vivir.”483 Other principles that underlie the Ingenios project include sovereignty over 
knowledge as a strategic objective of the State484 and the prohibition on the 
privatisation of biodiversity and the country’s genetic heritage, which are demarcated 
as property of the State that is “inalienable, perpetual, and unable to be 
encumbered.”485 Furthermore, the Ingenios Act recognises the “dialogue of knowledge 
[diálogo de saberes] as the process of generation, transmission and exchange of 
scientific knowledge and traditional knowledge,”486 which is intended to reify the 
existence of a plurinational and intercultural State.487  
Taken together, these passages reveal the ambition of the drafters of the 
Ingenios Act, and the desire to redefine numerous concepts that underlie 
contemporary social, political, and economic systems. Although the Ingenios Act 
claims to recalibrate the balance between public and private, and between owners and 
users of intellectual property, these appear to be secondary to other ends that the Act 
articulates. For instance, the law not only purports to redraw the boundaries of what is 
protectable knowledge, but also what constitutes knowledge itself. This redefinition is 
embodied in the decision to discuss “knowledges” in the plural (conocimientos). This 
word choice was intended to expand the scope of the subject matter that qualifies as 
intellectual property, while also manifesting the desire to exemplify the plurinational 
                                            
481 Ingenios Act, Art. 4(ii). 
482 Id. 
483 Ingenios Act, Art. 4(v). 
484 Ingenios Act, Art. 4(vi). 
485 The concept of the “dialogue of knowledges” refers to the idea that a mutual exchange should be 
promoted between different knowledges and ways of knowing, which in the context of the present 
chapter may be understood as a dialogue between scientific or academic knowledge and the kinds of 
knowledge held and developed customarily by campesinos. Martínez-Torres, M. E. & Rosset, P. M. 
(2014). Diálogo de Saberes in La Vía Campesina: Food Sovereignty and Agroecology. The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 41(6), 979-997. 
486 Ingenios Act, Art. 4(xvi). 
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state to which the 2008 Constitution is committed to actualising. As the Exposition of 
Motives of the Ingenios Act notes:  
“[W]e must stress that the noun knowledges – in plural – in the name of the 
Act is not a mere coincidence. In effect, the Ecuadorian State has maintained 
a historical debt throughout its republican life: its institutions have stubbornly 
employed a European worldview, [and] in this manner, have made invisible 
any manifestation of knowledge or culture that does not enter into the 
positivist and Western canons.”488   
The bold framing language of the Ingenios Act imagines a system that would 
eradicate all remnants of European colonialism from the Ecuadorian territory, and in 
its place install a pluralist system of governance and economic exchange to unite 
cosmopolitan and “subaltern”489 peoples. However, the Ingenios Act ultimately serves 
to justify centralisation rather than redistribution by situating the Ecuadorian State as 
the axis through which all knowledge-based transactions should flow. This 
phenomenon is suggestive of the tendency to “bring back the State” that has occurred 
in certain Latin America countries in recent years. Ramírez describes this as a strategy 
of “neosovereignty,” which involves the “reconstruction of the nation-state dimension 
of public action and delineation of a regional political space.”490 Such an approach is 
epitomised in the preamble of the Ingenios Act, which, citing the 2008 Constitution, 
includes the desire to “guarantee national sovereignty, promote Latin American 
integration, and propel a strategic insertion into the international context.”491 
To actualise this aspiration, the Ingenios Act erects new State-based systems 
for the management of knowledge. The focus on “institutionalism” is manifest in the 
positioning of the National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology and 
Innovation – a single government agency – as the entity responsible for the regulation, 
administration, and enforcement of all subject matter related to higher education, 
science and scientific research, innovation, and technological development. The 
Secretariat is further empowered to define all national norms relating to intellectual 
                                            
488 Ingenios Act, Exposición de Motivos, ¶8. 
489 In this context, the term “subaltern” relates to forms of knowledge or interpretations of the world 
that, de facto, are not considered viable or relevant epistemologies in the modern era, which may be 
described as remnants of the past and thereby “condemned to an inevitable neglect.” De Sousa 
Santos, B. (2008). Epistemologias do Sul. Revista Critíca de Ciências Sociais, 80, 5-10: 6. 
490 Ramirez G., F. (2016). Political Change, State Autonomy, and Post-Neoliberalism in Ecuador, 
2007-2012. (C. Perez, tr.). Latin American Perspectives, 206, 143-157: 144. 
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property and technology transfer. Additionally, following the enactment of the Ingenios 
Act, the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute was replaced by a new National 
Service for Intellectual Rights,492 an entity that also falls under the oversight of the 
Secretariat.493  
 Likewise, under the Ingenios system, the National Secretariat of Higher 
Education, Science, Technology and Innovation oversees multiple institutional 
manifestations of the National System for Science, Technology, Innovation and 
Ancestral Knowledge. Recently established physical spaces designed for the 
expansion of knowledge and innovation ecosystems include special technological 
zones for economic development; planned cities oriented towards scientific research 
and entrepreneurship (e.g., Yachay, the “City of Knowledge”494); scientific-
technological parks; techno-industrial parks; and technology transfer centres. The idea 
is that in these places, “the collaborative flows of knowledge and technology will be 
stimulated and managed, among all of the actors of the social economy of knowledge, 
creativity and innovation.”495 The Ingenios Act does not envisage the sort of public 
sector exclusivity of twentieth century socialist or communist economic models. 
Nevertheless, its provisions reset relationships between public and private actors, 
such that these interactions are subject to continual scrutiny by the State, through the 
broad discretionary powers that the law grants to the National Secretariat of Higher 
Education, Science, Technology and Innovation.  
 As mentioned earlier, the new institutionalism that the Ingenios Act establishes 
is a manifestation of the tenets of twenty-first century socialism. This emergent political 
theory has been described as a “centre-left pragmatic model seeking to maximise 
state-captured profits to finance state infrastructure and ambitious social programs” or 
alternately, as “Andean capitalism.”496 According to such a regime and in contrast to 
State sponsored socialist models popularised in the twentieth century, the private 
sector is supposed to play an express and important profit-generating function. 
However, as opposed to the neoliberal economic model – as it is characterised by the 
                                            
492 Decreto Presidencial No. 1425, supra note 405. 
493 Ingenios Act, Disposiciones Transitorias, Quinta. 
494 See Yachay homepage, retrieved from http://www.yachay.gob.ec/.  
495 Ingenios Act, Art. 17.  
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Ingenios Act – in an “Andean capitalist” system the State retains significant 
redistributive power.  
As described by René Ramírez, the Minister of the National Secretariat of 
Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation during the Correa presidency 
and one of the visionaries behind the Ingenios project, the idea is “to distribute 
producing and produce redistributing sustainably, putting life first and not the 
accumulation of capital.”497 This vision statement for the Ingenios model 
simultaneously encompasses elements of twenty-first century socialism and the buen 
vivir worldview. The intention of economic reformulation is reflected in the law’s 
attempt to expand the traditional forms of intellectual property ownership. To disrupt 
the standard dichotomy between public and private spheres of proprietary rights, the 
Ingenios Act creates space for multiple forms of collective ownership, including public, 
private, communitarian, state, associative, cooperative, and mixed.498  
Despite this innovation, a precise definition of each of these categories is not 
provided in the Ingenios Act. Although the 2008 Constitution recognises the same 
variegated forms of ownership,499 they are not explicitly defined in this latter document 
either. Thus, the parameters delimiting the boundaries between the various forms of 
property remain to be drawn. The failure to define each form of ownership suggests 
that the makers of the Ingenios Act were more concerned with elaborating the role of 
the State in intellectual property governance than with empowering potentially 
competing forms of cooperative organisation. Nevertheless, definitions of the various 
categories of intellectual property ownership could still be fixed in the Ingenios 
technical regulations that are expected to be finalised sometime in 2019. Alternatively, 
the meaning of each of the seven categories of rights could be left to judicial 
interpretation.  
Another area in which the Ingenios Act aspires to transcend conventional 
doctrinal forms is the conceptual association that the text performs to link intellectual 
property and human rights. The General Principles of the section of the Act concerned 
with intellectual property state, “the acquisition and exercise [of intellectual property 
rights], as well as their weighing with other rights, shall assure the effective enjoyment 
of fundamental rights and shall contribute to an adequate diffusion of knowledge in 
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benefit of the owners and society.”500 Here again, intellectual property is conceived as 
a tool to accomplish certain national goals, primary among which is the broad 
dissemination of knowledge. Meanwhile, intellectual property is subordinated to other 
rights regimes, including those of “health and nutrition, education, information, access 
to culture and to participate in scientific progress, as well as the right to develop 
economic activities, freedom of work, to access quality goods and services, and the 
rights to other forms of property.”501   
These provisions suggest that eventually, intellectual property enforcement 
under the new regime could regularly involve the invocation of other legal frameworks, 
in effect transcending the actual provisions of the Ingenios Act. Judges could resolve 
disputes over infringement based not on intellectual property norms, relying instead 
on constitutional considerations related to diverse categories of human rights. In any 
event, under the Ingenios Act the acquisition and exercise of intellectual property 
ownership is contingent upon the extent to which exclusivity would promote social 
innovation and the transfer and diffusion of knowledge, towards the reciprocal benefit 
of producers and users “in a way that favours social and economic well-being and the 
balance between rights and obligations.”502  
A primary effect of this mandated balancing of interests is a comprehensive, 
interventionist role of the State in general, and of the National Secretariat of Higher 
Education, Science, Technology and Innovation in particular, surrounding matters of 
intellectual property. The Ingenios Act declares intellectual property to be “of public 
interest and [thus it] shall enjoy a form of protection that allows for the satisfaction of 
the basic needs of society.”503 Essentially, the Act epitomises an attempt to deviate 
from the idea that intellectual property protection should be granted simply “as an end 
in itself,”504 instead favouring the strategic use of intellectual property as a means to 
accomplish specific, centrally defined goals, which would manifest the Ecuadorian 
State’s conceptualisation of public interest.  
Overall, the aspirations of the Ingenios Act consistently express a desire to 
move beyond the conventional logic of intellectual property. If its goals were fully 
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realised, the law would foster broad access to knowledge, pluralise ontologies for 
knowledge production, contribute to the reconfiguration of the Ecuadorian economy, 
and create a buen vivir society. However, it is not sufficient to take the stated goals of 
the Ingenios Act for granted. Instead, a thorough analysis is needed of the actual 
provisions of the law, to understand whether the Act truly reimagines intellectual 
property.     
 
3.4. Does the Ingenios Act really reimagine intellectual property? 
 Both the text of the Ingenios Act and the broader socialisation efforts that 
surrounded the making of the new regime claimed that the Ingenios project would 
reimagine the conventional logic of intellectual property and, as a result, the role that 
intellectual property plays in Ecuadorian society. It was supposed that this would 
occur, for instance, through the pluralisation of the conceptualisation of knowledge 
that the Ingenios Act embodies. Multiple motivations drove the attempt to experiment 
with new rationalities for intellectual property in Ecuador. These drivers have been 
most commonly explained in relation to the general theory of proprietary individual 
rights, or in the specific domain of patent law. Rather than follow this trend, this thesis 
explores how the Ingenios Act might offer innovative ways of thinking about intellectual 
property for plants. 
 As discussed in prior sections of Chapter 3, Ecuadorian policymakers recently 
adopted a new vision through which the country’s economy and society might begin 
to be restructured. The goals that this strategy espoused included transforming the 
national “productive matrix” of the economy to shift the basis of wealth creation from 
extraction and exportation of commodities with little value added to a system founded 
on the generation, broad diffusion, and eventual commodification of knowledge. Earlier 
sections of Chapter 3 also showed that the general rationale underlying the Ingenios 
project was to create a system that would foster the creation of a “social economy of 
knowledge, creativity, and innovation.”  
 However, the identification of these broad aspirations still leaves several key 
inquiries unanswered. For instance, why did the national intellectual property 
framework need to be remade to actualise the government’s economic and social 
objectives? What were the limitations of intellectual property as it was formerly 
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imagined under the 1998 Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Law? Why did lawmakers 
believe that enacting a law whose central purpose is to provide intellectual property 
protection was the optimal way of achieving their goals, given the doubts that these 
actors expressed about the 1998 Law? Finally, did the Ingenios system of intellectual 
property for plants diverge from the standardised logic of plant breeders’ rights? If so, 
how did the new framework accomplish this end?  
  The texts of the Ingenios Act offer a convenient starting point to address these 
queries. In addition to explicitly announcing their purposes in the law, the officials 
involved in the making of the Act also engaged in broad marketing efforts, promoting 
the project as a significant departure from the conventional rationality of intellectual 
property. The “socialisation” campaign garnered significant attention in national and 
international realms, with officials touting the Ingenios Act as an important example of 
participatory lawmaking.505  
 Ultimately, it will be important to consider the perspectives of these officials to 
understand fully the assumptions that underlie the Ingenios project. However, it is 
appropriate to begin with the text of the law. The version of the Ingenios Bill that was 
submitted to the National Assembly in 2015 declared:  
“The [Ingenios] Project…constitutes a normative instrument that aims to 
radically modify the existing paradigms in the generation, use, utilisation and 
distribution of the public good knowledge, through the implementation of 
juridical norms that facilitate just relationships between diverse social actors, 
as well as the necessary conditions for the balanced access to the benefits 
from this good to achieve the greatest degree possible of the satisfaction of 
needs and the full exercise of the rights of persons and nature.”506       
 According to this formulation, the essential purpose of the Ingenios initiative 
was to reimagine the role of knowledge in Ecuadorian society. Of principal concern 
was the “scarce endogenous development of knowledge in the country.”507 The 
Exposition of Motives of the Ingenios Bill lamented the low number of patent 
applications filed by Ecuadorians, the “nearly null” innovation generated by domestic 
firms, and the limited public expenditures in science, technology, and innovation as a 
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proportion of gross domestic product. “In this context, our cognitive and technological 
matrix has been predominantly dependent on the activities and goods produced in and 
by ‘developed’ countries.”508 
 According to the Ingenios Bill, this situation was exacerbated by the fact that 
“[T]he existence of the Intellectual Property Law approved in 1998, which for 
nearly 20 years, through a hyper-privatising system of knowledge…has solely 
benefitted the intellectual property owners/merchants corresponding to a few 
transnational monopolies, has limited the possibility to innovate, and [has 
failed] to attract foreign investment.”509   
 This language plainly describes the perception that the drafters of the Ingenios 
Bill had of the international status quo. In other words, these governmental actors 
understood that a system that grants exclusive proprietary rights could operate as a 
tool of economic subjugation, a function that should be resisted and reappropriated. 
However, contradictions exist between the several stated aspirations of the Ingenios 
Bill, such that certain objectives recapitulate the kind of “developmentalist” thinking 
that lawmakers claimed to be abandoning.510 The result is a curious hybridisation in 
which 
“[D]efinitively, the [Ingenios] Project determines a new institutionality which, 
inside of the international juridical order, promotes the generation of 
knowledge under an open, social, democratic, inclusive system, focused on 
human beings, on the development of their potential and exercise of their 
rights, within the framework of respect for the rights of others and of nature.”511 
The logic of the Ingenios Bill suggests that it would be possible to declare the “good” 
of knowledge to be of “public interest” as a response to the “cognitive capitalist model 
reigning in the international commercial context”512 and simultaneously to achieve 
economic development, human self-actualisation, and harmony with nature within an 
episteme of buen vivir.  
                                            
508 Id.  
509 Id. at ¶5. 
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P. (2017). Neo-developmentalism and a “Vía Campesina” for Rural Development: Unreconciled 
Projects in Ecuador’s Citizen’s Revolution. Journal of Agrarian Change, 17(2), 348-364. 
511 Ingenios Bill, Exposición de Motivos, at ¶6. 
512 Id. at ¶7. 
  
  
   
165 
 
 These aspirations, which have a utopic resonance, positioned the State as the 
central broker responsible for refereeing the movement of knowledge. According to 
the Ingenios Act, since extant models for the protection and management of 
knowledge “do not respond to the state of scientific and technological development in 
which we find ourselves,” “[i]t is necessary, then, that the State may…intervene in 
unjust situations, in which the distribution of knowledge is not only desirable but vital 
to achieve common wellbeing.”513 In effect, one of the aims of the Ingenios project was 
to restructure the relationships between the various stakeholders who interact with the 
intellectual property system. This “new model” promised “a balance between the rights 
of the owners of intellectual property rights…and users, competitors and citizens, to 
achieve a greater democratisation of the benefits and opportunities of knowledge.”514  
Democratic in this context does not necessarily signify popular. Instead, the 
democratisation of knowledge falls under the purview of Ecuadorian bureaucrats. As 
discussed in prior sections of Chapter 3, upon implementation of the Ingenios Act, 
officials at the National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology and 
Innovation will be responsible for a wide range of actions. These will include the 
creation and regulation of “knowledge spaces;” oversight of the accreditation and 
promotion of researchers and educators; and mediation of agreements for access to 
biological and genetic resources. These officials will also be tasked with the 
establishment of a “typology of goods” in areas of strategic focus, based on which 
mechanisms such as compulsory licenses may be used to access subject matter 
protected as intellectual property.  
Although the consolidation of disparate conceptual orientations and pragmatic 
institutional operations may be uncommon, the legal imaginaries that the Ingenios 
project seeks to realise are not necessarily novel. For instance, compulsory licenses 
as a State-mediated balancing mechanism are firmly established in international 
intellectual property jurisprudence. What is unusual is the fact that the law speaks of 
breaking with the “positivist and Western canons” of a “Eurocentric cosmology.”515 
Despite this, the Ingenios Act enables the consolidation of singular nation-state – in 
contrast to the “plurinationality” imagined by the 2008 Constitution – through 
processes of re-centralisation. A further inconsistency is manifest in the heavy reliance 
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in the Ingenios Act on rights-based notions of liberal democratic citizenship, even while 
the law discusses “interculturality” and “knowledges” in the plural form. Thus, a central 
question is, how radical is the Ingenios Act? Which aspects of the law constitute 
innovations and which parts simply repackage the conventional intellectual property 
narrative in reformist language? These queries can be addressed by contrasting the 
Act’s self-referential discourse with the words of actors involved in its making. 
While the various texts produced by the Ingenios project may attempt to speak 
for themselves, it would be insufficient to read these documents in isolation from their 
embedded and strategic position within the Citizen’s Revolution government. René 
Ramírez, who served as Minister of the National Secretariat of Higher Education, 
Science, Technology and Innovation under the presidential administration of Rafael 
Correa, was one of the key visionaries behind the Ingenios Act. Ramírez has explained 
that the evolution of his ideas surrounding the reconfiguration of the access, 
generation, and circulation of knowledge began to gestate when he served as Minister 
of the National Secretariat for Planning and Development. In this role, Ramírez was 
involved in the making of a new higher education law which, among other reforms, 
created a system of free, universal tertiary education in Ecuador. During this process, 
Ramírez says he came to believe that education could not be truly free and accessible 
to all Ecuadorians if the products of knowledge continued to be privatised, or in other 
words, protected as intellectual property.  
“Therefore, it was there where I said, we need [the Ingenios Act]. And in this 
framework, knowing that we cannot withdraw from international norms, it is 
necessary to have…I would have liked for it to be much more radical in the 
sense of the recuperation of public and common knowledge and culture. But 
you can’t because of the issue of international treaties. So, [we formulated] all 
intellectual property as an exception to the public domain, trying to recover as 
much as we can in the entire corpus of the law, this spirit.”516  
 Other officials likewise suggested that effect of the Ingenios experiment was 
not to break entirely from standard approaches to the governance of intellectual 
property. Instead, the process involved interpretative playfulness, including with the 
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lacunae that may be located in international agreements. For instance, an official at 
the Yachay public enterprise told me that the Ingenios Act 
“…doesn’t claim to abandon TRIPS. Rather, within the reigning international 
structure, it tries to find cracks and vacuums in the international legislation – 
which our own government has signed onto – in which principles could be 
inserted that are more progressive and more – why not say it – opportunistic 
in our stage of development.”517 
 The same official further noted: 
“I think that we reconceptualise our role within the system, but the schema of 
intellectual property is not reconceptualised. (…) It is coherent with the 
reformist vision of the government. It isn’t a socialist revolution. It isn’t the Paris 
Commune. But it is a space where…you can enjoy certain tunnels through 
which to pass, to be able to emerge in a new place, without needing to collide 
with other actors in the international system.”518 
 This explanation of the purpose of the Ingenios Act softens the language with 
which the text of the law is framed. Although the introductory sections of the Act speak 
of “radical transformation,” many of the actors in the Citizens’ Revolution government 
with whom I spoke emphasized that the fundamental purpose of the law was to provide 
a mechanism for changing the “productive matrix” of the country. One official went so 
far as to describe intellectual property under the Ingenios Act as “a weapon for 
development.”519 This characterisation is consistent with the interpretation of 
Ecuadorian academics familiar with the Ingenios project, who have described it as a 
“policy of resistance” based on the development model of the Citizens’ Revolution 
government.520 Therefore, the making of the Ingenios Act involved the defiance of 
certain global dynamics that the framers of the law identified as problematic. However, 
the process was not one of radical reinvention or outright rejection of standard 
intellectual property norms.  
In order to identify gaps in the treaty regimes to which Ecuador is party, the 
lawmakers responsible for drafting the Ingenios Bill enlisted the help of external 
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consultants. These actors included the South Centre,521 the Chilean non-
governmental organisation Corporación Innovarte522 and academics from the 
Sorbonne523 and the Latin American Faculty for Social Sciences.524 One of the 
individuals involved was Professor Carlos Correa,525 who described the process of 
drafting the Ingenios text as characterised by taking calculated risks with legislation. 
“In the consultancy that I and others did in Ecuador, [we] tried to find solutions 
that are compatible. If they aren’t, well, some other World Trade Organization 
member country would have to lodge a complaint, would need to put together 
a panel, and if Ecuador has made a mistake, it would have the opportunity to 
correct it. But in any case, what [the Ingenios Act] tries to do is to operate 
within the limit of the legitimate, in ways that are of interest for the country. It 
can be seen that other countries are following similar paths. None of them 
have been challenged in the World Trade Organization for reasons of TRIPS 
compliance.”526   
 In other words, at least in the sections of the law concerned with conventional 
intellectual property norms – for instance, those related to patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, and plant breeders’ rights – the exercise was one of finding flexibilities 
within the existing frameworks rather than re-creating these regimes. Furthermore, 
                                            
521 The South Centre is the intergovernmental organization of developing countries that helps 
developing countries to combine their efforts and expertise to promote their common interests in the 
international arena. The South Centre (n/d) About the South Centre. Retrieved from 
https://www.southcentre.int/about-the-south-centre/.  
522 The Innovarte Corporation is an NGO based in Santiago, Chile whose mission is “to build capacity 
to design, understand, and utilise a balanced system of intellectual property norms that would 
promote…economic and social development of communities.” Innovarte (n/d) Quiénes somos. 
Retrieved from http://sitio.innovarte.cl/quienes-somos/. 
523 Academics from the Sorbonne in France, including Carlo Vercellone, have openly expressed 
support for the Ingenios project. In 2015, Ingenios was reportedly included as part of the curriculum of 
study for a doctoral program in “cognitive capitalism” at the Sorbonne. IEPI (26 de junio de 2015) El 
Proyecto INGENIOS como modelo de estudio en la Universidad Sorbona de París. Retrieved from 
https://www.propiedadintelectual.gob.ec/el-proyecto-ingenios-como-modelo-de-estudio-en-la-
universidad-sorbona-de-paris/.   
524 The Latin American Social Sciences Faculty (FLACSO) in, Argentina, analysed Ingenios in a 
debate and “socialization” event in Buenos Aires in July 2015. IEPI. (3 de Julio de 2015). Código 
INGENIOS es acogido con éxito en Argentina. Retrieved from 
https://www.propiedadintelectual.gob.ec/codigo-ingenios-es-acogido-con-exito-en-argentina/.  
525 Note that Professor Correa is also the author of several works that describe the policy space for 
patent and plant variety protection lawmaking under the TRIPS Agreement. These proposals are 
discussed in greater detail in earlier sections of this thesis.  
526 Carlos Correa, Professor at the University of Buenos Aires and Consultant with the South Centre. 
(21 March 2016). Personal interview. See also Correa, supra note 282 at 58 (stating that “no 
complaint has been submitted against countries that granted [compulsory licenses]/government use 
under the WTO dispute settlement rules.”).  
  
  
   
169 
 
while the making of the Ingenios Act was partially driven by a desire to take advantage 
of the available formal policy space, the strategy was also motivated by the internal 
philosophy and goals of the Citizens’ Revolution government. Notwithstanding its 
stated orientation towards “post-developmentalism,” the Correa administration 
regularly operated in a way that was consistent with the tenets of neoliberal 
developmentalism.527 
It is also important to highlight the fact that the drafting of the Ingenios text was 
processual rather than discrete. When compiling preliminary versions of the Bill, 
lawmakers engaged in experimentation, in some instances deviating substantially 
from international intellectual property standards.528 However, as the Ingenios Bill 
matured and a greater number of actors representing a wider variety of interests 
became involved, the provisions of the draft law increasingly began to conform more 
than reform.  
 There are at least two reasons for this de-radicalisation. The first relates to 
internal tensions that operated behind the scenes during the making of the Ingenios 
Act. As the project evolved – especially between the release of the first public version 
of the Bill online via the Wikimedia page in October 2014, and the submission of a 
finalised version of the text to the National Assembly in June 2015 – progressive and 
conservative actors within the Citizen’s Revolution government clashed with one 
another.529 These conflicts coincided with and were exacerbated by the fact that as 
the Ingenios project progressed through stages of internal drafts by a small number of 
officials in the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute, to a period of public comment, 
to submission to and debate within the National Assembly, national presidential 
elections loomed ever nearer. When the Ingenios Act was finally passed and published 
in the Official Register in December 2016, the polemical election that could have 
ended the era of the Citizen’s Revolution was merely weeks away.530     
                                            
527 Escobar, A. (2010). Latin America at a Crossroads: Alternative Modernizations, Post-Liberalism, or 
Post-Development? Cultural Studies, 24(1), 1-65. Radcliffe, S. A. (2012). Development for a 
Postneoliberal Era? Sumak Kawsay, Living Well and the Limits to Decolonisation in Ecuador. 
Geoforum, 43(2012), 240-249. Wilson, J. & Bayon, M. (2017). The Nature of Post-Neoliberalism: 
Building Bio-Socialism in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Geoforum, 81(2017), 55-65. 
528 Consultant from FLOK Society who was involved in compiling comments made to the Ingenios Bill 
text. (17 May 2016). Personal interview; Director level official from the Ecuadorian Intellectual 
Property Institute. (16 April 2016). Personal interview. 
529 Director level official from the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute. (16 April 2016). Personal 
interview. 
530 The first round of presidential elections was held on 19 February 2017. Rafael Correa was no 
longer eligible to run as a candidate, as term limits had been established in the 2008 Constitution. 
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 In May 2016, one directorial level official at the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property 
Institute noted:  
“We are living in a sui generis political moment. [We have] a government that 
has had nine years in power and is in a normal process of winding down. We 
have elections next year. Therefore, almost everything that is being discussed 
at this time [in relation to the Ingenios project] is politicised. Is extremely 
politicised.”531 
 This politicisation manifested itself textually in the Ingenios Act, as different 
factions struggled over the question of how radical to render the law. Initially, the 
National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation was 
the principal institutional actor involved in the making of the Ingenios Act. Under the 
vision of Minister René Ramírez, as we have already seen, one of the primary 
motivations was to re-create the national system of science, technology, and 
innovation. At the outset, the question was, as another directorial level official within 
the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute told me, 
“How do we change the system of science, technology, and innovation? An 
analysis was done of how it could be changed. And a fundamental part was 
intellectual property rights.”532 
 At this point, the second reason for why the Ingenios project was de-radicalised 
emerged. Beginning in 2013, the idea to reform the intellectual property law was taken 
up as 
“…an issue at the ministerial level. But they didn’t have much of an idea of 
what international treaties are. They thought that it was as easy as making our 
own law, with whatever standards you want, but it was not like that.”533  
 Thus, officials at the National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, 
Technology and Innovation contracted a private law firm to conduct an analysis for the 
                                            
Thus, the contest was primarily between Correa’s Vice President, Lenín Moreno, and several 
opposition parties. However, no candidate was able to achieve more than the required popular vote 
margin in the first round, therefore triggering a runoff election on 2 April 2017. Ultimately, Moreno won 
this election by a narrow margin of 51.15%, while the majority opposition candidate Guillermo Lasso, 
called for a recount and protests erupted across the country. The Citizen’s Revolution is now 
positioned to remain in power until 2021, though its policies have become increasingly contested in 
recent years.   
531 Director level official from the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute. (12 May 2016). Personal 
interview.  
532 Director level official from the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute. (16 April 2016). Personal 
interview.  
533 Id.  
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purpose of identifying parts of the 1998 Intellectual Property Law that could be 
effectively revised within the parameters of Ecuador’s international obligations. After 
reviewing this external analysis, the Secretariat ultimately rejected the changes it 
proposed as overly “tied to private interests.”534 At that point, the Secretariat decided 
to assemble its own small team under the leadership of the Director of the Ecuadorian 
Intellectual Property Institute to construct an entirely sui generis regime, although as 
discussed earlier the extent to which the “new text” could be truly novel was shaped 
by a variety of forces, both external and internal.  
 One of the original drafters involved in the making of the new text described the 
process to me: 
“The work was developed in matrices. So, you have the text of the current 
intellectual property law. You have the text of the Andean Community 
decisions, and you have here the proposed text. And in each one of these, 
you have observations. So, it occurs to me that the law should say this in that 
article. But TRIPS, what does it tell you? You see that TRIPS doesn’t say 
anything, so why don’t we take it up? Or no, let’s change this. This was the 
style. The analysis is not only of TRIPS but also for example, [the] Berne 
[Convention] speaks about this. [The] Paris [Convention] tells you that. 
 
Afterwards, we went area by area, reviewing. Copyright, industrial property, 
plant varieties. This is how we went, building. I can’t tell you how much time it 
took exactly, but I know that we worked Saturday and Sunday. A moment 
arrived when I didn’t know what day it was. It reached that level. What day is 
today? There was political pressure because this had to happen fast. Because 
obviously they wanted [the law] to be passed before the next election 
period.”535 
 In this way, the final version of the Ingenios text did not simply result from an 
isolated experiment-in-lawmaking conducted in the meeting rooms and cubicles of 
administrative buildings in Quito. Nor was the new law primarily shaped by the 
transversal democratic participation of ordinary Ecuadorian citizens, whether through 
online engagement with the Wiki site or physical presence at Ingenios sensitisation 
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events. Instead, the Act was crafted through a technical, iterative, and highly 
referential practice of assemblage, in which policy structures originally devised in 
nineteenth-century Paris were amalgamated with objectives associated with twenty-
first century socialism ideals, and with institutional translations of Andean cosmology.  
 Throughout this process, internal political pressures constantly interrupted and 
refashioned the development of this patchwork of intellectual property. An official at 
the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute confided to me that: 
“I think that the pressure was from the Minister himself, and what we’ll call the 
left wing of the government. Because there were interests on the right that 
said, ‘we don’t want this.’ And above all the pressure was because a [free 
trade] agreement was going to be negotiated with the European Union. And 
the left wing was against the agreement with the European Union, above all 
because of intellectual property issues.”536 
 The pressures from outside and within the Ecuadorian government did not 
operate in isolation from one another. Instead, these influences regularly intertwined. 
As another person who was involved in the early stages of the drafting process 
explained to me, 
“The Ecuadorian system has international agreements and the Constitution. 
And current laws cannot be transcended in a new framework. And within this 
new framework there also exists a political vision of the current government, 
and there are limits within which you have to play.”537  
A further twist was the fact that at times, rather than solely being subject to 
forces external to the lawmaking process, the Ingenios Act itself became an instrument 
through which pressure could be exacted on other actors. For instance, during 
negotiations towards the free trade agreement with the European Union, one official 
revealed to me that 
“they began to put in many more compulsory licenses. It was to pressure, to 
get rid of the matter of the negotiations with the European Union. Let’s grant 
compulsory licenses. Because this is going to bother them, and it is going to 
make the agreement fall through.”538 
                                            
536 Id.  
537 Consultant from FLOK Society who was involved in compiling comments made to the Ingenios Bill 
text. (17 May 2016). Personal interview. 
538 Director level official from the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute. (16 April 2016). Personal 
interview. 
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 Thus, notwithstanding the stylised language of the Ingenios Act surrounding the 
radical transformation of intellectual property, the project has in fact embodied a 
variety of purposes since its inception. The final language of the Ingenios Act was 
influenced by numerous actors and contextual factors, which gradually rendered the 
text less radical over time and as the law was drafted and redrafted. Furthermore, the 
Ingenios paradigm was destined from the outset to be bounded in certain respects. As 
lawmakers consistently acknowledged when I interviewed them, the Citizen’s 
Revolution government never intended to withdraw from the World Trade Organization 
or from other treaties to which Ecuador is party.  
“[T]he Constitution of the Republic was approved by 82% of the population in 
referendum.539 Therefore, the fact of having such a strong capacity to mobilise 
volunteers – and with a political project that calmly could have said ‘I’m leaving 
the World Trade Organization. Because it’s the way’ – with the political 
legitimacy that the project had, we could have easily done it. But I don’t think 
it was ever an objective.”540 
 Even in the excitement that the small team of drafters experienced over the 
perception that they were reimagining intellectual property, that they were creating 
something that had never been tested in other countries, the notion of withdrawing 
from the World Trade Organization or other international obligations was never 
seriously considered. One of the drafters of early versions of the Ingenios Bill 
explained the deliberations to me as such: 
“In one moment, the idea came out: what happens if we leave the World Trade 
Organization? But later, of course, we analysed it more clearly and realised it 
wasn’t possible. Aside from the fact that it was our idea, not the 
government’s.”541 
                                            
539 Although during this interview, the government official with whom I spoke stated that the 2008 
Ecuadorian Constitution was approved by 82% of the population, this is an overestimate. In fact, 
63.9% of the 75.8% of the eligible population that participated in the referendum vote chose “yes” 
when asked, “Do you agree with the text in the New Poligical Constitution written by the Constituent 
Assembly. Political Database of the Americas. “2008 Revocatory Referendum, Ecuador.” Edmund A. 
Walsh School of Foreign Service, Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University (8 
October 2008). Retrieved from http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Ecuador/refconst08.html. The 
statistic of 82% more accurately refers to the proportion of voters who agreed in 2007 to form a 
Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitutional text. “Ecuador convoca para el 30 de septiembre 
las elecciones a la Asamblea Constituyente.” El País (25 April 2007). Retrieved from 
https://elpais.com/internacional/2007/04/25/actualidad/1177452004_850215.html.  
540 Director level official at the Yachay Public Enterprise. (1 April 2016). Personal interview. 
541 Director level official from the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute. (16 April 2016). Personal 
interview. 
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This statement reveals one of the fundamental themes of governance under 
the Citizens’ Revolution in Ecuador. Consistent with the tenets of twenty-first century 
socialism or Andean capitalism, Ecuadorian lawmakers plainly stated that their 
intention was to charter a path between classical socialism and neoliberal capitalism, 
to “bring back the State” but not to entirely abandon free-market economics. This 
strategy was manifested concretely in the Ingenios Act through a series of 
compromises. Thus, reformist aspirations were married to provisions that attempted 
to take advantage of the policy space that remained in international agreements, 
without substantively forsaking the dominant paradigm. As one Citizens’ Revolution 
official characterised it, the strategy was “disruptive, but not rupturist.”542  
This approach, involving a progressive but not necessarily transformative 
reform of intellectual property law in general, could potentially represent a source of 
inspiration for other countries whose circumstances are similar to those of Ecuador. 
However, up to this point the thesis has not focused specifically on whether the new 
Ecuadorian system of intellectual property for plants actually deviates from the 
conventional logic of plant breeders’ rights. For this reason, Chapter 4 of this thesis 
will explore how officials in Ecuador have approached the regulation of plants as 
intellectual property. Chapter 4 will also consider how Ecuadorian lawmakers have 
adopted different legal strategies to govern the access and use of different types of 
plants, including through laws that regulate farmers’ seeds and traditional knowledge. 
Subsequently, Chapter 5 will extrapolate lessons from the Ecuadorian experience to 
develop a series of policy options that other countries could consider to govern the 
uses of different types of plants.    
  
                                            
542 Directorial level official at the Yachay Public Enterprise. (1 April 2016). Personal interview. 
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Chapter 4. Experimenting with Innovative Lawmaking in Ecuador  
A central contention of this thesis is that notwithstanding the availability of a 
formal legal space for the making of intellectual property laws for plants, in practice 
experimentation in lawmaking has diminished. This is due in part to the global 
expansion and durability of the logic of plant breeders’ rights, a way of thinking that 
has been most visibly inscribed in the UPOV Convention. Accordingly, plants have 
been conceptualised in a way that approximates other subject matter protected as 
intellectual property.  
Laws that regulate plants as intellectual property frequently emphasize the 
importance of incentivising innovation in plant breeding, of rewarding technological 
advancement in plant genetics, and of providing economic remuneration for these 
efforts through exclusive proprietary rights. Part 1 of the thesis demonstrated how this 
way of thinking developed and spread over time, even as alternative lawmaking 
priorities related to the governance of different types of plants have also become 
increasingly visible. Subsequently, Chapter 3 introduced the legislative experiment 
that the Ingenios Act of Ecuador embodies. This new legal instrument purposively 
questions many of the conventional assumptions of intellectual property law.  
While Chapter 3 presented the history and theory of the overall Ingenios project, 
Chapter 4 will show how the Act and other recently introduced Ecuadorian regimes 
have responded to the need to find local solutions for the regulation of plants as 
intellectual property. The exploration that follows will demonstrate that in Ecuador, 
although it is true that opportunities for experimentation with locally tailored intellectual 
property laws for plants have been in some ways formally bounded, alternative 
imaginaries may still be located to structure relationships between people, institutions, 
and different kinds of plants. The experimentation that Ecuadorian lawmakers have 
undertaken transcends the conventional domain of intellectual property, to include 
administrative regulations to implement the Ingenios system of plant breeders’ rights; 
a new law for the regulation of agrobiodiversity, seeds, and sustainable agriculture; a 
framework for the protection for traditional knowledge; and a regime to govern access 
to genetic resources and equitable benefit sharing. The case study of Ecuador 
demonstrates that it is necessary for countries to move beyond the logic of plant 
breeders’ rights to imagine new futures that would consider the needs of the multiplicity 
of actors who participate in the national agricultural sector. 
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Part 1 of this thesis showed that a series of obligations contained in international 
agreements legally constrain the ways that many countries may regulate plants as 
intellectual property. As was noted earlier, Ecuador is a member of the World Trade 
Organization, and the country is not classified as “least-developed.” This subjects 
Ecuador to the basic requirement that it must protect new varieties of plants with some 
form of intellectual property, whether via patents, a sui generis system, or a 
combination of both. Furthermore, the country is legally bound to the 1978 version of 
the UPOV Convention, the norms of the regional Andean Community, and several 
other international instruments that relate to the regulation of plants according to the 
rationality of intellectual property. 
The international obligations to which Ecuador is subject dictate that any regime 
that the country might enact must allow for the protection of plant breeder’s rights, in 
accordance with the terms of UPOV 1978 and the Andean Community Decision No. 
345. It has been broadly acknowledged that the plant breeders’ rights model was 
developed primarily to suit the realities of industrialised agriculture in developed 
countries, based on the “standard argument” that this form of intellectual property will 
stimulate investment in research, contribute to the development of the domestic seed 
sector, and enable countries to take advantage of foreign technology.543 However, this 
line of reasoning does not take into account the nature of Ecuadorian agriculture and 
the fact that it may differ from that of most industrialised countries.  
Diverse stakeholders represent important constituencies in the agricultural 
sector in Ecuador. These include large-scale growers who produce commodities – for 
example, fresh cut flowers, bananas, coffee, and cacao – primarily destined for export 
markets. Meanwhile, many Ecuadorians practice forms of customary agriculture. This 
group is comprised of individual small-scale farmers – some of whom are members of 
indigenous communities – and farmer cooperatives. During the making of the Ingenios 
Act, Ecuadorian politicians and bureaucrats formally accepted inputs that these 
various stakeholders submitted. Nevertheless, as described in Chapter 3 of the thesis, 
local perspectives were at times marginalised by other factors. 
For instance, the systems for plant breeders’ rights elaborated in the 1978 
version of the UPOV Convention and in Decision No. 345 of the Andean Community 
provide clear baselines for how Ecuador should regulate plants as intellectual 
                                            
543 Tripp, Louwaars, & Eaton, supra note 350 at 355. 
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property. However, these regimes are not concerned with the governance of plants 
that do not qualify as new, distinct, uniform, and stable varieties. Nevertheless, 
Ecuador has taken on other international commitments that require the country to 
legislate issues related to these other types of plants, including the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Plant Treaty, and the Nagoya Protocol. Membership in these 
regimes means that Ecuador must enact laws related to issues such as access and 
benefit sharing for plant genetic resources and farmers’ rights.  
As a result of these various engagements, during the making of the Ingenios 
Act Ecuadorian lawmakers were charged with the difficult task of not only ensuring 
that the new plant breeders’ rights law would comply with the 1978 version of the 
UPOV Convention and Decision No. 345 of the Andean Community. These officials 
also needed to consider how mechanisms could be created to realise other goals, 
including the conservation of agrobiodiversity, the protection of customary agricultural 
practices, the Ecuadorian constitutional guarantee of food sovereignty, the regulation 
of access to plant genetic resources, and the governance of traditional knowledge 
related to agriculture and the environment. Notwithstanding the templates provided by 
the various relevant international regimes to which Ecuador is legally bound, these 
issues have proven difficult to implement at the national level.         
The remainder of Chapter 4 will investigate various lawmaking experiments 
related to the regulation of plants as intellectual property that have been undertaken 
in Ecuador in recent years. These initiatives have been designed – though not always 
consciously or coherently – to balance the international obligations to which the 
country is subject with domestic concerns. The initiatives that will be described in 
Chapter 4 include the plant breeders’ rights chapter of the Ingenios Act, the 2017 Law 
for Agrobiodiversity, Seeds, and the Promotion of Sustainable Agriculture, and the 
protections for traditional knowledge embodied in the Ingenios regime. However, prior 
to exploring the new Ecuadorian legal landscape, it will be important to characterise 
the nature of the country’s agricultural sector so that the challenges which lawmakers 
faced during the making of the Ingenios Act may be better understood.  
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4.1. A “Plurination” of Campesinos and Industrialists: A Brief Introduction to 
Ecuadorian Agriculture 
Ecuadorian agriculture has been depicted as a “mosaic” of systems, including 
subsistence farming as well as production for national markets and international 
export.544 These diverse agricultural systems include a mixture of large, medium, and 
small-scale operations, whose produce ranges from “bust and boom” plantation crops 
to native food plants sourced from a variety of climates and ecosystems. In 
geophysical as well as sociocultural terms, Ecuador is a diverse country, characterised 
by a range of climactic zones and farming traditions that span the tropical lowlands on 
the Pacific coast, the Andean highlands whose glaciated volcanoes reach heights of 
over 6300m above sea level, and the lush rainforests of the Amazon basin. Customary 
agricultural practices evolved over centuries to this uniquely “vertical” landscape. 
Historically, communities in different ecozones practiced “ecological complementarity” 
as a means to minimize risk by planting and trading a diversity of crops timed around 
staggered planting and harvest seasons.545 Thus, one of the key features that 
traditionally typifies Ecuadorian agriculture is “verticality,” embodied in a system that 
is designed to exploit and control the maximum possible number of ecological niches 
at different altitudes, to ensure the sustainability of crop production and food 
security.546      
 Over the past half century, numerous factors have transformed the nature of 
smallholder farming in the highland regions of Ecuador. These include agrarian reform, 
according to which large plantations (latifundios) that since the period of colonisation 
were controlled by European-descended Ecuadorians were broken up in order to 
distribute the land more equitably, especially to indigenous and traditional peoples. 
Unfortunately, however, many scholars have observed that the most significant 
consequence of land reform was that it became harder for many smallholder farmers 
to access key resources, as customary systems of ecological complementarity were 
dismantled.547 Additionally, small-scale Ecuadorian farmers report that numerous 
                                            
544 Rhoades, R. E. (2006). Linking Sustainability Science, Community and Culture. In R. E. Rhoades 
(Ed.). Development with Identity: Community, Culture and Sustainability in the Andes. Oxfordshire, 
UK: CABI Publishing. pp. 7. 
545 Moates, A. S. & Campbell, B. C. (2006). Incursion, Fragmentation and Tradition: Historical Ecology 
of Andean Cotacachi. In R. E. Rhoades (Ed.). Development with Identity: Community, Culture and 
Sustainability in the Andes. Oxfordshire, UK: CABI Publishing. pp. 28. 
546 Id. at 27.   
547 Id. at 39. 
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other challenges have complicated their agricultural management systems in recent 
years, ranging from decreased production, to climate change, to loss of traditional 
knowledge, to continued subjugation including – in the eyes of some communities – 
international non-governmental organisations that have encouraged the planting of 
improved varieties of crops.548    
Meanwhile, industrial agricultural production continues to expand in Ecuador, 
both in terms of physical space and socio-political influence.  According to the most 
recent statistics published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, industrial agriculture cultivates as much as 80 per cent of the productive land 
in Ecuador and utilizes 63 per cent of the water available for irrigation, even while 
constituting only 15 per cent of national agricultural production units.549 Actors who 
practice large-scale agriculture in Ecuador principally grow crops for export, the most 
prominent of which are bananas, cacao, and coffee, as well as ornamental plants such 
as roses and carnations.   
 In contrast to the relatively small size of the industrial agricultural sector, 
approximately 85 per cent of the agricultural production units in Ecuador are classified 
as familial, with 64 per cent of national production in the hands of smallholder 
farmers.550 Further highlighting the importance of small-scale agriculture, 60 per cent 
of the food consumed in Ecuador is sourced locally from family farms. This 
“campesino” agricultural sector is characterised by cultivation on small plots, mostly 
by individual family units, of crops that are important for subsistence, for exchange 
with other farmers, and for sale in local markets. Ecuadorian campesinos generally 
live below the national poverty line, and these small-scale and subsistence farmers 
rely on customary practices of seed saving and exchange through farmer-to-farmer 
networks to source planting material.551 Although industrial agriculture contributes 
significantly to the national economy – three of Ecuador’s top five non-petroleum 
                                            
548 Campbell, B. C. (2006). Why is the Earth Tired? A Comparartive Analysis of Agricultural Change 
and Intervention in Northern Ecuador. In R. E. Rhoades (Ed.). Development with Identity: Community, 
Culture and Sustainability in the Andes. Oxfordshire, UK: CABI Publishing. 
549 Id. 
550 “Ecuador en una mirada.” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Retrieved 
from: http://www.fao.org/ecuador/fao-en-ecuador/ecuador-en-una-mirada/en/ (accessed 1 November 
2018).  
551 Santivañez, T., Tejada, G., Aguilera, J., Mastrocola, N., & Pinedo, R. (2014). Semillas Certificadas 
para la Agricultura Familiar en la Zona Andina. In S. Salcedo & L. Guzmán (Eds.) Agricultura Familiar 
en América Latina y el Caribe: Recomendaciones de Política. Santiago, Chile: Organización de las 
Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura. 
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exports are agricultural products552 – traditional forms of agriculture are much more 
relevant to Ecuadorians living in rural areas, both to provide a source of income and 
to guarantee food security.553  
Beginning in the 1990s, advocacy for the rights of campesinos, as well as on 
behalf of indigenous groups, gained visibility and political agency in Ecuador. Various 
social movements coalesced in Ecuador in the early 2000s including those which 
advocated for the formal recognition of special rights for indigenous peoples 
specifically and for campesino communities more generally. As discussed in Chapter 
3 of the thesis, many of these groups united under the banner of the Citizens’ 
Revolution, on whose platform Rafael Correa won the 2006 presidential election.  
During his first presidential campaign, Correa promised that one of his first 
actions in office would be to initiate the framing of a new, populist constitution that 
would, among other elements, better incorporate the historically marginalised 
perspectives of indigenous and campesino peoples. This promise was effectively 
realised when a Constituent Assembly554 was held from November 2007 until October 
2008. The formation of the Constituent Assembly was approved by nearly 82 per cent 
of the Ecuadorian voting populace, and the final text was ratified via referendum by 
approximately 64 per cent of voters in October 2008.555 
The groups that had advocated on behalf of indigenous peoples and other 
campesinos considered the recognition of new “buen vivir rights” in the 2008 
                                            
552 The top non-petroleum exports in Ecuador are bananas, shrimp, canned fish, flowers, and cacao. 
Instituto de Promoción de Exportaciones e Inversiones del Ecuador. (2018). “Análisis Exportaciones 
no Petroleras Ecuatorianas: Ene-May 2018.” Retrieved from https://www.proecuador.gob.ec/informe-
mensual-de-comercio-julio-2018/ (accessed 1 November 2018).    
553 One manifestation of this importance is the fact that in Ecuador between 80 and 90 percent of the 
seeds sown by smallholder farmers have been saved from prior harvests, obtained through 
exchanges with neighbouring communities, or acquired in local markets or seed fairs (Heifer-Ecuador 
2015). This demonstrates that Ecuadorian campesinos are essentially self-reliant surrounding the 
production and procurement of seed, one of the principal agricultural inputs. 
554 Numerous civil society organizations participated in the 2007 Constituent Assembly, including the 
National Indigenous Confederation of Ecuador (Confederación Nacional de Indígenas del Ecuador – 
CONAIE); the National Federation of Indigenous and Afro-descendant Peasants of Ecuador 
(Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras del Ecuador – FENOCIN); 
the Ecuadorian Federation of Indigenous Evangelicals (Federación Nacional de Indígenas 
Evangelicas – FEINE); the National Affiliated Confederation of Peasant Social Security – National 
Peasant Coordination (Confederación Nacional de Afiliados al Seguro Social Campesino – 
Coordinadora Nacional Campesina – CONFEUNASSC-CNC); and the Nacional Confederation of the 
Quichua Community (Confederación de los Pueblos de Nacionalidad de Kichua del Ecuador – 
Ecaurunari). 
555 The Carter Center. (25 September 2008). Informe Final sobre el Referéndum Constitucional 
Aprobatorio de Ecuador del 28 de septiembre de 2008. Retrieved from 
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/ecuador-
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Constitution to be a significant victory. Many of these organisations had participated 
directly in the drafting of the new constitutional text through the Constituent Assembly. 
The guarantees enshrined in the 2008 Constitution included new rights designed to 
protect the cultural identities of campesinos and indigenous peoples; access to land, 
water, and food; as well as the natural environment and national biodiversity. Given 
the breadth of the reforms, subsequent to the ratification of the 2008 Constitution 
debates have proliferated about how to rewrite existing, subordinate legal frameworks 
in order that they might conform to the new constitutional text. The subject matter that 
these reforms cover is vast, including laws governing culture,556 finance,557 higher 
education,558 and citizen participation in policymaking.559 
Following this trend, the Ingenios project was launched in 2014 based on the 
need to align the country’s intellectual property law with the new, buen vivir-oriented 
national development paradigm that the 2008 Constitution was designed to support. 
Other lawmaking projects that have been undertaken in recent years also relate to 
issues of great importance for Ecuadorian farmers. These include the enactment of a 
new law for the protection of agrobiodiversity, seeds, and sustainable agriculture, as 
well as frameworks to regulate access to genetic resources and equitable benefit 
sharing,560 and food sovereignty.561  
Furthermore, one of the new regimes that is most pertinent to Ecuadorian 
agriculture is the section in the Ingenios Act that creates a system of intellectual 
property for plants in the form of plant breeders’ rights. The importance of this chapter 
of the law is especially salient given the dualistic nature of the agricultural sector in 
Ecuador, where the interests of industrial and small-scale producers are starkly 
divided. While representatives of industrial agriculture regard plant breeders’ rights as 
an important tool to incentivise research and development towards plant genetic 
improvement and to ensure return on investments,562 campesino farmers are more 
                                            
556 Ley Orgánica de Cultura (2016), Registro Oficial No. 913. 
557 Código Orgánico Monetario y Financiero (2014), Registro Oficial No. 332. 
558 Ley Orgánica de Educación Superior (2010), Registro Oficial No. 298. 
559 Ley Orgánica de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social (2010), Registro Oficial No. 175. 
560 El Reglamento Nacional al Régimen Común sobre Acceso a los Recursos Genéticos en 
Aplicación a la Decisión 391 de la Comunidad Andina del Ecuador. Decreto Presidencial No. 905 (3 
de octubre de 2011).  
561 Ley Orgánica del Régimen de la Soberanía Alimentaria del Ecuador. Registro Oficial Suplemento 
583 (5 de mayo de 2009).  
562 Alejandro Martínez, President of Expoflores, Workshop on Ornamental Varieties, Technology 
Transfer and Innovation, “Management of Plant Varieties for Development,” Yachay Tech, Urcuquí, 
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concerned with the maintenance and promotion of customary agricultural practices, 
including seed storage, exchange, and sale in local markets.563 
Despite the differences between industrial and smallholder agricultural 
practices and how the new plant breeders’ rights law might affect each group, as of 
2018 intellectual property is not very relevant for food crops in Ecuador. The plant 
breeders’ rights regime that the former, 1998 Intellectual Property Law established 
was used almost exclusively to protect ornamental plants. According to the most 
recent records available from the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute, of the 291 
plant varieties that were registered in the country as of 2016, 92 per cent were 
flowers.564 Among the few food crops that were protected with breeders’ rights in 
Ecuador, only two staples had been registered.565 These were a pair of rice varieties, 
both of which were titled to a public agency, the National Agricultural Research 
Institute of Ecuador. Aside from these two varieties of rice, as of 2016 all of the 
breeder’s rights certificates that had been granted for plants grown for food protected 
high value specialty crops such as artichokes, grapes, strawberries, mandarin 
oranges, and sugarcane, which were likely all designated for export.566 Essentially all 
rights over protected varieties of plants in Ecuador were held by foreign entities. 
 During the making of the Ingenios Act, some civil society actors argued that 
given the national intellectual property landscape, food crops should be entirely 
excluded from intellectual property protection. However, in general, the privatisation 
of ornamental crops was not contested. For instance, as one advocate for campesino 
agriculture told me, “I am against intellectual property for seeds. If they are flowers…I 
think that is a question for the floriculturists. But if [intellectual property] gets involved 
in agriculture, it’s very complicated.”567 It is noteworthy that the Ecuadorian officials 
involved in the making of the Ingenios Act considered this perspective when drafting 
the new chapter that would replace the plant breeders’ rights framework that the 1998 
                                            
Ecuador (25 April 2016) (recording on file with the author). Representative of Expoflores. (17 March 
2016). Personal interview.  
563 Leader at the National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous, and Black Organisations of Ecuador 
(FENOCIN). (3 May 2016). Personal Interview. Professor of Local Development at an Ecuadorian 
university. (15 April 2016). Personal interview. 
564 Lista de Variedades Vegetales Vigentes, Instituto Ecuatoriano de la Propiedad Intelectual, 
Dirección Nacional de Obtenciones Vegetales. Actualizado al 18 de noviembre de 2016. Retrieved 
from https://www.propiedadintelectual.gob.ec/obtenciones-vegetales/ (accessed 1 November 2018). 
565 Id. 
566 Id.  
567 Professor of Local Development at an Ecuadorian university. (15 April 2016). Personal interview. 
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Intellectual Property Law had created. One official from the Ecuadorian Intellectual 
Property Institute explained to me that the process of constructing the new framework 
was iterative: 
“[I]f I’m honest, we’ve had a movement of positions. First…it began originally 
with a regulation in terms of the 1978 Act [of UPOV]. And then…it was 
modified with the possibility of maintaining the norms from UPOV 1991 that 
are featured in the Andean Decision [No. 345]. Then…the possibility was 
analysed of creating a differentiated regime for ornamental and food 
varieties.”568 
Thus, the officials involved in the drafting of the texts that became the Ingenios 
Act considered certain innovative strategies for redesigning the Ecuadorian regime to 
regulate plants as intellectual property, such as creating a tiered system that would 
have mandated different criteria for the protection of ornamental plants on the one 
hand, and food crops on the other. Ultimately, this idea was not realised, largely due 
to the belief on the part of officials that such a system would not be viable given 
Ecuador’s international obligations under the UPOV Convention and the Andean 
Community regional framework.569 Nevertheless, the system for plant breeders’ rights 
created in the Ingenios Act does deviate from these conventional models in certain 
ways. The novel elements of the law will be explored in the following two sections.  
 
4.2. The Conceptualisation of the Plant Variety in the Ingenios Act 
In order to understand how plants are conceived as the subject matter of 
intellectual property in the Ingenios Act, it is important to return to the new national 
governance model that the 2008 Constitution established. Indeed, one of the principal 
forces that motivated the reform of the Ecuadorian intellectual property regime as a 
whole was the need to institutionalise several of the novel guarantees that the new 
Constitution introduced. These included rights that are particularly relevant to 
agriculture, such as the right to food and other provisions designed to advance the 
“strategic objective” of food sovereignty. Additionally, the 2008 Constitution obligates 
the State to undertake a series of activities related to customary agricultural practices, 
                                            
568 Directorial level official from the Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Institute. (12 May 2016). Personal 
interview. 
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including promoting smallholder production; avoiding the dependence on food imports; 
preserving and recovering national agrobiodiversity and ancestral knowledge; and 
ensuring that seeds may be freely used, saved, and exchanged.570  
The intention to balance the exclusive, proprietary rights granted to plant 
breeders with other important national goals is visible in the section of the Ingenios 
Act concerned with intellectual property for plants. In this chapter, the subject matter 
eligible for protection is delimited as “varieties pertaining to all plant genera and 
species provided that the cultivation, possession or utilisation thereof is not prohibited 
for reasons of human, animal or plant health, food sovereignty, food security and 
environmental security.”571 The language is significant in that it renders the Ingenios 
Act as the only intellectual property law for plants in existence worldwide to explicitly 
invoke food sovereignty, in addition to food and environmental security as grounds to 
exclude certain varieties from protection.572 This provision could potentially create a 
basis for the exclusion of certain varieties of plants from breeders’ rights protection, 
for instance those which are derived from landraces and that are popularly grown for 
local consumption. Nevertheless, it is difficult to discern how these subject matter 
exclusions might operate in practice, given that they have not been tested in the courts 
of Ecuador or elsewhere.  
A further innovation in the Ingenios framework is the specificity with which the 
law enumerates categories of plant varieties that are excluded from the ambit of plant 
breeders’ rights. In comparison to the provisions of the 1998 Ecuadorian Intellectual 
Property Law, the Ingenios Act demonstrates a more nuanced and ecological 
understanding of the relationship between people and plants. Thus, in its definition of 
protectable subject matter, the Ingenios Act specifies that species may not be 
protected as intellectual property when: (1) they are in a “wild, natural or native state,” 
(2) they “result from a mere discovery, except mutations,” or (3) “there exists or is 
implied a process of plant improvement derived from the simple, symbiotic, long-term 
relationship between the species and human beings.”573 This explicitly recognises that 
plant genetic improvement is not a process that exclusively occurs through 
                                            
570 Constitución de la República del Ecuador de 2008, Art. 281. 
571 Ingenios Act, Article 471 (emphasis added). 
572 According to a search utilizing the keywords “food sovereignty” in all records in the WIPO Lex 
database of international intellectual property laws, 11 July 2018. 
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professional breeding. Instead, humans and plants constantly interrelate and may co-
evolve over the course of history. 
The conceptualisation of the subject matter eligible for intellectual property 
protection is intended to recognise that farmers, in addition to professional scientists, 
act as plant breeders.574 Further, the language employed in the Ingenios Act suggests 
that the law is inviting farmers to register as intellectual property the varieties that they 
develop. This may be possible because although plant varieties that result from a 
simple symbiotic, long-term relationship between the species and a person or people 
are expressly excluded from protection, the implication is that varieties resulting from 
a complex symbiotic long-term relationship would be protectable.  
Research on participatory plant breeding conducted with smallholder famers 
has concluded that farmers are often motivated by diverse goals when they select and 
re-plant the seed and other propagating material of varieties that have desirable traits. 
Among other motivations, small-scale producers often intentionally engage in 
selection towards the ends of changing or conserving crop genetic variation.575 Under 
the terms of the Ingenios Act, such activity could conceivably be understood as a 
complex symbiotic, long-term relationship, or in other words, breeding.  
The intention of the Ingenios Act to recognise farmers as plant breeders due to 
their role in plant genetic improvement is evident in other sections of the law. For 
instance, the creation of a new plant variety is defined as  
“the resulting of a new variety through the application of scientific methods 
through conventional and non-conventional plant breeding techniques; and the 
empirical method based on experimentation and observation that farmers 
undertake to obtain improved varieties and varieties that are better adapted to 
their local reality, such as those obtained by natural mutations, provided that 
they comply with the requirements [for protection].”576  
Here, farmers are explicitly conceived as agents who interact with the natural 
environment, and whose intellectual contributions shape that environment in ways that 
create value. This language represents a more expansive approach in comparison to 
                                            
574 Directorial level official at the National Service for Intellectual Rights. (19 October 2018). Personal 
interview.  
575 Soleri, D. & Cleveland, D. A. (2004). Farmer Selection and Conservation of Crop Varieties. In R. 
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the UPOV Convention, which defines a “breeder” as “the person who bred, or 
discovered and developed, a variety.577  
However, notwithstanding the various ways in which the Ingenios Act attempts 
to recognise farmers as breeders, it is unclear whether actors other than professional 
plant breeders could realistically meet the requirements for protection to obtain rights 
under the new law for the varieties that they develop or improve. There are two primary 
reasons for this uncertainty. First, it is generally understood that genetic variation 
within and among farmers’ plant varieties is much greater than is the case with 
varieties developed by professional breeders.578 In addition, the growing environments 
in which farmers operate are usually more variable in space and time. Thus, it may be 
unlikely that farmers’ varieties would be able to meet the UPOV-based uniformity and 
stability requirements for protection that the Ingenios Act reinscribes.  
Second, farmers’ plant varieties may not comply with the requirement of 
novelty. This is because small-scale farmers in Ecuador, as in many countries, 
customarily exchange seeds with others. For instance, a farmer may develop a plant 
variety that is never sold commercially, but the farmer may still make the variety 
available to others through the customary practice of seed exchange. If such 
transactions were to occur for a period of time greater than one year prior to the date 
of filing of the application for plant breeders’ rights, the farmer’s variety would not be 
novel under the Ingenios Act. This is because it is likely that in such cases the 
existence of the variety would meet the definition of common knowledge.579  
Some other countries have recognised farmers as plant breeders in sui generis 
intellectual property laws for plants. Countries with such legislation already in place 
include India,580 Thailand,581 and Malaysia.582 In contrast to the system that the 
Ingenios Act institutes, these three countries have all created separate categories for 
the protection of farmers’ plant varieties on the one hand, and commercial or 
professional breeders’ varieties on the other. As of 2018, other governments, including 
                                            
577 UPOV 1991, Art. 1. 
578 Cleveland & Soleri, supra note 209. See also Salazar, Louwaars, & Visser, supra note 318. 
579 For instance, UPOV 1978 states that common knowledge “may be established by reference to 
various factors such as: cultivation or marketing already in progress….” (Art. 6(1)(a)).  
580 The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act of India (2001). 
581 Plant Varieties Protection Act of Thailand, B.E. 2542 (1999). 
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those of Sri Lanka583 and Nepal,584 were also weighing the possibility of enacting 
similar legislation. The basis for the creation of a typology of plant varieties is the 
recognition that farmers may be conceptualised as breeders, but that the UPOV-based 
requirements for protection may be difficult for farmers to meet.  
Under these sui generis systems of intellectual property for plants, farmers are 
usually required to meet relatively less stringent requirements for protection in 
comparison to commercial or professional plant breeders. The rationale for requiring 
farmers to meet relatively laxer criteria than professional breeders is that members of 
this latter group are typically able to access sophisticated scientific tools, as well as 
the time and resources with which to conduct controlled breeding experiments towards 
the development of new, distinct, uniform, and stable plant varieties. In contrast, 
farmers’ efforts to effect plant genetic improvement customarily occur in the field, in 
parallel with other agricultural activities such as planting, harvesting, and seed sorting. 
Furthermore, trait selection by farmers is commonly based on phenotypic observation, 
while professional plant breeders may utilise advanced genetic techniques to obtain 
new varieties.   
The Ecuadorian officials involved in the making of the Ingenios Act were aware 
of the precedents set by certain other countries, especially the exhaustively studied 
case of the Indian Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act of 2001.585 
Nevertheless, the new Ecuadorian legislation does not separately categorise 
breeders’ and farmers’ plant varieties. Instead, the Ingenios Act reinscribes the UPOV-
derived novelty, distinctness, uniformity, and stability criteria for the protection of all 
types of plant varieties as intellectual property. Although numerous other provisions 
were modified in the Ingenios Act as compared to the 1998 Intellectual Property Law, 
these requirements for protection remained essentially unaltered.  
The genealogy of the new Ecuadorian system of intellectual property for plants 
reveals that the criteria for protection that the Ingenios Act mandates have retained 
their essential form over time, dating to the first, 1961 version of the UPOV Convention. 
This lineage is the logical result of Ecuador’s obligations under UPOV 1978, which 
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stipulates that Member States may not grant proprietary rights to plant breeders based 
on conditions other than novelty, distinctness, uniformity, and stability.586 Although 
Ecuadorian officials were able to experiment with certain doctrinal provisions during 
the making of the Ingenios Act, the criteria for protection were non-negotiable, at least 
at the level of legislation. 
However, understanding how the novelty, distinctness, uniformity, and stability 
requirements might operate in practice under the new Ecuadorian regime involves a 
deeper level of analysis than simply reading the text of the law. Even though the 
Ingenios Act did not create separate criteria for the registration of farmers’ plant 
varieties, officials were aware of the space to innovate that existed in the regulatory, if 
not in the legislative realm. The existence of this opportunity for experimentation is 
evidenced in the General Regulations to the Ingenios Act, released via presidential 
decree in May 2017. This framework stipulates that 
“The competent authority in matters of intellectual [property] rights shall 
ensure the compliance with the principle of equality established in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, guaranteeing the recognition of 
farmers’ rights. For the [evaluation of applications] for varieties obtained 
through the empirical method based on experimentation and observation that 
farmers realise, the same requirements as for varieties obtained through 
classical or modern plant biotechnological methods shall not be applied.”587 
 According to the General Regulations, although the UPOV-based novelty, 
distinctness, uniformity, and stability requirements for protection were not altered in 
the Ingenios Act, Ecuadorian officials should not assess farmers’ plant varieties 
according to the same standards as varieties developed by professional breeders. As 
one official from the National Service for Intellectual Rights explained to me, this 
provision was included in recognition that farmers who obtain new plant varieties via 
mass selection are not able to provide the same kind of scientific documentation as 
professional breeders who create new varieties via hybridisation or genetic 
engineering.588 However, specific criteria for how farmers’ varieties should be 
assessed for plant breeders’ rights protection were not elaborated in the General 
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Regulations. As of 2018, it remained unclear whether these details would be clarified 
in the Technical Regulations, which at that point remained in draft form.  
The process of formulating the Ingenios Technical Regulations began publicly 
in October 2017, when the newly formed National Service for Intellectual Rights 
organised a public dialogue in which 170 representatives from universities, technical 
institutes, public research institutions, law firms, non-profit organisations, and private 
businesses participated. At this event, government officials solicited comments from 
participants regarding the subject matter that would be addressed in the forthcoming 
administrative framework, including in relation to scientific research, intellectual 
property, and access to genetic resources.589  
The comments received during the October 2017 event were incorporated into 
a first draft of the Ingenios Technical Regulations, written by officials at the National 
Service for Intellectual Rights. In July 2018, the text of the draft was published in its 
entirety on an online platform, with sets of provisions enumerated for the various forms 
of intellectual property, including trademarks, patents, copyright, traditional 
knowledge, and plant breeders’ rights.590 A period of public comment was opened from 
July to September 2018, and during this time, users were able to submit comments 
directly through the online platform.  
Following the period of public comment, the digital platform was taken offline. 
After reviewing the inputs received, the National Service for Intellectual Rights 
organised a series of roundtable discussions, to which it invited everyone who 
provided comments through the online platform.591 Certain individuals who were 
unable to access the website in time but who still wanted to give feedback were also 
welcomed to attend the meetings. The roundtable discussions were organised by 
thematic area, such that different individuals attended specific meetings related to 
traditional knowledge protection, trademarks, patents, copyright, and plant breeders’ 
rights, respectively. Subsequently, the National Service for Intellectual Rights worked 
to compile all of the comments received via the online platform and the roundtable 
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discussions to generate a new draft of the Technical Regulations. As of late 2018, it 
was unclear whether the next version would be the final one. It was also not known 
whether the new draft would also be submitted to another round of public comments, 
though one senior official intimated to me that many members of the National Service 
for Intellectual Rights hoped that this would occur.592  
The most recent available version of the Ingenios Technical Regulations does 
not specify whether the testing process to evaluate distinctness, uniformity, and 
stability would be different for farmers’ plant varieties on the one hand and those 
developed by professional plant breeders on the other. This lack of differentiation 
contrasts with the express stipulation of the General Regulations that the assessment 
of farmers’ plant varieties should not be subjected to the same requirements as for 
varieties obtained through classical or modern plant biotechnological methods. One 
option to address this discrepancy could be to specify in the Technical Regulations 
that farmers’ plant varieties would only generally need to meet the criteria of uniformity 
or stability. Such a strategy has been considered in other countries, including Nepal.593 
As of late 2018, officials in the National Service for Intellectual Rights were weighing 
this option, and in any event, they made it clear to me that they intended to create a 
system that would encourage farmers to protect the varieties that they develop.594 
Regardless of the approach that the Ecuadorian policymakers decide to follow, 
the UPOV Convention should not constrain their ability to experiment with local 
definitions of the distinctness, uniformity, and stability requirements for plant breeders’ 
rights protection. This is because the Convention does not provide precise, technical 
definitions of the criteria for protection, offering only vague, general descriptions of 
these concepts. For instance, uniformity is determined to exist when a variety is 
“sufficiently uniform in its relevant characteristics,”595 but the meaning of “sufficiently 
uniform” is not elaborated. Notably, what constitutes “sufficiently uniform” differs from 
one species of plant to another.  
Due to the difficulty of translating the exact parameters of uniformity into 
technical terms to guide field-testing, UPOV allows signatories to the Convention to 
develop their own national-level regulatory frameworks. This means that the Ingenios 
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Technical Regulations could ostensibly recognise different definitions of distinctness, 
uniformity, and stability for farmers’ and professional breeders’ plant varieties. 
Acknowledging the ambiguities involved in translating concepts such as uniformity and 
stability into bureaucratic protocols, the UPOV Council has developed a set of 
guidance documents to help Member States to better navigate the complexity of 
conducting field-testing. However, the character of these documents is informative, 
and they state explicitly, “[t]he only binding obligations on members of the Union are 
those contained in the text of the UPOV Convention itself.”596 In other words, national 
governments are free to define distinctness, uniformity, and stability in a manner that 
would be best suited to locally relevant conditions of the various species of plants that 
are cultivated within their borders.  
Notwithstanding this formal legal space, the idea of defining the distinctness, 
uniformity, and stability criteria differentially based on the identity of the applicant for 
plant breeders’ rights is experimental. The UPOV Council has never expressly 
addressed this issue, although UPOV guidance documents elaborate various methods 
for the evaluation of uniformity and stability based on the rationale that variation in the 
expression of relevant characteristics within varieties has both genetic and 
environmental components.597 At least a few territories have already experimented 
with the idea of defining separate registration requirements for breeders’ versus 
farmers’ plant varieties. For instance, as mentioned above the draft plant variety 
protection law of Nepal does not create separate categories for farmers’ varieties on 
the one hand and professional breeders’ varieties on the other. However, in 
recognition that farmers’ varieties frequently originate from native or local varieties 
whose traits are often expressed heterogeneously,598 under the proposed Nepali 
framework farmers’ varieties would only be expected to “generally” meet the criteria of 
uniformity and stability to receive protection.599  
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The strategy that Ecuador could undertake in the Ingenios Technical 
Regulations is similar to the approach under consideration in Nepal. If the Ingenios 
Technical Regulations were written to mandate different acceptable ranges of 
uniformity and stability for farmers’ varieties on the one hand and those developed by 
professional breeders on the other, it might be more likely that farmers’ varieties could 
meet the conditions for intellectual property protection. The question of whether such 
a differentiated approach would be compliant with the UPOV Convention will be 
explored further in Chapter 5 of the thesis. Chapter 5 will also consider the relevance 
of the Ingenios case study for countries other than Ecuador that are legally bound to 
reinscribe the UPOV model. Meanwhile, the next section will dissect other areas in 
which the Ingenios Act deviates from the conventional plant breeders’ rights paradigm, 
highlighting examples of innovative and locally adaptive lawmaking.    
 
4.3. Reforming or Conforming? The Ingenios System for Intellectual 
Property in Plants 
The system of intellectual property for plants that the Ingenios Act establishes 
generally tracks the framework initially created in Decision No. 345 of the Andean 
Community. This in turn means that the Ingenios law essentially mirrors the basic 
parameters of the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention. The UPOV administration 
previously evaluated Decision No. 345 and determined that the Andean Community 
regime is compliant with the 1978 version of the Convention.600 Thus, the relevant 
inquiry for the purposes of this thesis is, to what extent does the Ingenios Act conform 
to or deviate from the Andean Community framework? While the two regimes are 
similar, certain substantive and intriguing differences exist between Decision No. 345 
and the Ingenios system for the regulation of plants as intellectual property. These 
distinctions are illustrative of the attempt by Ecuadorian lawmakers to exploit the 
lacunae in the Andean Community and UPOV models.  
One area in which the Ingenios Act substantially departs from the template 
provided in Decision No. 345 concerns instances where the breeder’s authorisation is 
not required for use of a protected variety. Decision No. 345 expressly limits plant 
breeders’ rights protection such that the right-holder’s authorisation is not needed to 
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use protected varieties for experimental purposes.601 The Ingenios Act also contains 
this provision, but the new law expands the subject matter covered by exempting from 
infringement acts that are conducted for the purposes of teaching or for scientific or 
academic research.602 While this change may appear to be minor, the exception for 
the use of protected plant varieties for teaching could have benefits for students and 
farmers alike. This could be the case if varieties registered with plant breeders’ rights 
were used as the basis for academic instruction or in agricultural extension services.  
Similarly, the Ingenios Act expands the exceptions to plant breeders’ rights to 
include the use of protected varieties by farmers – the so-called farmer’s privilege – 
under a variety of circumstances. The Ingenios Act and Decision No. 345 both specify 
that plant breeders’ rights do not include the ability to prevent third parties from using 
a protected variety for private, non-commercial purposes; for experimental purposes; 
or for the breeding or exploitation of a new variety.603 However, the Ingenios system 
enlarges the ambit of the farmer’s privilege such that farmers are specifically permitted 
to use intellectual property protected plant varieties for several additional purposes. 
These include reproduction and exchange with other farmers for the purposes of 
multiplication of seed or other propagating material, on the condition that such 
activities do not extend to production for commercial purposes.604  
Additionally, under the Ingenios Act farmers may use plants protected as 
intellectual property for an array of purposes in the context of “ancestral agricultural 
practices or in a traditional communitarian ambit,” including selling or exchanging 
seeds or other material derived from a protected variety.605 The exception for certain 
commercial activities is an important deviation from the UPOV Convention. The 1978 
and 1991 versions of the Convention both limit the permitted unauthorised use of 
protected plant varieties to non-commercial acts. Therefore, this provision of the 
Ingenios framework stands out as a significant attempt to rebalance the interests of 
                                            
601 Decisión No. 345, Art. 25. 
602 Ingenios Act, Art. 490. 
603 Compare Decisión No. 345 at Art. 25 with Ingenios at Art. 490. 
604 Ingenios Act, Art. 490(4).  
605 Decisión No. 345, Art. 26. Note that the meaning of “selling” in this context is limited to the 
“traditional communitarian ambit,” which would be considered a non-commercial activity under the 
UPOV 1978 conceptualisation of the farmers’ privilege. However, sale of a protected variety without 
the authorisation of the right holder would not be permitted under UPOV 1991, even within the 
traditional communitarian sphere. Salazar, Louwaars, & Visser, supra note 318. 
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plant breeders with those of farmers, in recognition of the realities of how customary 
agriculture is practiced in Ecuador.  
Further differences between the Andean Community legislation and the new 
Ecuadorian regime relate to when the intellectual property rights of plant breeders are 
considered to be exhausted. Decision No. 345 does not include any language related 
to exhaustion, nor do the 1961/1972 or 1978 versions of the UPOV Convention, 
though exhaustion provisions do appear in UPOV 1991.606 For its part, the Ingenios 
Act extensively enumerates situations in which plant breeders’ rights may be 
considered to be exhausted. Thus, the rights granted under the Ingenios framework 
do not include the ability to prevent third parties from using the protected material once 
it has been introduced into the stream of commerce of any country with the consent of 
the breeder, his licensee, or a person economically linked to the breeder or licensee.607  
In contrast to the Ingenios system, the 1991 version of the UPOV Convention 
limits exhaustion such that plant breeders’ rights do not extend to acts concerning 
material of a protected variety that has been commercialised “in the territory of the 
Contracting Party concerned.”608 This provision is much broader in the Ingenios Act, 
given that the breeder is not able to prevent third parties from using the protected 
material once this material has been introduced into the stream of commerce of any 
country. It could be argued that the Ingenios Act has taken advantage of policy space 
that appears in Decision No. 345, which provides that Member States of the Andean 
Community “may adopt means to regulate or control in their territories, the production 
or the commercialisation, importation or exportation of the reproductive or multiplying 
material of a variety,” so long as these measures do not impede or repudiate the 
proprietary rights of plant breeders.609 However, it is also possible that the exhaustion 
provisions in the Ingenios Act could be challenged under UPOV 1978, which stipulates 
that “[t]he free exercise of the exclusive right accorded to the breeder may not be 
restricted otherwise than for reasons of public interest.”610 
                                            
606 UPOV 1991, Art. 16. 
607 Such acts must imply (1) commercialisation of the variety as reproductive or multiplying material; 
or (2) exportation of the material of the variety for the purposes of reproduction, to a country that does 
not protect varieties of the genus or species to which that variety pertains. Ingenios, Art. 468.  
608 Id. 
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In addition to expanding the exceptions to the plant breeders’ rights, the 
Ingenios Act also develops certain ideas that Decision No. 345 includes but outlines 
in relatively more conservative terms. This phenomenon is illustrated by comparing 
the respective regimes’ provisions on compulsory licensing. Decision No. 345 
generally permits compulsory licenses to be granted, such that in “exceptional cases 
of national security or public interest, the National Governments may declare [a 
protected plant variety] freely available, on the basis of equitable compensation for the 
breeder.”611  
In contrast, under the Ingenios Act, a comprehensive compulsory licensing 
framework allows for the liberation of protected varieties under several specifically 
enumerated circumstances. These include for reasons of public interest, national 
emergency or security;612 anticompetitive practices;613 or when the right holder of a 
patent cannot commercially exploit a patented invention without utilising the protected 
variety.614 Although the Ingenios framework substantially enlarges the grounds based 
on which compulsory licenses may be granted, the law still attempts to comply with an 
express obligation that UPOV 1978 contains. The relevant provision specifies that 
where the proprietary rights of a plant breeder are restricted to permit the widespread 
distribution of the protected variety, the government “shall take all measures 
necessary to ensure that the breeder receives equitable remuneration.”615 
While the Ingenios Act expands certain basic provisions of Decision No. 345, 
the new Ecuadorian regime also introduces novel measures in an attempt to align the 
country’s system of plant breeders’ rights with other laws related to the regulation of 
different types of plants. These include the applicable domestic and regional 
frameworks for access to plant genetic resources and equitable benefit sharing. Since 
1996, the Andean Community has governed issues of access and benefit sharing at 
the regional level, through Decision No. 391.616 Where the Andean Community plant 
breeders’ rights legislation does not include provisions on access and benefit sharing, 
                                            
611 Decisión No. 345, Art. 30. 
612 Ingenios Act, Art. 476. 
613 Ingenios Act, Art. 479. 
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615 UPOV 1978, Art. 9(2).  
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the Ingenios Act seeks to amalgamate intellectual property for plants with the spirit of 
Decision No. 391.  
For instance, the Ingenios system includes nullity provisions that are designed 
to remedy violations of the access and benefit sharing law. Thus, plant breeders’ rights 
may be declared null and void if a copy of the access agreement is not presented, 
when the protected variety has been developed based on genetic resources sourced 
from Ecuador or other Andean Community Member States.617 It is unclear whether 
this provision could be challenged as exceeding the parameters for nullity outlined in 
UPOV 1978. This version of the UPOV Convention allows governments to declare the 
breeder’s right to be null if “he does not provide the competent authority with the 
reproductive or propagating material [or] the documents and the information necessary 
for checking the variety.”618 The meaning of “necessary documents and information” 
could arguably be construed to include the access agreement, though “checking the 
variety” in the UPOV context likely refers to conducting testing for distinctness, 
uniformity, and stability rather than verifying the provenance of source material used 
for plant breeding.  
Furthermore, it is notable that UPOV 1978 does not allow plant breeders’ rights 
to be annulled except on the grounds enumerated in the UPOV Convention.619 The 
UPOV Council has previously expressed its support for laws regulating access to 
genetic resources and equitable benefit sharing, stating that  
“UPOV encourages the principles of transparency and ethical behaviour in the 
course of conducting breeding activities and, in this regard, the access to the 
genetic material used for the development of a new variety should be done 
respecting the legal framework of the country of origin of the genetic 
material.”620 
However, the UPOV Council has also emphasized that issues related to access and 
benefit sharing are outside of the scope of the UPOV Convention. As the Council has 
specifically stated, “The competent authority for the grant of the breeder’s rights is not 
in a position to verify whether the access to genetic material has taken place in 
                                            
617 Ingenios Act, Art. 474. 
618 UPOV 1978, Art. 10(3)(a).  
619 UPOV 1978, Art. 10(4).  
620 UPOV (23 October 2003) “Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing: Reply of UPOV to 
the Notification of June 26, 2003, from the Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD).” Adopted by the Council of UPOV at its thirty-seventh ordinary session. Pg. 3. 
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accordance with the applicable law in this field.”621 This statement suggests that UPOV 
might consider the nullity language included in the Ingenios Act to exceed the scope 
of the Convention, although the UPOV Council has not published any guidance 
documents on this issue.  
 In addition, UPOV has unequivocally stated that “the UPOV Convention 
requires that the breeder’s right should not be subject to any further or different 
conditions than the ones required to obtain protection.”622 This means that according 
to the 1978 version of the Convention,623 UPOV signatories cannot require the access 
agreement to be presented as a requirement for the grant of the breeder’s right. In the 
Ingenios Act, Ecuadorian lawmakers have circumvented this limitation by requiring the 
access agreement to be presented not as a condition to obtain intellectual property, 
but under a separate and independent legal regime.624 Thus, failure to present a copy 
of the access agreement is conceptualised as a violation of the access and benefit 
sharing law, not as a failure to comply with the requirements for plant breeders’ rights. 
This is a clever attempt to exploit the available formal policy space while remaining 
compliant with UPOV 1978.  
A further area in which the Ingenios Act deviates from the Andean Community 
framework relates to the question of whether plant breeders’ rights should be extended 
to cover essential derived varieties. This concept is defined in Decision No. 345 such 
that  
“[A] variety shall be deemed to be essentially derived from an initial variety 
when it originated therefrom or from a variety itself essentially derived from 
the initial variety and it retains the expression of the essential characteristics 
that result from the genotype or combination of genotypes of the original 
variety, and which although distinguishable from the initial variety, 
nevertheless conforms to it in the expression of the essential characteristics 
that result from the genotype or combination of genotypes of the initial variety, 
except with respect to differences resulting from the derivation process.”625 
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It is notable that Decision No. 345 does not require Andean Community Member 
States to offer protection for essentially derived varieties, but rather merely offers 
national authorities the option to do so.626 
The concept of the essentially derived variety was introduced for the first time 
in the 1991 version of the UPOV Convention. The inclusion of this concept within the 
scope of plant breeders’ rights was designed to respond to advances in molecular 
breeding techniques and biotechnology that occurred throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, which facilitated more rapid and precise development of new plant varieties. In 
this context, there was concern that protected varieties could be “plagiarised,” that 
“copycat breeding” would occur, or that “mimic,” “imitation,” or merely “cosmetic” 
varieties would be developed and protected with plant breeders’ rights by parties other 
than the original breeder.627 Although since 1991, language related to essentially 
derived varieties has been incorporated into numerous national level intellectual 
property laws for plants, there is still considerable confusion over how to determine a 
suitable threshold for essential derivation.628 
By eliminating essentially derived varieties from the scope of intellectual 
property protection, the Ingenios Act avoids the difficulties inherent in determining how 
to regulate this concept pragmatically. However, the Ecuadorian government has also 
separately argued that exploiting the notion of essential derivation could offer a 
mechanism for protection against the misappropriation of farmers’ plant varieties,629 
which may be used as source material in breeding programs. Indeed, some scholars 
have suggested that the concept of essentially derived varieties could be extended 
beyond plant varieties protected by patents or breeders’ rights to also include those 
which are listed in registers of farmers’ varieties. Under such a paradigm, authorisation 
from the farmer would be required to develop new plant varieties if the farmer’s variety 
were used as initial breeding material.630  
                                            
626 Id., Art. 24(i).  
627 Lawson, supra note 317. 
628 Id. See also Sanderson, J. (2006). Essential Derivation, Law and the Limits of Science. Law 
Context: A Socio-Legal Journal, 24, 34. 
629 Ministerio de Comercio Exterior del Ecuador. (11 de mayo de 2016) “Protección de los derechos 
de los agricultores y de las variedades vegetales en el Acuerdo Comercial Multipartes.” Ficha No. 5. 
Retrieved from http://www.comercioexterior.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2016/11/5.-Ficha-
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There is no obligation under either Decision No. 345 or the 1978 version of the 
UPOV Convention to include essentially derived varieties in the new Ecuadorian 
intellectual property law for plants. As such, the Ingenios Act is in compliance with its 
international obligations surrounding essential derivation of protected plant varieties. 
However, the decision not to include essentially derived varieties in the Ingenios Act 
could represent a missed opportunity to take advantage of the available formal policy 
space to expand the ambit of protection for farmers’ plant varieties.    
Overall, in comparison to the international obligations to which Ecuador is 
subject, the embodiment of plants as intellectual property in the Ingenios Act contains 
several distinct features. These include the expansion of the farmer’s privilege, the 
enumeration of new grounds on which the proprietary rights of plant breeders might 
be exhausted or declared null, and the enlargement of the grounds on which 
compulsory licenses may be granted. Additionally, the 2017 General Regulations to 
the Ingenios Act utilised the formal policy space available at the administrative level, 
by differentiating between breeders’ and farmers’ plant varieties for the evaluation of 
distinctness, uniformity, and stability.  
Together, these measures in the Ingenios Act represent an attempt to balance 
the rights of plant breeders with other important policy goals. The provisions discussed 
above exploit ambiguities and lacunae that exist in the 1978 version of the UPOV 
Convention and in Andean Community Decision No. 345. Furthermore, in some 
instances the substance of the Ingenios Act probes the limits of lawmaking for the 
regulation of plants as intellectual property under these international agreements. The 
Act is generally careful not to undermine its treaty obligations directly, except for one 
obvious discrepancy with Decision No. 345 concerning the duration of plant breeders’ 
rights protection. Under the Andean Community framework, Member States must 
grant a term of protection “from 20 to 25 years for the case of vines, forest and fruit 
trees including their rootstocks and, from 15 to 20 years for all other species.”631 Under 
the Ingenios system, only 18 years of protection are provided for vines, forest, fruit 
and ornamental trees.632 To further complicate the matter, the minimum periods of 
protection provided in the Ingenios Act are the same as those mandated under UPOV 
1978, at 18 years for vines, forest, fruit and ornamental trees and 15 years for all other 
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species.633 Thus, although the Ingenios Act conforms to UPOV 1978, Ecuador could 
be challenged within the Andean Community for non-compliance with the minimum 
standards established in Decision No. 345.  
Similarly, Ecuador could eventually witness a confrontation between the system 
of intellectual property for plants that the Ingenios Act establishes and the parameters 
of the 2016 EU-Ecuador free trade agreement. As discussed in Chapter 1 of the thesis, 
the intellectual property section of this trade agreement states that the other parties to 
the treaty – including the European Union, Colombia, and Peru – “shall cooperate to 
promote and ensure the protection of plant varieties based on [UPOV], as revised on 
19 March 1991.”634 However, a footnote associated with the same article states that 
“[a]t the moment of signature of this Agreement, [UPOV 1978] applies for Ecuador.”635  
If Ecuador were pressured to revise the new system for plant breeders’ rights 
that the Ingenios Act has established, numerous provisions might need to be reformed 
to meet the minimum standards mandated under the 1991 version of the UPOV 
Convention. Discrepancies to be addressed could include the periods of protection for 
registered plant varieties, the farmer’s privilege, exhaustion of the breeder’s right, 
nullity, and protection for essentially derived varieties. For instance, the minimum 
periods of protection mandated in UPOV 1991 are 25 years from the grant date for 
trees and vines and 20 years for all other species.636 As discussed above, the periods 
of protected granted under the Ingenios Act are 18 years for vines, forest, fruit and 
ornamental trees and 15 years for all other species. 
Likewise, the farmers’ privilege that the Ingenios system recognises would likely 
need to be curtailed if Ecuador were required to comply with UPOV 1991. As currently 
written, the Ingenios Act contains exceptions to plant breeders’ rights for use of 
protected varieties “for non-profit sale or exchange of the product [of the variety] as 
raw material or food.”637 Also exempted are uses of protected plant varieties “in the 
context of ancestral agricultural practices or in a traditional agricultural communitarian 
sphere,” including the non-profit sale or exchange of such varieties.638 In contrast, 
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UPOV 1991 only provides a limited “optional exception” that signatory countries can 
incorporate into their national plant breeders’ rights laws. This version of the farmer’s 
privilege allows UPOV 1991 Member States to, 
“within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate 
interests of the breeder, restrict the breeder’s right in relation to any variety in 
order to permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own 
holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, on 
their own holdings, the protected variety.”639   
This provision is substantially more limited than the current farmer’s privilege provision 
of the Ingenios Act, which extends far beyond farmer’s own holdings to protect 
traditional agricultural practices that occur at the interpersonal and community levels. 
 Additionally, if the Ingenios Act were required to conform to the parameters of 
the 1991 version of the UPOV Convention, the current exhaustion provisions would 
need to be amended. Under UPOV 1991, “the breeders’ right does not extend to acts 
concerning any material of the protected variety…which has been sold or otherwise 
marketed by the breeder or with his consent in the territory of the Contracting Party 
concerned.”640 The conceptualisation of exhaustion in the Ingenios Act is much 
broader, declaring that the proprietary rights of plant breeders do not include “the right 
to stop a third party from realising acts with respect to the material of [the breeders’] 
variety…after this material has been introduced into the [stream of] commerce of any 
country with the consent of the owner, a licensee, a person economically linked to the 
owner or licensee, or any other authorised person.”641 This provision effectively 
permits the parallel importation of protected plant varieties. In other words, if a plant 
variety that is protected in Ecuador were sold in another country, seed from this variety 
could ostensibly be imported into Ecuador and sold there without the consent of the 
right-holder. Such an effect could increase Ecuadorian farmers’ access to foreign 
germplasm, but it is not a model that is compatible with the UPOV 1991 framework.642  
A further discrepancy between UPOV 1991 and the Ingenios Act is that the 
latter allows for plant breeders’ rights to be nullified “if a copy of the access agreement 
has not been presented, when the variety has been obtained or developed through 
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genetic resources or the products thereof derived from those for which Ecuador or any 
of the Andean Community member countries is the country of origin.”643 No such 
language is included in UPOV 1991. UPOV officials and independent scholars alike 
have affirmed that there is no inherent incompatibility between the UPOV system and 
the various international treaties relating to access and benefit sharing (i.e., the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Plant Treaty).644 
However, as of 2018 the UPOV Council had not specifically commented on whether 
the failure to include a copy of the access agreement would be appropriate grounds 
for nullifying plant breeders’ rights under the terms of the Convention. Finally, and as 
noted above, if the Ingenios Act were required to be revised to conform with UPOV 
1991, the provisions concerning essentially derived varieties – which were formerly 
included in the 1998 Ecuadorian Intellectual Property Law – would need to be 
reinstated.  
During the making of the Ingenios Act, the officials involved in generating drafts 
of the law were acutely aware of the various international obligations to which Ecuador 
is subject. Commensurately, these actors were also familiar with the regimes to which 
Ecuador currently does not need to conform, especially UPOV 1991. When drafting 
and marketing the text of the Ingenios Bill, lawmakers consistently invoked the notion 
of “cognitive capitalism,” which they alleged was promoted through international 
alliances with wealthy capitalist countries, including via free trade agreements. One of 
the principal visionaries behind the Ingenios Act contended that such treaties, as well 
as the global “ratcheting-up” of intellectual property minimum standards, have 
subjected Ecuador “to an [intellectual property] system that induces dependence on 
knowledge generated in countries in the North.”645 In its section on intellectual property 
for plants, the Ingenios Act attempts to resist cognitive capitalism by counterbalancing 
plant breeders’ rights with protections for other actors, including small-scale farmers.  
At the same time, the Ingenios Act essentially recapitulates the model for 
intellectual property for plants that the UPOV Convention establishes. This fact 
illustrates the extent to which the logic of plant breeders’ rights has influenced 
lawmakers’ perceptions of the imaginaries available, even in a country where officials 
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were well aware of the formal legal space that existed in the context of treaty 
obligations. While it is true that Ecuador is legally bound to the UPOV Convention, 
officials could have experimented with the plant breeders’ rights template to a greater 
extent than was the case during the making of the Ingenios Act. For instance, and as 
discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, Ecuador could have established a separate 
system for the protection of different types of plant varieties, such as those developed 
by smallholder farmers. Similarly, lawmakers could have created a system that would 
only protect ornamental plants and not food crops. This is because UPOV 1978 only 
requires that member countries offer plant breeders’ rights for at least twenty-four 
botanical genera or species in total.646   
One example of how the standard approach to intellectual property for plants 
has influenced the Ecuadorian Ingenios Act is visible in how lawmakers have 
conceptualised national development. Although Citizens’ Revolution officials regularly 
proclaimed the desire to institutionalise an “alternative to development”647 
encapsulated in policies that espouse buen vivir, in practice this concept has been 
mobilised in the service of conventional strategies designed to promote economic 
growth.648 A concrete manifestation of this trend was the execution of the 2016 free 
trade agreement with the European Union – an instrument that contains stricter 
minimum standards for intellectual property than those to which the country was 
previously subject – a mere one month before the Ingenios Act became law.  
This contradiction illustrates the complexity of interests at play in Ecuador’s 
attempt to remake its system of intellectual property for plants according to a truly local 
design. On the one hand, the Ingenios Act essentially reproduces the conventional 
assumption that intellectual property should be conceived as a tool for development 
through the incentivisation of innovation. However, in recent years Ecuador has 
simultaneously advanced an ambitious legislative agenda designed to regulate the 
uses of plant genetic resources according to alternative rationalities. These include 
systems to govern the conservation of agrobiodiversity, the circulation of seeds, and 
                                            
646 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (revised October 23, 1978), 
Art. 4(3)(b)(iii).  
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the protection and promotion of traditional knowledge. The following two sections will 
discuss recent Ecuadorian lawmaking projects related to these various subjects. 
 
4.4. Seed Law as an Alternative to Intellectual Property for Plants 
Although intellectual property laws represent important legal means to structure 
the ability of various social actors to access and use different types of plants, other 
regimes are also relevant to these activities. Frameworks that regulate the control and 
circulation of seeds are particularly impactful for the governance of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture. The significance of seed laws is based on the fact 
that seeds perform many functions in agriculture. Seeds act as carriers of genetic 
diversity, as key inputs for crop production, as commodities that can be traded, and in 
many instances, as expressions of culture and as embodiments of traditional 
knowledge.649  
Notably, seed laws and policies do not necessarily follow the same logic as 
systems that grant plant breeders’ rights. While it is true that in many countries seed 
laws have historically focused on stimulating private enterprise – a goal similar to those 
frequently associated with plant breeders’ rights legislation – in more recent years 
attention has shifted to strengthening integrated seed systems.650 Generally, these 
paradigms are designed to support the parallel and mutually supportive development 
of seed generated by professional plant breeders and multipliers on the one hand, and 
by small-scale farmers on the other.  
In Ecuador, national programs designed to support both industrial and 
smallholder agricultural production simultaneously have been launched in recent 
years. For instance, in 2012 the national Ministry of Agriculture unveiled an “Integrated 
Project for Sustainable Agricultural, Environmental, and Social Development,” whose 
purpose was to implement comprehensive systems of agricultural production by 
blending modern technologies with customary practices.651 Concurrently, the need to 
recognise new rights and protections for indigenous and campesino peoples emerged 
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at the forefront of national politics. This phenomenon materialised in the 2008 
Constitution, which contains numerous new guarantees related to environmental 
conservation and management, customary agricultural practices, and the protection 
and promotion of traditional knowledge.  
In some ways, the new system of intellectual property for plants that the 
Ingenios Act establishes is motivated by these same priorities, although as discussed 
above, the law is based essentially on the conventional model for plant breeders’ 
rights. Nevertheless, it is significant that the Ingenios regime recognises a series of 
protections for farmers, allowing the use of intellectual property-protected plants 
without the authorisation of the right-holder for “personal use”; “selling or exchanging, 
for non-profit purposes, the product as raw material or food”; and “in the context of 
ancestral agricultural practices or within the scope of traditional communitarian 
agriculture, including the non-profit sale or exchange of seeds or other material from 
the variety.”652 Furthermore, the Ingenios Act expands the concept of the farmers’ 
privilege beyond the Andean Community regime and the former 1998 Ecuadorian 
Intellectual Property Law, such that farmers may use the material from varieties 
protected by third parties for the purposes of multiplication or for exchange with other 
farmers, provided that these activities do not occur at a commercial scale.653  
Thus, in some ways the Ingenios Act deviates from the UPOV Convention 
model for plant breeders’ rights. However, the Act does not go so far as to 
conceptualise intellectual property for plants according to a typology of different kinds 
of plants that would be subject to different forms of protection, as the laws of certain 
other countries such as India, Thailand, and Malaysia have done. Some of these 
systems grant intellectual property for plant varieties developed by professional 
breeders on the one hand and for those developed by farmers or communities on the 
other. Meanwhile, other laws recognise a form of protection for wild-type plants, as a 
means to prevent misappropriation of natural agrobiodiversity. Such frameworks, 
while perhaps not intellectual property in the conventional sense, may enable a 
country to comply with various international obligations simultaneously – including 
those provided in the TRIPS Agreement, the UPOV Convention, the Convention on 
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Biological Diversity, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Plant Treaty – while also realising 
multiple national policy goals.    
Although the Ingenios Act does not contain these kinds of provisions, Ecuador 
has nonetheless sought to address complex issues inherent to the realities of the 
national agricultural sector in other recently enacted laws. One of these new regimes 
is the Law for Agrobiodiversity, Seeds, and the Promotion of Sustainable Agriculture654 
(hereafter referred to as the 2017 Seed Law) – which could in some ways represent 
an alternative to intellectual property as a means to govern the uses of plants for 
agricultural purposes. In contrast to similar legislation that was previously in place in 
Ecuador and which remains in force many other countries, the 2017 Seed Law does 
not merely provide a system of quality control for seeds that circulate in national 
markets. Instead, the new regime endeavours to synthesise diverse goals, including 
promoting organic agriculture, ensuring the conservation and sustainable use of plant 
genetic resources, protecting customary agricultural practices, and guaranteeing food 
security and food sovereignty.   
Scholars and activists alike criticised the first generation national seed laws in 
the Andean region, arguing that these regimes subordinated customary agricultural 
practices to industrial systems for crop production by consolidating control over the 
flow and uses of seeds.655 Particular concern revolved around the fact that the 
requirements for registration and certification in these laws were frequently too strict 
for the seeds of native or local (landrace) plant varieties to meet. If the seeds of 
landrace varieties are not registered but continue to be used, seed laws can effectively 
marginalise or even criminalise customary seed management practices.656 Critics 
linked the first generation Ecuadorian seed law to the country’s experience with the 
“Green Revolution,” which they claim was characterised by the expansion of crop 
monocultures, as well as the proliferation of seeds that require significant inputs of 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides.657  
                                            
654 Ley Orgánica de Agrobiodiversidad, Semillas y Fomento de la Agricultura Sustentable (hereafter 
“2017 Seed Law”). (8 de junio de 2017). Registro Oficial No. 10, Órgano del Gobierno del Ecuador. 
655 Bravo, E., Álvarez, T., Armendáris, E., & Almeida, A. (2014). En el Laberinto de las Semillas 
Hortícolas: Una Visión desde la Ecología Política. Quito, Ecuador: Abya-Yala. 
656 Id. 
657 Conferencia Plurinacional e Intercultural de Soberanía Alimentaria (COPISA) (2012) “Un Nuevo 
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Ecuador has operated a system for seed certification since 1978, the year in 
which the country’s first seed law was enacted.658 This framework divided seeds into 
two essential categories: certified seed and common seed.659 The law explicitly 
subjected certified seed to greater oversight by the Seed Certification Department than 
common seed,660 ostensibly leaving space for the commercialisation of the seed of 
landrace plant varieties within customary farmer-to-farmer networks. However, once 
implemented, the 1978 law effectively required that all seed sold in Ecuador be 
registered and subjected to quality control standards.661 While this requirement was 
not routinely enforced against farmers, in the decades following the enactment of the 
1978 Seed Law, Ecuadorian activists demanded that the framework be rewritten in a 
way that would more explicitly recognise and promote customary agricultural 
practices.662  
Movements to reform the 1978 Ecuadorian Seed Law culminated in 2009 with 
the creation of the Plurinational and Intercultural Conference for Food Sovereignty 
(a/k/a the “Food Sovereignty Conference”). This group worked for several years – in 
collaboration with over 500 local civil society organisations663 – on a proposal for a 
new law that would embody multiple themes important to the forms of agriculture 
practiced in Ecuador, including agrobiodiversity conservation, the promotion of 
“agroecological” practices, and seed regulation.664 The proposal that the Food 
Sovereignty Conference developed was comprised of five key objectives: (1) to 
conserve and promote agrobiodiversity, farmer seed, and the knowledge associated 
therewith; (2) to incentivise agroecological practices; (3) to conduct participatory 
research, training, education, and extension within the framework of the dialogue of 
knowledges; (4) to regulate the production and certification of industrial seeds, and to 
guarantee that Ecuador will remain a territory free of transgenic plants; and (5) to 
foment a new “institutionality” and greater social participation.665  
                                            
658 Ley No. 2509, Ley de Semillas de 1978. 
659 Id. Art. 3. 
660 Id. Art. 42. 
661 GRAIN. (2014) Leyes de Semillas y Otros Pesares: Los Pueblos de América Latina las Cuestionan 
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In 2012, the Food Sovereignty Conference proposal for a holistic new 
framework encompassing agrobiodiversity, agroecology, and seed regulation was 
submitted to the Ecuadorian National Assembly, forming one inspiration for the initial 
draft of the 2017 Seed Law. The Bill stalled for several years in the legislature, but it 
was reanimated in 2016. During this period, a pre-legislative consultation about the 
draft Seed Bill was opened, and the Food Sovereignty Conference filed a 
pronouncement based on comments that were compiled through consultations with 
nearly 700 organisations and institutions across the country.666  
This pronouncement contained seven key points, many of which reiterated the 
themes introduced in the initial Food Sovereignty Conference proposal. Specifically, 
Ecuadorian campesinos, indigenous groups, and their supporters requested that the 
2017 Seed Law: (1) recognise ancestral and farmer seeds as farmers’ heritage; (2) 
incentivise and promote organic agriculture and agroecology; (3) promote the use of 
ancestral and farmer seeds; (4) guarantee the free flow and exchange of such seeds; 
(5) protect agrobiodiversity and ancestral seeds; (6) comply with the constitutional 
mandate that establishes Ecuador as a country free of transgenic seeds; and (7) 
promote research and education within the framework of the dialogue of 
knowledges.667  
These principal themes formed the basis for discussions between legislators, 
campesino organisations, and community members during the pre-legislative 
consultation process, which included local meetings held in all of Ecuador’s twenty-
four provinces. According to surveys conducted and published by the National 
Assembly, 87 per cent of participants in the pre-legislative consultations agreed with 
the substantive components of the draft Seed Bill, particularly in relation to the 
protection of traditional agricultural knowledge, agrobiodiversity, and the regulation of 
native seed.668 Prominent legislators involved with the making of the new law 
                                            
666 El Telégrafo. (25 de noviembre del 2016). “Copisa presentará propuestas para la Ley de Semillas.” 
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highlighted the importance of these themes, especially in relation to protecting 
campesinos’ customary agricultural practices.669  
Ultimately, the new Law for Agrobiodiversity, Seeds and Promotion of 
Sustainable Agriculture was enacted in June 2017. The principal objectives of the 
framework are 
“[T]o protect, revitalise, multiply, and invigorate agrobiodiversity in relation to 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; ensure the production, free 
and permanent use of seeds of quality and variety, through the promotion and 
scientific investigation and the regulation of models for sustainable agriculture; 
respecting the diverse identities, knowledge and traditions towards the end of 
guaranteeing the self-sufficiency of healthy, diverse, nutritious and culturally 
appropriate foods to achieve food sovereignty and contribute to Buen Vivir or 
Sumak Kawsay.”670    
This statement of purpose expressly reflects many of the policy priorities that the Food 
Sovereignty Conference had promoted.  
One of the most significant features of the new law is that it “guarantees the 
free use, production, promotion, conservation and exchange of campesinos’ seed, 
which comprises native and traditional seed.”671 In addition, the law establishes an 
individual and collective “right to the free production, conservation, commercialisation, 
exchange and access to all classes of native, traditional, and certified seed.”672 This 
right is reinforced in one of several guarantees related to campesino agriculture, which 
provides that farmers may “conserve on their holdings, utilise, exchange, and 
commercialise their planting or propagating material.”673 Finally, the law obligates the 
State to “preserve, produce, regenerate, conserve, revitalise, distribute, promote, and 
facilitate the use, free exchange, and consumption, in a sustainable manner, [of] 
agrobiodiversity and native and campesino seeds.”674 
These guarantees are significant because they take campesinos’ customary 
agricultural practices seriously. The 2017 Seed Law recognises the contributions that 
                                            
669 TV Legislativa Noticias (10 de octubre del 2016). Entrevista a Mauricio Proaño, Vicepresidente de 
la Comisión de Soberanía Alimentaria. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tzAoV1xLmSk  
670 2017 Seed Law, Art. 1. 
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small-scale farmers have made and continue to make to ensure national food security, 
as well as to conserve Ecuadorian agrobiodiversity. The protections granted for 
customary seed management practices thus advance the buen vivir agenda of the 
government, by respecting campesino and indigenous ways of life and valuing these 
peoples’ contributions to modern Ecuadorian society.  
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the 2017 Seed Law amalgamates 
these policy priorities with an otherwise conventional system for seed certification. In 
so doing, the legislation is designed to satisfy the demands of indigenous peoples and 
groups of small-scale farmers without deviating from strategy that the Citizens’ 
Revolution government propounded to reconfigure the national economy. Therefore, 
although campesino seeds are granted protection under the 2017 Seed Law, the 
framework also supports the use of modern biotechnological methods to realise goals 
such as the development of “high performance crops,” which is one of the tactics that 
the government has advocated for changing the productive matrix of Ecuador.675 
In order to differentiate between campesino and industrial forms of agriculture, 
the 2017 Seed Law creates a typology of seeds (see Figure 8). The 2017 Seed Law 
differentiates between two systems of seed production: non-conventional and 
conventional. The first of these is conceptualised as a “traditional system practiced by 
natural or legal persons, collectives, communes, communities, peoples, and 
nationalities that produce, reproduce, exchange, commercialise, lend, and maintain 
their own seeds, under multiple modalities,”676 or in other words, campesino 
agriculture. Meanwhile, the conventional seed system is based on seed certification 
and subject to State regulation,677 which is representative of industrial agriculture. 
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Figure 8: Typology of Seeds in the 2017 Ecuadorian Seed Law 
 
 The non-conventional seed system is concerned entirely with campesinos’ 
seed (semilla campesina), a category that is further divided into two classifications: 
native seed and traditional seed. The former is defined as  
“[A]ll sexual and asexual plant reproductive material that maintains its capacity 
of reproduction, original or autochthonous, that has been domesticated, 
conserved, raised, cared for, utilised and exchanged by producers, 
communes, communities, peoples and nationalities in accordance with their 
diverse knowledge and cultures, whose use, conservation, conditioning, 
exchange, promotion and protection correspond to people and collectives with 
the support of the State.”678   
Meanwhile, the definition of traditional seed essentially tracks the conceptualisation of 
native seed, except that traditional seed is not original or autochthonous, but “has been 
adapted, conserved, cared for, utilised, cultivated and exchanged by producers, 
communes, communities, peoples and nationalities.”679  
The distinction between native and traditional seed can be illustrated by 
comparing crops such as quinoa and rice. Quinoa is indigenous to the Andean 
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region,680 and therefore this grain is classified as a native seed under the new law. In 
contrast, while rice was not domesticated in Ecuador, it has been cultivated in the 
territory that is now located within the country’s borders since at least the end of the 
eighteenth century.681 Rice thus falls into the category of traditional seed. 
The separation of native and traditional seed into two distinct categories based 
on the historical origins of a given species may be convenient for the purposes of 
lawmaking. However, science on plant genetics has long questioned the validity of the 
concept of “centres of origin” for certain crops, which may not have in fact originated 
in these centres.682 Furthermore, for the purposes of protecting campesino agricultural 
practices, the distinction between native and traditional seeds may be 
counterproductive. This is evidenced by the fact that international instruments such as 
the Plant Treaty enact protections for customary agricultural practices based on the 
recognition that indigenous and traditional farmers have made an “enormous 
contribution” to the conservation and development of all plant genetic resources used 
for food and agriculture, regardless of where a particular species was domesticated.683  
Thus, the rationale behind granting differential protections for native versus 
traditional seeds is difficult to discern. When I asked one member of the staff of a 
legislator who had worked on the project about why lawmakers decided to create two 
separate categories of campesino seed, she responded frankly that she did not know 
the reason.684 One key difference between these native and traditional seed is that the 
law recognises the former as “heritage (patrimonio) of [Ecuadorian] peoples and 
nationalities, [which] is part of the genetic resources for food and agriculture,” and may 
not be misappropriated.685 In contrast, traditional seed is not considered to form part 
of the heritage of Ecuadorian farmers, which also means that traditional seed is not 
explicitly protected from misappropriation.  
The 2017 Seed Law likewise guarantees that the National Agrarian Authority 
will promote the organisation of seed fairs and other spaces for the exchange and 
                                            
680 Tapia, M. E. & Fries, A. M. (2007) Guía de Campo de los Cultivos Andinos. Roma: Organización 
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commercialisation of native seeds,686 in addition to creating campaigns, mechanisms 
of stimulus, and incentives so that “peoples and nationalities protect, conserve, use 
and reproduce native seeds.”687 The law is silent as to whether traditional seed would 
also be included in these events and programmes. These are curious and potentially 
detrimental discrepancies, especially given that traditional but non-native crops such 
as rice, barley, maize, and fava bean are critical for food security and food sovereignty 
in Ecuador.688           
 Meanwhile, the reformist language that characterises the introductory sections 
of the 2017 Seed Law is not always reflected in the substantive provisions of the 
legislation. Although one of the goals of the framework is to strengthen the use, 
conservation, and free exchange of native and traditional seeds,689 these categories 
of seed would need to meet phytosanitary requirements in order to enter into the 
conventional seed market.690 Furthermore, the law permits transgenic seeds and 
crops to enter into the country, provided that these materials are used solely for 
research purposes.691 The potential uses of genetically modified organisms are 
narrowly drawn in the new law, and the State is explicitly obligated to “monitor and 
control the condition of the country as a territory free of transgenic seeds and crops.”692  
The allowance of the importation of transgenic seeds and crops solely for 
research purposes is consistent with the objectives of the Citizens’ Revolution 
government. Government officials who were in office during the Correa presidency 
regularly expressed interest in developing a “bioeconomy” through the marriage of 
modern biotechnological tools with Ecuadorian native biodiversity.693 However, critics 
allege that this goal fundamentally contradicts the buen vivir worldview, because of its 
continued orientation towards commercialisation and economic growth.694 
Indeed, based on misgivings about the 2017 Seed Law, four lawsuits were filed 
immediately following the enactment of the regime in June 2017. The plaintiffs – who 
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were the organisations Ecological Action, Ecuarunari, the Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador, and the Ecuador Free of Transgenics Collective – contended 
that the law violates the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution.695 The 2008 constitutional 
framework declares the country to be “free of transgenic crops and seeds,” a 
prohibition that can only be subverted in cases of “national interest dually established 
by the President of the Republic and approved by the National Assembly.”696 The 
continued controversy illustrates the misgivings of campesino and indigenous groups, 
who have wondered whether the aspiration of the 2017 Seed Law to realise buen vivir 
has been subordinated to the interests of industrial agriculture.697  
 It is still too early to assess the potential impact of the 2017 Seed Law on the 
form of customary agriculture that many Ecuadorian farmers practice, given that as of 
2018 the legislation had not yet been implemented. The question of whether the 
framework can engender parity between small-scale and industrial agricultural 
systems remains to be answered. Although the new framework expressly incorporates 
several of the points listed in the Food Sovereignty Conference proposal, certain 
conceptual ambiguities exist within the law. In addition to the issues raised above, it is 
notable that the primary purpose of the regime is to institutionalise a system that 
essentially conforms to the realities of industrial agriculture. This orientation is 
evidenced by the continued emphasis on seed certification and regulation, which 
reiterates the focus of the 1978 Seed Law. 
Furthermore, the 2017 Seed Law in some ways situates campesino agricultural 
practices historically rather than contemporarily. This is evidenced by the terminology 
that the law employs. The campesino seed system is conceptualised as “non-
conventional” while the industrial seed system enjoys the default position of 
“conventional.” Such language may be accurate in North America or Europe where 
industrial agriculture produces the majority of the food that residents consume. 
However, in Ecuador, where the majority of the food consumed is sourced locally from 
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contra-de-ley-de-semillas (accessed 4 September 2017).     
696 Constitución de la República del Ecuador de 2008, Art. 401. 
697 La Hora. (6 de mayo de 2017). “Colectivo indígena de Ecuador muy preocupado por Ley de 
Semillas.” Retrieved from https://lahora.com.ec/noticia/1102055605/colectivo-indc3adgena-de-
ecuador-muy-preocupado-por-ley-de-semillas (accessed 4 September 2017).    
  
  
   
215 
 
family farmed plots, many of which depend heavily on native and traditional seeds, the 
characterisation of campesinos’ seed as non-conventional is both ironic and 
inaccurate.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the 2017 Seed Law contains several 
provisions that concretely advance policy goals related to the protection and promotion 
of customary agricultural practices. In addition to guarantees related to access and 
use of seeds, the law establishes a series of individual and collective rights related to 
agrobiodiversity conservation and food security. These include the right to free 
production, commercialisation, and consumption of healthy, nutritious, and diverse 
foods; the right of communities, peoples, and nationalities to the recognition and 
valorisation of ancestral and traditional knowledge linked to agrobiodiversity and the 
production of seeds; and the right to participation in decision making surrounding 
agrobiodiversity.698  
These provisions actualise many of the international obligations that Ecuador 
has assumed under instruments governing the uses of plant genetic resources, 
especially the Plant Treaty. Specifically, this regime requires that contracting Parties 
should take measures to promote “farmers’ rights” through certain enumerated 
provisions. These include the protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant 
genetic resources for food, and the right to participate in making decisions at the 
national level on matters related to the conservation and sustainable use of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture.699  
In addition to granting a series of rights to actors involved in the national 
agricultural sector, the 2017 Seed Law creates a set of duties that the government is 
bound to uphold. These obligations include guaranteeing the conservation of 
agrobiodiversity; preserving, producing, regenerating, conserving, revitalising, 
distributing, promoting, and facilitating the use and free exchange of native and farmer 
seed; and guaranteeing individual and collective rights to the conservation, storage, 
production, improvement, access, free circulation, commercialisation, and export of 
seeds.700 Finally, the State has the duty to shield ancestral and traditional knowledge 
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from misappropriation, and to ensure that these ways of knowing are promoted, 
alongside of customary agricultural practices and technologies.701    
Overall, the 2017 Seed Law functions as a complement to the system for the 
governance of plants as intellectual property that the Ingenios Act establishes. 
Although like the Ingenios Act the 2017 Seed Law in some ways evidences the extent 
to which rationalities of scientific innovation, proprietisation, and commercialisation 
have influenced imaginaries for lawmaking, the legislation is also concerned with the 
realisation of other national policy goals related to the usage of agricultural and food 
plants. For instance, the 2017 Seed Law grants a series of rights to farmers in relation 
to certain categories of seeds. These guarantees are designed to ensure that 
campesinos may continue to engage in customary farming practices, such as seed 
saving, replanting, and exchange.  
Notably, the 2017 Seed Law does not conceive of campesino seed according 
to an individualistic, proprietary logic. In contrast to the plant variety protection laws of 
countries such as India, the new Ecuadorian seed legislation does not establish a 
mechanism through which individual farmers or farmer cooperatives might register 
new varieties that they develop. Instead, the 2017 Seed Law conceptualises native 
seed as Ecuadorian farmers’ heritage, a recognition that does not follow the rationality 
of exclusivity. Although the regime could have gone further by establishing the same 
kind of protection for traditional seed, the 2017 Seed Law nevertheless represents an 
innovative, alternative means to enact sui generis legislation for the realisation of 
national goals related to the governance of different types of plants.  
However, one important distinction between intellectual property laws for plants 
and frameworks such as the new Ecuadorian Seed Law is the fact that the latter is 
primarily concerned with the regulation of physical plant materials, namely seeds. In 
contrast, intellectual property laws are supposed to offer protection that extends to 
ideas or inventions. Although the 2017 Seed Law does recognise the right of 
Ecuadorian farmers and indigenous peoples to the recognition, valuation, and 
protection of the traditional knowledge that they possess in relation to plants and 
seeds,702 the legislation does not elaborate how this guarantee should be effectuated. 
For this reason, it will be interesting to return to the Ingenios Act in the following 
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section, to explore how Ecuadorian lawmakers have imagined a new form of protection 
for traditional knowledge derived, in part, from the standard intellectual property model.    
 
4.5. Traditional Knowledge Protection as an Alternative to Conventional 
Intellectual Property Law for Plants 
The trend towards the rendering of traditional knowledge703 in possessive terms 
– whether or not according to the standard rationality of intellectual property – has 
become increasingly visible in recent years, both in Latin America and worldwide. For 
instance, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) regularly convenes an 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, which for years has attempted to create an 
international legal instrument for the protection of traditional knowledge. At present, 
no such global framework exists. In 2018, the Intergovernmental Committee 
announced that a draft treaty should be finalised by 2020.704 However, the formation 
of this prospective regime has been fraught, and the viability of the Voluntary Fund 
that finances the participation of indigenous peoples in the negotiations has been 
jeopardised on several occasions.705 
In the absence of a multilateral treaty, certain regional intergovernmental 
organisations have created frameworks for the governance of traditional knowledge, 
usually according to a proprietary logic similar to that which is associated with 
conventional forms of intellectual property. These regional instruments include the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community with its Regional Framework for the Protection 
of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Culture706 and the Swakopmund Protocol 
                                            
703 Note that although the terms “traditional knowledge” and “indigenous knowledge” may mean 
different things in distinct applications, I use them interchangeably for the purposes of the thesis.   
704 Assemblies of Member States of WIPO Fifty-Seventh Session. Agenda Item 18: Matters 
Concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (2-11 October 2017). Retrieved from 
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of the African Intellectual Property Organization.707 At the national level, some 
countries have enacted laws to protect indigenous knowledge based on two general 
models.  
The first typically involves the compilation of a State-administered database, 
which can be used to defeat applications for conventional forms of intellectual property 
based on lack of novelty. WIPO classifies these repositories of traditional knowledge 
as mechanisms for “defensive protection.”708 Meanwhile, WIPO characterises the 
second general model as one that offers “positive protection.” Such systems are 
designed to prevent the unauthorised use of traditional knowledge, as well as 
potentially to promote the commercial exploitation of such knowledge by “legitimate 
possessors.”709  
Among the few territories to have experimented with a more nuanced approach 
to the governance of traditional knowledge is Ecuador. Indeed, the chapter on 
traditional knowledge protection is among the most innovative parts of the Ingenios 
Act, in that it is not based on pre-existing international models. Structurally, the 
traditional knowledge framework forms the final part of Book 3 of the Act, which is 
entitled “Of the Management of Knowledge.” Book 3 is entirely concerned with the 
protection of “intellectual rights,” which according to the Ingenios paradigm constitute 
both intellectual property and traditional knowledge.710  
Thus, under the new Ecuadorian model protections for traditional knowledge 
are not expressly rendered according to the language of property. Instead, the 
Ingenios Act recognises intellectual property and traditional knowledge as parallel and 
coequal systems for the management of different ways of knowing, towards the 
objective of “promoting scientific, technological, artistic, and cultural development, as 
well as incentivising innovation.”711 Furthermore, the Ingenios Act specifically intends 
to function as a mechanism “to preserve and perpetuate the traditional knowledge of 
communities, peoples, nationalities and communes, procuring the expansion thereof 
and protecting it from illegitimate commercial appropriation.”712  
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Although the term “traditional knowledge” suggests an historical rather than 
contemporary appreciation of indigenous, alternative, or subaltern713 cosmologies, the 
Ingenios Act acknowledges that such knowledge holds continued contemporary 
relevance for Ecuadorian society. This understanding of traditional knowledge as 
dynamic, vital, and constantly evolving is further reinforced by the intentions expressed 
in the framing language of the Ingenios Act. This section recalls the 2008 Constitution, 
which “foresees that it shall be the responsibility of the State to facilitate and promote 
the incorporation of the society of knowledge to achieve the objectives of the 
development regime; promote the generation and production of knowledge, foment 
scientific and technological research, and strengthen [potenciar] traditional 
knowledge, to thus contribute to the realisation of buen vivir.”714 The general objectives 
of the Ingenios system also include “the rescue of ancestral knowledge.”715 This 
provision implies that certain forms of knowledge have been lost – or at least 
obfuscated or subjugated – but that such ways of knowing will be important for the 
actualisation of the new Ecuadorian “development regime.”  
The strategy for an alternative to development – or as critics of the Citizens’ 
Revolution government allege, alternative development716 – is encapsulated in the 
Second National Plan for Buen Vivir (2013-2017). This policy endeavours to realign 
the national development objectives according to principles derived from the concept 
buen vivir. The Second National Plan specifies that “buen vivir is the form of life that 
allows for happiness and the permanence of cultural and environmental diversity; it is 
harmony, equality, equity and solidarity. It is not to seek opulence or infinite economic 
growth.”717 The relationship between aspirations for national development and 
intellectual property is longstanding, and intellectual property has frequently been 
conceived as a tool for economic growth in conventional development narratives.718 
However, the Ingenios Act does not import this theory wholesale. Instead, the law 
                                            
713 For a description of subaltern knowledge and an argument for why its elevation should constitute a 
legislative priority, see de Sousa Santos, B. (2007). Para Além do Pensamento Abyssal: Das Linhas 
Globais a uma Ecologia de Saberes. Novos Estudos. 
714 Ingenios Act, los Considerandos, ¶2. 
715 Id. 
716 Merino, R. (2016). An Alternative to ‘Alternative Development’?: Buen Vivir and Human 
Development in Andean Countries. Oxford Development Studies, 44(3), 271-286. 
717 Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo del Ecuador (SENPLADES). (2013) “El Plan 
Nacional del Buen Vivir (2013-2017).” Pg. 13. 
718 See, e.g., Gould, D. M. & Gruben, W. C. (1996). The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Economic Growth. Journal of Development Economics, 48(2) 323-350. 
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announces the intention to re-imagine the role of intellectual property in development, 
because development in this context is understood to mean something other than 
simply the accumulation of wealth. Under such a paradigm, indigenous ways of 
knowing attain renewed value, and thus the protection of traditional knowledge has 
been taken seriously in the Ingenios Act.  
This newly institutionalised appreciation for indigenous peoples’ knowledge 
contrasts with the former Ecuadorian intellectual property framework, which did not 
substantively recognise traditional knowledge as subject matter eligible for protection. 
The 1998 Intellectual Property Law only stated that “a sui generis system of collective 
intellectual rights of the local ethnicities and communities shall be established. The 
protection, mechanisms of valuation, and application thereof shall be subjected to a 
special law that shall be emitted for this effect.”719 However, no legal framework was 
ever elaborated under the 1998 Intellectual Property Law or any independent sui 
generis regime, until the incorporation of traditional knowledge protections into the 
Ingenios Bill in 2014.  
The extensive participation of individuals and groups from indigenous and 
campesino communities in the 2007 Constitutional Constituent Assembly was 
catalysed into the legal recognition of collective rights over traditional knowledge that 
was embodied in the 2008 Constitution.720 While significant in itself, the constitutional 
guarantees related to traditional knowledge drew attention to the lack of a formal, 
national framework to substantiate the form of protection that this knowledge should 
receive. Thus, the political momentum that indigenous and campesino organisations 
had gained during the Constituent Assembly process was further channelled into 
official efforts to develop an independent regime for traditional knowledge governance.  
The mechanism through which the Ingenios Act grants protection for traditional 
knowledge builds upon guarantees recognised in the 2008 Constitution, by developing 
a sui generis system of rights. The Ingenios traditional knowledge framework is 
notable both for its comprehensive nature and for how the law devotes nearly equal 
space to traditional knowledge protection and to other chapters that cover 
conventional forms of intellectual property, such as patents or trademarks. 
Furthermore, it is significant that the Ingenios system for traditional knowledge 
                                            
719 Ecuador Ley de Propiedad Intelectual (Codificación No 2006-013), Art. 377. 
720 Constitución de la República del Ecuador de 2008, Art. 57. 
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protection is not cast in explicitly proprietary terms. As will be discussed in greater 
detail below, such a conceptualisation could be problematic for both theoretical and 
pragmatic reasons.  
Under the Ingenios regime, traditional knowledge is defined broadly, to include  
“[A]ll knowledge, principally collective, such as practices, methods, 
experiences, capacities, signs and symbols belonging to peoples, 
nationalities and communities that form part of their cultural acquis and have 
been developed, actualised and transmitted from generation to generation. 
Traditional knowledge is, among others, ancestral and local knowledge, the 
intangible component associated with genetic resources and traditional 
cultural expressions.”721 
The Ingenios Act further enumerates several categories of processes and 
products that qualify as embodiments of traditional knowledge, while remaining open 
to recognising forms of knowledge that are not expressly listed. Examples include 
health related knowledge; agricultural practices; knowledge about the management of 
biodiversity; knowledge related to ecosystem function and conservation for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation; crafts and artistic creations and rituals; scientific 
technologies and innovations; music; sports and recreation; and architecture.722 Thus, 
the Ingenios rendition of traditional knowledge covers an expansive range of subject 
matter, which if cast in standard intellectual property terms would fall under the ambit 
of patents (e.g., scientific technologies and innovations), copyright (e.g., artistic 
creations), geographical indications (e.g., crafts) or other regimes.   
Under the framework that the Ingenios Act conceives, rights over traditional 
knowledge are collective, and they pertain to “legitimate possessors,” not to owners.723 
In remaining faithful to the constitutional objective of plurinationality, the protection of 
traditional knowledge should be effectuated “in accordance with [legitimate 
possessors’] own customs, institutions and cultural practices, contributing to the 
strengthening of their traditional internal structures.”724 Given that rights in traditional 
knowledge are imagined as inherently collective, and because protection should be 
granted in accordance with the customs, institutions, and practices of the communities 
                                            
721 Ingenios Act, Art. 511.  
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to which intellectual resources belong, the Ingenios Act speaks of possession rather 
than ownership of traditional knowledge. This formulation is supposed to conform to 
Indigenous Andean understandings of the relationship between individuals and their 
intellectual productions.725  
While the attempt of the law to take local Ecuadorian cosmologies seriously is 
in itself significant, the Ingenios system for traditional knowledge protection is also 
noteworthy for its comprehensive nature. The regime does not operate solely as a 
defensive mechanism that would provide an instrument to challenge the novelty of 
applications for conventional forms of intellectual property, such as via a national 
registry or database. Instead, collective rights over traditional knowledge are 
recognised as “imprescriptible, inalienable, and inviolable.”726 Decision-making 
surrounding uses of protected subject matter is enshrined as a right of free 
determination, to be realised according to legitimate possessors’ “own forms of 
conviviality, social organisation, institutions, and the generation and exercise of 
authority.”727  
 Thus, the Ingenios Act aspires to provide a form of positive protection for 
traditional knowledge, the parameters of which should be consonant with local 
indigenous customary law. However, some officials at the National Service for 
Intellectual Rights believe that as currently drafted, the Ingenios system of protection 
for traditional knowledge is not sufficiently robust. Administrators have proposed 
modifications to the Ingenios Act, for instance to impose stricter sanctions for violations 
of the rights of legitimate possessors of traditional knowledge.728 In fact, in October 
2018 the motivation to bolster the Ingenios system was so strong that one official told 
me that he believed that the Act could be reformed before the end of the year.729  
 In the meantime, a draft set Technical Regulations, the final version of which 
will implement the Ingenios system of traditional knowledge protection, were published 
in July 2018.730 The Technical Regulations specify that parties who wish to access, 
                                            
725 Larrea, A. M. (2011). El Buen Vivir como Contrahegemonía en la Constitución Ecuatoriana. Utopía 
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726 Ingenios Act, Art. 512. 
727 Id., Art. 520. 
728 Official at the National Service for Intellectual Rights of Ecuador. (25 October 2018). Personal 
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730 Servicio Nacional de Derechos Intelectuales del Ecuador. “Borrador de Reglamento por Temas.” 
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use, or utilise Ecuadorian traditional knowledge must conduct “due diligence” to locate 
the legitimate possessors.731 This process should involve the steps of research and 
verification, to ensure that the correct persons are identified. Upon being contacted by 
a party seeking access to traditional knowledge, legitimate possessors would be 
empowered to: (1) authorise, stop, or deny access, use, or utilisation; (2) accept or 
reject the due diligence conducted by the party interested in obtaining the knowledge; 
(3) define, according to their customs, traditions, forms of living, and social 
organisation, the mechanisms of participation, representation, and traditional manners 
of decision making; (4) secure co-management in the case of shared traditional 
knowledge; and (5) negotiate the sharing of benefits with the party interested in 
obtaining the knowledge.732 The proposed Technical Regulations also enumerate 
procedures that prospective users should follow to obtain prior informed consent from 
legitimate possessors; to distribute monetary and non-monetary benefits; and to 
execute contracts with legitimate possessors surrounding the use of traditional 
knowledge. 
In contrast to the systems for traditional knowledge protection that certain other 
countries have enacted, under the Ingenios Act “the recognition of the collective rights 
of legitimate possessors over their traditional knowledge is not subject to any formality 
or registration for the effects of guaranteeing the protection, vigilance and exercise 
thereof, given that this power resides in the legitimacy of the communitarian 
sphere.”733 The proposed Technical Regulations substantiate this provision by 
recognising parallel systems of protection for traditional knowledge, which are 
comprised of a state-run database, deposit, and registry on the one hand, and on the 
other community registries to be administered according to customary law.734 The 
Technical Regulations further stipulate that community registries should be managed 
based on locally developed procedures for the registration of traditional knowledge, 
according to customary norms and in the native language of the community. 
Although as of 2018 the Technical Regulations to the Ingenios Act had not yet 
been finalised, the National Service for Intellectual Rights had already begun to 
                                            
731 Borrador, Reglamento de los Conocimientos Tradicionales. Capítulo XX.- De la debida diligencia 
al acceso a los conocimientos tradicionales. 
732 Id. Artículo XX.- De las atribuciones de los legítimos poseedores. 
733 Ingenios Act, Art. 522. 
734 Borrador, Reglamento de los Conocimientos Tradicionales. Capítulo XX.- Formas de protección de 
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inscribe examples of Ecuadorian traditional knowledge in its institutional registry. 
According to one official, as of October 2018 approximately 120 registrations had been 
made.735 Furthermore, the National Service for Intellectual Rights was continuing to 
organise in situ sensibilisation events to explain the purpose of the traditional 
knowledge protection system to various communities in the Ecuadorian coastal, 
Sierra, and Amazon regions.736  
Notably, early examples of the registration of traditional knowledge have 
resulted from direct collaboration with certain indigenous groups. Thus, administrators 
from the National Service for Intellectual Rights have travelled to local villages, where 
drafts of the traditional knowledge registration form were co-constructed with 
community members, especially those from the Tsáchila nationality.737 One staff 
member at the National Service for Intellectual Rights told me that the participatory 
process through which the registration form has been designed has required officials 
to engage in “day to day learning, which is quite dynamic.”738 
Another interesting aspect of the Ingenios system for the protection of 
traditional knowledge is that the law recognises the coexistence of private intellectual 
property on the one hand, and the “public interest character of knowledge” on the 
other. In so doing, the Ingenios Act explicitly delimits the relationship between 
traditional knowledge and the public domain. This demarcation serves to challenge 
the “romance of the commons” in which the “information resources of the West” were 
propertised while the “information resources of the rest of the world, such as genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge” were left in a global commons.739 According to 
the delineation that the Ingenios Act establishes, traditional knowledge is only 
considered to be in the public domain when this knowledge has left the “cultural ambit” 
of its legitimate possessors, and is found in bibliographic resources, databases, or ex 
situ collections.740  
                                            
735 Director level official at the National Service for Intellectual Rights of Ecuador. (19 October 2018). 
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In the event that traditional knowledge has passed into the public domain, under 
the Ingenios system the government would nonetheless recognise the rights of 
legitimate possessors to “a just and equitable participation in the benefits” derived from 
any exploitation of such knowledge.741 By recognising these collective rights, the 
Ingenios Act further intends to challenge the standard dichotomy between public 
domain and private rights, which frequently characterises debates about intellectual 
property. As one means to accomplish this end, the Ingenios Act deliberately pluralises 
the word knowledge (“conocimientos”) in order to recognise the inherent value in forms 
of knowledge not conventionally acknowledged in conventional intellectual property 
regimes. As Chapter 3 of the thesis already discussed, it was not a “mere coincidence 
[to include] the noun knowledges – in plural – in the name of the [Ingenios Act].”742 
 The rhetorical respect that the Ingenios Act has for traditional knowledge is 
reinforced by the numerous privileges that the law grants to legitimate possessors. 
These include the right to maintain, foster, manage, enrich, protect, control, innovate, 
and develop traditional knowledge, as well as the right to impede or halt the improper 
access, use, and utilisation of this knowledge by third parties.743 The Act also 
recognises legitimate possessors’ right of free determination over decisions related to 
their traditional knowledge,744 and guarantees that the same protections will be 
afforded to legitimate possessors whose original geographical territories extend to 
land outside of the modern borders of Ecuador, and who therefore may not actually 
be Ecuadorian citizens.745 
The system of traditional knowledge protection that the Ingenios Act institutes 
aspires to empower communities to manage their knowledge on their own terms. This 
intention of the law has inspired passion in the way that representatives of the National 
Service for Intellectual Rights approach their work. For instance, as one official 
confided to me, “I am always attentive, careful [to ensure] that this knowledge is not 
lost. Sometimes I can’t sleep. I wake up and ask myself, what would happen if this 
information disappeared?”746 Although both the Ingenios Act and the actors who are 
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responsible for the implementation of the law intend to empower Ecuadorian 
indigenous communities to govern their intellectual resources on their own terms, in 
order to be effective the Act requires traditional knowledge to be formally inscribed 
and administered by the State.  
Thus, the regime situates the National Service for Intellectual Rights as the 
central archivist, intermediary, and enforcer of Ecuadorian traditional knowledge. 
While legitimate possessors are under no formal obligation to register their knowledge 
– the system runs on “voluntary deposits” – the hope is that the greatest amount of 
information possible will be placed in the centralised registry. Officials have spent 
countless hours on-site, working with communities to explain the importance of 
traditional knowledge deposits. One administrator who has been involved in such 
initiatives since 2009 – long before the Ingenios Act was even conceived – described 
the experience as “a constant battle for the community to understand why this is 
important. That they can trust me.”747  
These efforts may well pay off. Another official described the sensibilisation 
process as contagious, such that once the National Service for Intellectual Rights has 
travelled to one community, others “write to us or call us or come to our offices and tell 
us ‘we want this too.’ And this creates a domino effect, and we keep working and 
working.”748 However, even if this momentum were to manifest in the establishment of 
nationwide community-based registries, traditional knowledge would need to be made 
legible in new ways to the centralised Ecuadorian governmental apparatus. For 
instance, according to the system proposed in the draft Technical Regulations, local 
custodians would be obligated to submit an annual report to the National Service for 
Intellectual Rights that would detail the number of registrations made and the security 
measures employed to protect the knowledge that has been deposited.749 
Furthermore, the National Service for Intellectual Rights would constitute the entity 
responsible for undertaking “permanent monitoring of the collective rights of legitimate 
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possessors,” for the stated purpose of preventing improper access, use, or utilisation 
of traditional knowledge.750 
Notwithstanding the trend towards centralisation, the system for the protection 
of traditional knowledge imagined in the Ingenios Act contains many provisions that 
are designed to empower marginalised peoples and their ways of knowing the world. 
However, another potential issue is the fact that transforming “culturalized 
communities” into subjects of neoliberal government could entail unintended 
consequences. For instance, Coombe has argued that, concomitant with the extension 
of a rights-based framework to protect traditional knowledge, indigenous communities 
are configured in increasingly politicised economic terms as holders of collective 
property that they are “encouraged to culturalize.”751 This has occurred in Ecuador in 
part through the institutionalisation of traditional knowledge protection in the Ingenios 
Act. Even if not expressly conceptualised as intellectual property, the doctrinal linkage 
of rights related to traditional knowledge with the copyright, patent, and trademark 
regimes may have the effect of translating indigenous ways of knowing the world into 
the rationality of neoliberalism.       
According to such an interpretation, the Ingenios Act operates as a new 
governmental technology through which indigenous and other subaltern groups are 
encouraged to represent themselves as “collective subjects bearing distinctive 
cultures and safeguarding valuable diversity.”752 In this context, the protection of 
traditional knowledge may extend novel opportunities to historically marginalised 
peoples – for instance through greater political visibility, participation in decision-
making, or access to new economic resources. However, doing so could also serve to 
make these groups legible to different actors, while also reifying “social imaginaries” 
that presume the existence of unified communities that receive uniform benefits from 
the exploitation of their cultural goods.753 Evidence for this possibility may be found in 
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the refinements that officials from the National Service for Intellectual Rights continue 
to make to the registration form, to obtain information such as geographic coordinates, 
and age and gender of the legitimate possessor. As one administrator explained to 
me, these details are important to ensure that the government may quantify the 
traditional knowledge contained within the national territory, and understand trends 
related to the deposits made.754 
At a broader level, the idea that the protection of traditional knowledge may 
function as a means to actualise the contemporary Ecuadorian strategy for national 
development is conceptually problematic. It has been noted that the notion of 
“sustainable development is an oxymoron.”755 In contrast, as Kothari et al. note, “in 
indigenous knowledge, there is nothing analogous to the concept of development…. 
There is no concept of a linear process of life to establish a before and after state, 
namely underdevelopment and development.”756 Correspondingly, the recognition of 
traditional knowledge in a regime designed primarily for the protection of intellectual 
property could precipitate effects that further entrench the neoliberal political and 
economic structures that the Ingenios Act purports to disrupt.  
In practice, it is conceivable that the Ingenios Act will enable legitimate 
possessors of traditional knowledge to prevent certain forms of exploitation. However, 
the law may also operate to incentivise the holders of traditional knowledge to 
monetise manifestations of their cultures. Furthermore, although the Ingenios Act 
explicitly recognises that traditional knowledge is not static, the establishment a 
system through which this subject matter may be protected requires that traditional 
knowledge be rendered legible in a particular way so that it can be administered by 
centralised systems of governance. Thus, traditional knowledge must be fixed and 
translated into terms that in certain ways conform to a possessive – if not necessarily 
proprietary – logic.  
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the system of traditional knowledge protection 
established in the Ingenios Act could still represent an interesting example for 
countries to consider when they explore alternatives to conventional forms of 
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intellectual property for plants. Although the traditional knowledge chapter of the 
Ingenios Act does not establish a model of intellectual property for plants that would 
operate as an alternative to plant breeders’ rights, the law does offer a mechanism 
through which farmers’ and indigenous peoples’ knowledge about how to use certain 
kinds of plants may be protected from misappropriation. Thus, one effect of the 
Ingenios system could be that users of native and local Ecuadorian flora would be 
required to obtain authorisation from the legitimate possessors of traditional 
knowledge about a particular plant, where such knowledge is implicated in its use. 
This arrangement suggests that the users would be expected to provide some form of 
compensation to the legitimate possessors for the use of their knowledge.  
Furthermore, the traditional knowledge registries that the Ingenios Act institutes 
could serve as a mechanism to prevent the monopolisation of particular plants by other 
parties through the use of other forms of intellectual property. This could occur where 
registered traditional knowledge is used to defeat claims of novelty in applications for 
patents or plant breeders’ rights, which is, according to policymakers, one of the key 
objectives of the law.757 Given these possibilities, regimes that grant protection for 
traditional knowledge – like the system established by the Ingenios Act – could be 
understood as one piece in a mosaic of legislative options that both legally unbound 
and legally bound countries might consider as means to regulate plants as intellectual 
property. These various options will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5 of the 
thesis, in the form of lessons learned from the Ecuadorian experiment.          
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Chapter 5. Lessons from the Ecuadorian Approach to Intellectual 
Property for Plants  
In response to the observation that the plant breeders’ rights model has 
proliferated worldwide, influencing the way that people think about how to structure 
relationships between people, institutions, and plants, the final section of Chapter 2 of 
the thesis proposed two standardised options for lawmaking. It should be noted that 
the adoption of these strategies would presuppose a coordinated effort on the part of 
national governments. In reality, lawmakers in many countries not understand the 
various issues that are implicated in regimes that regulate the uses of different types 
of plants, or how these concerns interrelate with one another. Furthermore, many 
governments experience partisan intransigence, rendering it difficult for actors from 
across the political spectrum to cooperate. Yet another obstacle is that many territories 
have already enacted legislation to address some but not all of the issues discussed 
throughout this thesis, and therefore substantive reform of existing laws may be 
improbable. For these reasons, it is important that lawmakers consider governing the 
relationships between people, institutions, and plants through multiple legal 
frameworks.  
To explore how this option might operate in practice, it will be informative to 
remain grounded in the case study of Ecuador, which Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis 
have described in detail. The Ecuadorian case is noteworthy for several reasons. First, 
it involves a country that was effectively controlled by a single party for approximately 
one decade under the administration of President Rafael Correa and his Citizens’ 
Revolution government (2007-2017). Under the Correa presidency, a new Ecuadorian 
Constitution was enacted in 2008, and numerous other law reform efforts were 
undertaken subsequently. This momentum for change meant that several regimes 
related to the governance of interactions between people, institutions, and plants were 
remade, in some ways according to rationalities associated with concepts including 
“buen vivir” and “twenty-first century socialism,” as well as the Citizens’ Revolution 
strategy for national development. Thus, while the various issues that underlie the 
regulation of different types of plants were not contemplated in a singular framework, 
these matters were all legislated based on the priorities of the same dominant political 
ideology.  
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During the tenure of the Citizens’ Revolution government under President 
Correa, several laws that govern the uses of different kinds of plants were remade. 
These include the framework that grants intellectual property in the form of plant 
breeders’ rights, as well as the system for the protection of traditional knowledge, 
which are both embodied in the 2016 Ingenios Act. Another pertinent regime is the 
2017 Law for Agrobiodiversity, Seeds, and the Promotion of Sustainable Agriculture 
(“2017 Seed Law”), which re-structures the national seed system and the relationships 
between the various actors that interrelate in this space. A third framework is the 2009 
Food Sovereignty Law, which enacts a system designed to promote local agricultural 
production as a means to ensure sustainable access to nutritious and culturally-
appropriate food. Finally, the National Regulations to the Common Regime on Access 
to Genetic Resources in the Andean Community758 were implemented in Ecuador in 
2011. This regime governs how Ecuadorian plant genetic resources may be accessed, 
in addition to establishing the basic terms for how providers and users of these 
resources should interact.  
Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis have already described how the various, recently 
enacted Ecuadorian laws operate to uphold the country’s international obligations 
while simultaneously addressing other important national policy goals related to 
structuring the relationships between people, institutions, and plants. The treaty 
frameworks whose provisions are relevant to this discussion are the TRIPS 
Agreement, the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention, the norms of the Andean 
Community, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Plant Treaty, and the Nagoya 
Protocol. Ecuador is party to all of these international instruments and thus the country 
is legally bound to uphold numerous commitments related to the regulation of the 
access and use of plants, including according to a proprietary logic.  
The nature of Ecuador’s international obligations can be distilled into four key 
elements: (1) the regulation of plants as intellectual property, via a system that 
recognises plant breeders’ rights; (2) the protection of customary agricultural practices; 
(3) the protection of traditional knowledge related to plants, including those which are 
used for agricultural purposes; and (4) the regulation of access to plant genetic 
resources and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the commercial exploitation 
                                            
758 These regulations are embodied in Decreto No. 905, El Reglamento Nacional al Régimen Común 
sobre Acceso a los Recursos Genéticos en Aplicación a la Decisión 391 de la Comunidad Andina (3 
de octubre de 2011).  
  
  
   
232 
 
of these resources. The first element, namely the embodiment of plants in an 
intellectual property law, was already analysed at length in Part 1 of the thesis, and 
therefore the discussion will not be repeated here. Instead, the following sections will 
review how Ecuadorian lawmakers have incorporated the remaining three elements 
into a variety of recent legislative and regulatory initiatives.   
 
5.1.  Protections for Customary Agricultural Practices  
 Protections for customary agricultural practices have been significantly 
expanded under Ecuadorian law in recent years. As described in Chapter 4 of the 
thesis, the reformed intellectual property regime for plants that the 2016 Ingenios Act 
adopted includes provisions that expand the exceptions to the exclusive rights of plant 
breeders beyond those which were recognised in the 1998 Intellectual Property Law. 
Specifically, the Ingenios Act limits the proprietary rights of plant breeders such that 
authorisation is not required to use protected plant varieties for private, non-
commercial purposes. The Act also permits the use of intellectual property protected 
plant varieties “in the context of ancestral agricultural practices or in a traditional 
communitarian ambit,” which is defined to include the non-profit sale or exchange of 
seeds or other material derived from protected varieties.759 Furthermore, the Ingenios 
Act stipulates that farmers may use plant varieties protected with plant breeders’ rights 
for the purposes of multiplication or exchange with other farmers, provided that the 
breeder’s trademark or commercial name is not used.760 
The 2017 Seed Law is another recently enacted Ecuadorian legal instrument 
that provides safeguards for systems of customary seed management. This legislation 
“guarantees the free use, production, promotion, conservation and exchange” of the 
seed of “native” and “traditional” plant varieties.761 The new law also pledges to ensure 
that native and traditional, as well as “certified” seed is able to be freely produced, 
conserved, commercialised, exchanged, and accessed by farmers.762 This guarantee 
is reinforced in another clause, which specifies that farmers may “conserve on their 
holdings, utilise, exchange, and commercialise their planting or propagating 
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material.”763 Finally, the 2017 Seed Law obligates the Ecuadorian State to sustainably 
“preserve, produce, regenerate, conserve, revitalise, distribute, promote, and facilitate 
the use, free exchange, and consumption” of native and traditional seed.764 In the 
future, officials hope that this provision will be realised through concrete programs, for 
instance initiatives to establish community seed banks or to organise local seed 
fairs.765 
  Ecuadorian customary agricultural practices are also protected in the country’s 
2009 Food Sovereignty Law. This legislation provides the broad guarantee that the 
State as well as individual citizens and collectives “shall promote and protect the use, 
conservation, qualification, and free exchange of all native seed.”766 This language is 
further complemented by the provision that “native germplasm, seeds, plants and 
ancestral knowledge associated therewith constitute the heritage of the Ecuadorian 
people, [and] consequently they shall not be subject to appropriation in the form of 
patents or other intellectual property modalities.”767 The prohibition on the granting of 
proprietary rights over Ecuadorian biodiversity and traditional knowledge is grounded 
in the 2008 Constitution,768 and it is reified in other legislative regimes including the 
2017 Seed Law.769 This and other legislative provisions are designed to guarantee 
that seeds and other vegetal planting material may be broadly accessed and utilised.   
Furthermore, some aspects of the recent lawmaking experiments in Ecuador 
appear to be designed to extend intellectual property protection for new varieties of 
plants that are produced through customary practices. For instance, the 2017 General 
Regulations to the Ingenios Act stipulate that for the evaluation of applications for plant 
breeders’ rights protection, for plant “varieties obtained through the empirical method 
based on experimentation and observation that farmers realise, the same 
requirements as for varieties obtained through classical or modern plant 
biotechnological methods shall not be applied.”770 Thus, in contrast to countries such 
                                            
763 Id. at Art. 9(b).  
764 Id. at Art. 14(b). 
765 Director level official at the National Institute for Agricultural Research of Ecuador. (2 November 
2018). Personal interview.  
766 Ley Orgánica del Régimen de la Soberanía Alimentaria. (5 de mayo de 2009). Registro Oficial 
Suplemento 583. Art. 8. 
767 Id.  
768 See Constitución de la República del Ecuador de 2008, Art. 402. 
769 See 2017 Seed Law, Los Considerandos, ¶ 12. 
770 Reglamento General al Código Orgánico de la Economía Social de los Conocimientos, Creatividad 
e Innovación. Decreto Presidencial No. 1435. (23 de mayo de 2017) pg. 14 (emphasis added). 
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as India, Malaysia, and Thailand, Ecuador has not created a separate category of 
protection for farmers’ varieties in its intellectual property law for plants. Instead, the 
country has created a legal basis for the differentiation between farmers’ and 
professional breeders’ plant varieties at the level of regulation.  
As of 2018, the Technical Regulations that will implement the Ingenios Act 
remained in draft form, and as such it was difficult to determine how farmers’ plant 
varieties will ultimately be treated by Ecuadorian administrative agencies. The draft 
Technical Regulations that were published in July 2018 did not formally create 
separate criteria for the evaluation of farmers’ versus breeders’ plant varieties, though 
it remained possible that different ranges of distinctness, uniformity, and stability could 
be established for each category. Alternatively, the Technical Regulations could simply 
reify the language from the General Regulations, and thereby grant a measure of 
latitude to examiners for plant breeders’ rights to determine eligibility for protection. 
This facet of the Ecuadorian case study may merit consideration by other countries, 
given that it highlights the need for lawmakers to look beyond the legislative to the 
administrative realm when designing systems of intellectual property for plants.   
   
5.2.  Protection of Traditional Knowledge Related to Plants  
 The system for the protection of Ecuadorian traditional knowledge has been 
built around new guarantees that were established in the country’s 2008 Constitution. 
The new constitutional framework recognises the right of indigenous and local 
peoples, communities, and nationalities to maintain, protect, and develop their 
ancestral knowledge, science, and technologies, and specifically their traditional 
knowledge related to national genetic resources.771 The 2008 Constitution also 
prohibits all forms of misappropriation of collective knowledge, as well as of genetic 
resources related to Ecuadorian agrobiodiversity.772 Finally, the new constitutional 
framework creates a national system for science, technology, innovation, and 
traditional knowledge. One of the purposes of this platform is to recover, strengthen, 
and enhance ancestral knowledge in Ecuador.773 
                                            
771 Constitución de la República del Ecuador de 2008, Art. 57(12). 
772 Id. at Art. 322. See also id. at Art. 402 (prohibiting the granting of intellectual property rights over 
derived or synthesized products obtained through the collective knowledge associated with national 
biodiversity).  
773 Id. at Art. 385.  
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As a means to implement the new constitutional guarantees, the 2016 Ingenios 
Act elaborated an extensive chapter on traditional knowledge protection, which was 
analysed in Chapter 4 of the thesis. It is worth reiterating here that the new framework 
for traditional knowledge rights in Ecuador is comprehensive, offering a positive form 
of protection that includes voluntary government-administered and community-based 
registries, in addition to defences against the unauthorised access, use, and utilisation 
of traditional knowledge. The subject matter that this law covers is broad, including for 
instance knowledge about natural products and compositions for uses related to 
agriculture, fishing, hunting, and other subsistence activities.774 Protection is also 
available for knowledge about practices related to the sowing and harvesting of plants, 
seed management and collection, and other agricultural activities,775 and knowledge 
about natural biological compounds used for the elaboration of foodstuffs.776      
 There are several reasons why the traditional knowledge chapter of the 
Ingenios Act represents an interesting example that could inspire similar legislation in 
other countries. For instance, the law acknowledges that a substantial amount of 
locally-held agricultural knowledge may have been divulged in an oral or informal 
manner to people from outside of the community during the collection of local plant 
genetic resources. In many cases, such information now accompanies the collected 
physical material in ex situ germplasm collections, and it is considered to be in the 
public domain.  
In recognition of this trend, the Ingenios Act guarantees the right of the 
legitimate possessors of knowledge associated with plant genetic resources that have 
been collected and stored in ex situ collections to “just and equitable” benefit sharing, 
even where no prior informed consent has been obtained and where no agreement 
was executed between the providers and users of the resources.777 The language of 
this provision suggests that it is intended to apply to samples that were collected prior 
to the entry into force of the Convention on Biological Diversity, or the subsequent 
establishment of the Andean Community and the Ecuadorian regional and national 
regimes for access and benefit sharing. It is unclear how such a measure would be 
enforced, though it is a remarkable example of the extent to which the Ingenios Act 
                                            
774 Ingenios Act, Art. 521(d). 
775 Id. at Art. 521(e). 
776 Id. at Art. 521(c). 
777 Id. at Art. 526.  
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attempts to substantively implement the spirit of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the Plant Treaty, and the Nagoya Protocol.  
 The 2017 Seed Law also endeavours to actualise the guarantees established 
in Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution, by recognising a form of protection for traditional 
knowledge held by farmers, complementing the broader framework created in the that 
the Ingenios Act creates. The 2017 Seed Law grants a “right of communes, 
communities, peoples, and nationalities to the recognition and valorisation of ancestral 
and traditional knowledge linked to agrobiodiversity and the production of seeds, as 
well as the substantial role of women and the elderly in the conservation, protection, 
and safeguarding thereof.”778 The 2017 Seed Law further guarantees the ability of 
farmers to participate, both as individuals and collectively, in the protection of 
traditional knowledge related to the use of agrobiodiversity.779 
 The 2017 Seed Law is also concerned with the recovery and promotion of 
ancestral knowledge, and of agroecological and organic practices and technologies, 
formulating this priority as an express obligation that the State is bound to uphold.780 
The law reinscribes the government’s constitutional duty to prohibit all forms of 
misappropriation of individual and collective traditional knowledge,781 and to adopt 
measures to prevent the loss of traditional knowledge and customary practices 
associated with agrobiodiversity, native seeds, and food.782 The 2017 Seed Law also 
requires the State to establish mechanisms to promote, regenerate, conserve, care 
for, improve, and multiply – both in situ and ex situ – native seeds and associated 
knowledge.783 Finally, the legislation states that the Ecuadorian government is 
responsible for prohibiting the granting of patents or other forms of intellectual property 
claiming derived or synthesized products that have been obtained through the use of 
collective knowledge associated with national agrobiodiversity.784 
 An additional provision that the 2017 Seed Law enacts in relation to traditional 
knowledge is the express recognition of the “dialogue of knowledges,” a concept that 
was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis. In the 2017 Seed Law, the dialogue 
                                            
778 2017 Seed Law, Art. 8(d). 
779 Id. at Art. 10(d). 
780 Id. at Art. 14(b).  
781 Id. at Art. 14(c). 
782 Id. at Art. 14(e). 
783 Id. at Art. 14(p). 
784 Id. at Art. 14(r). 
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of knowledges is invoked as a means to structure the relationship between scientific 
inquiry and traditional knowledge. Specifically, the legislation provides that future 
research programs developed in Ecuador should “respect ancestral knowledge in 
matters of agrobiodiversity, seeds, and sustainable agriculture.”785 When read against 
the backdrop of the text as a whole, it appears that the 2017 Seed Law intends to 
formally elevate the status of traditional knowledge in Ecuador, such that it would 
interact with and inform professional scientific agricultural knowledge. Thus, rather 
than conceptualise traditional knowledge as static or archaic, the framework regards 
Indigenous Ecuadorian ways of knowing as coequal with other forms of agricultural 
knowledge.   
 A fourth legal instrument that was recently enacted in Ecuador and which 
incorporates provisions related to traditional knowledge is the national regulatory 
framework for access to genetic resources and equitable benefit sharing. As in other 
laws already discussed in this section of the thesis, these National Regulations to the 
Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources in the Andean Community 
expressly prohibit the Ecuadorian State from recognising private rights – including in 
the form of intellectual property – over derived or synthesized products obtained using 
the collective knowledge associated with national biodiversity.786 This framework 
further designates the National Environmental Authority as the entity responsible for 
regulating access and benefit sharing in Ecuador, mandating that this Authority 
coordinate all actions related to prevention, control, and sanctions to combat illegal 
and illegitimate access to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge.787 
Likewise, the regulations appoint the Secretariat of Peoples, Social Movements, and 
Citizen Participation as the agency responsible for coordinating prior informed consent 
with local communities to obtain access to traditional knowledge associated with 
Ecuadorian genetic resources.788 
 The 2009 Food Sovereignty Law is a final example in the web of recently 
enacted laws that are designed to protect traditional knowledge in Ecuador. According 
to this framework, the national food sovereignty “regime” is intended to promote 
practices towards the realisation of sustainable and nutritious, local-level food 
                                            
785 Id. at Art. 23. 
786 Decreto No. 905, El Reglamento Nacional al Régimen Común sobre Acceso a los Recursos 
Genéticos en Aplicación a la Decisión 391 de la Comunidad Andina (3 de octubre de 2011), Art. 4. 
787 Id. at Art. 8.  
788 Id. at Art. 11. 
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production, “respecting and protecting agrobiodiversity, traditional and ancestral 
knowledge and forms of production, under the principles of equity, solidarity, inclusion, 
[and] social and environmental sustainability.”789 Thus, in contrast to conventional 
approaches to food security that groups such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations endorse,790 Ecuador has adopted a national policy 
that focuses on self-reliance in food production and consumption. Traditional 
knowledge is taken seriously within this paradigm, since one of the essential aims of 
the law is to base the national food system on local, small-scale agricultural 
production.791 
 Indeed, the 2009 Food Sovereignty Law stipulates that the national government 
must protect the right of Ecuadorian rural communities, peoples, and nationalities to 
conserve and promote their biodiversity management practices, as well as to develop 
their collective knowledge, science, technologies, and ancestral wisdom.792 As with 
the other Ecuadorian laws analysed above, the food sovereignty legislation 
guarantees that “native germplasm, seeds, plants, and the ancestral knowledge 
associated therewith constitute the heritage of the Ecuadorian people, [and] 
consequently they shall not be subject to appropriation in the form of patents or other 
intellectual property modalities.”793 This provision complements the form of traditional 
knowledge protection that the Ingenios Act establishes. In other words, although 
holders of traditional knowledge are shielded from misappropriation by unauthorised 
third parties, they may themselves register their knowledge and receive a kind of 
collective intellectual right from the government. 
 
                                            
789 2009 Food Sovereignty Law, Art. 1. 
790 The United Nations conceptualises food security as the availability and adequate access at all 
times to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food so that people are able to maintain healthy and active 
lives. United Nations World Food Programme. (2018). “What is food security?” Retrieved from 
https://www.wfp.org/node/359289. In contrast, food sovereignty is frequently characterised as a 
question of the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through 
ecologically sound and sustainable methods, in addition to peoples’ right to define their own food and 
agriculture systems. Forum for Food Sovereignty, Declaration of Nyéléni (23-27 February 2007), 
Sélingué, Mali. Retrieved from https://nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290.  
791 2009 Food Sovereignty Law, Art. 1. 
792 Id. at Art. 9.  
793 Id. at Art. 8.  
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5.3. Regulation of Access to Plant Genetic Resources and Equitable Benefit 
Sharing  
 The national framework for access to plant genetic resources and equitable 
benefit sharing in Ecuador is derived from legislation that was promulgated at the 
regional level by the Andean Community. The relevant norms were established in 
Decision 391 of the Andean Community, which was enacted in 1996, shortly after the 
entry into force of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Decision 391 reaffirmed the 
principle of national sovereignty over genetic resources and any products derived from 
these resources. Thus, the Andean Community regime acknowledged that its 
members were responsible for implementing independent, national level rules for 
access and benefit sharing. Despite this recognition, Decision 391 instituted the basic 
parameters to which such domestic systems must conform.  
 For instance, Andean Community Decision 391 delineated the basic protocols 
for the lodging of applications for access to genetic resources,794 as well as the 
execution of access agreements between the relevant National Authority and the 
prospective user of the resources.795 Under Decision 391, the access agreement must 
“take into account the rights and interests of providers.”796 Thus, in the event that an 
“intangible component” such as the traditional knowledge of local peoples is 
implicated, the agreement must include an annex with terms related to the just and 
equitable sharing of any benefits derived from the utilisation of the resource.797 The 
resource providers themselves must sign this annex, and the transaction is subject to 
review by the relevant National Authority. Additionally, an “accessory agreement” must 
be executed between the prospective user of the resource and the owner of land from 
which it is sourced, if the resource in question is obtained on private property.798   
 The framework created in Decision 391 also included limitations on access for 
any plant genetic resources that are used in the context of customary agricultural 
practices. For instance, Andean Community Member States may partially or totally 
restrict access to certain genetic resources if “essential elements of peoples’ cultural 
                                            
794 Decisión 391 de la Comunidad Andina. Régimen Común sobre Acceso a los Recursos Genéticos 
(2 de julio de 1996), Caracas, Venezuela. Art. 26. 
795 Id. at Art. 32. 
796 Id. at Art. 34. 
797 Id. at Art. 35. 
798 Id. at Art. 41(a). 
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identity” would be negatively impacted,799 or if undesirable environmental effects800 or 
genetic erosion801 could occur. In the event that genetic resources were accessed 
absent the appropriate governmental authorisation, Decision 391 would permit 
signatories to impose a variety of sanctions, including administrative, civil, and criminal 
penalties.802  
 In Ecuador, Decision 391 has been substantiated and implemented through the 
National Regulations to the Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources. In 
addition to fulfilling obligations to the Andean Community and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, these National Regulations were expressly designed as a means 
for the country to comply with the access and benefit sharing protections that the Plant 
Treaty establishes for farmers in particular.803 The provisions of these various 
international instruments are unified and reified in the National Regulations. 
Furthermore, the Ecuadorian system expands on the minimum standards that the 
treaties originally instituted.  
For instance, under the Ecuadorian National Regulations, all agreements that 
are negotiated for access and benefit sharing must specify an appropriate mechanism 
for the distribution of benefits resulting from the utilisation of genetic resources or 
derivatives thereof.804 A system of monitoring and evaluation must also be detailed in 
the access agreement, and the payment of economic benefits – either actual or 
potential – derived from the worldwide commercialisation of any products generated 
based on the accessed resource must be guaranteed.805 Non-monetary benefits must 
also be included as an essential condition for the approval of the access agreement, 
for example via the transfer of any technologies that have been developed through the 
use of the resource.806 When local communities are involved as providers of an 
“intangible component” associated with the relevant genetic resource, accession to 
                                            
799 Id. at Art. 45(c). 
800 Id. at Art. 45(d). 
801 Id. at Art. 45(e). 
802 Id. at Art. 47.  
803 Decreto No. 905, El Reglamento Nacional al Régimen Común sobre Acceso a los Recursos 
Genéticos en Aplicación a la Decisión 391 de la Comunidad Andina (3 de octubre de 2011), Los 
Considerandos, ¶12.  
804 Id. at Art. 26.  
805 Id.  
806 Id.  
  
  
   
241 
 
the terms of the access agreement must occur locally, in the communities 
themselves.807     
Consistent with the terms of Decision 391, the Ecuadorian National Regulations 
further elaborate provisions for access to “intangible components” that are associated 
with genetic resources. This subject matter is defined as all collective or individual 
knowledge, innovations, or practices, with real or potential value, associated with 
genetic resources and the derivatives thereof.808 The section of the National 
Regulations designed to enable access to intangible components specifies that an 
annex to the access agreement that contains terms for access and benefit sharing 
must be reviewed and signed by the legal representative of the local community from 
which the knowledge or information associated with the genetic resource has been 
obtained.809 The National Environmental Authority of Ecuador is required to review 
and sign this annex agreement to ensure compliance with the access and benefit 
sharing law.  
In addition to the specialised framework elaborated in the National Regulations, 
access and benefit sharing is also covered in the traditional knowledge chapter of the 
Ingenios Act. The latter regime reinforces the parameters previously established in the 
National Regulations by providing more precise terms for how users can obtain free, 
prior, and informed consent from providers of traditional knowledge. For instance, the 
prospective user must divulge sufficient information to traditional knowledge holders 
about the purposes, risks, implications, and eventual uses and applications of the 
accessed knowledge.810 Prospective users are also required to utilise culturally 
appropriate methods for obtaining consent, and to “respect the dialogue of 
knowledges.”811 
Under the Ingenios Act framework for access and benefit sharing, all 
determinations that legitimate possessors of traditional knowledge make to grant or 
deny access must be registered with the national intellectual property authority as a 
means to enforce the decisions.812 The Ingenios Act further specifies that access 
agreements must be executed in Spanish as well as in the legitimate possessors’ 
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808 Id. at Art. 6. 
809 Id. at Art. 34. 
810 Ingenios Act, Art. 530.  
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native language, if it exists in written form.813 Once signed, these agreements must be 
reviewed by the national intellectual property authority – with oversight by the National 
Secretariat for Higher Education, Science, Technology, and Innovation – to verify the 
existence of prior, free, and informed consent, and just and equitable benefit 
sharing.814  
When read against the aforementioned National Regulations to Andean 
Community Decision 391, it becomes clear that multiple Ecuadorian governmental 
authorities are responsible for ensuring that the provisions surrounding access to 
genetic resources and equitable benefit sharing are effectively actualised. Although in 
theory such redundancy could be intended to provide strong protection for holders of 
traditional knowledge, in practice bureaucratic inefficiency or interagency conflict could 
operate to hinder effective relations between resource providers and users. For this 
reason, other countries seeking to follow the Ecuadorian example could consider 
appointing a single government authority as the overseer of the national access and 
benefit sharing regime.  
* * * 
 Chapter 5 of the thesis has invoked the Ecuadorian case study as an example 
for how countries might implement multiple legal frameworks to structure relationships 
between people, institutions, and plants beyond the conventional template for plant 
breeders’ rights. The Ecuadorian example demonstrates that countries do not 
necessarily need to cover all relevant issues in the same law. In fact, there are 
potential advantages to legislating intellectual property for plants in one regime and 
related issues in separate regimes, provided that the various frameworks are 
connected by a unified approach to governance. For instance, the strategy of enacting 
multiple laws could create diverse causes of action for violations, in addition to 
rendering issues related to the governance of plants and knowledge about how to use 
them as increasingly visible and available as a means for diverse social actors to 
influence public policy. Countries that wish to follow the Ecuador’s example by 
implementing multiple laws to regulate the relationships between people, institutions, 
and plants could consider the following points: 
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• The various issues related to the regulation of different kinds of plants could 
be incorporated wholly or partially into diverse existing or reformed legal 
frameworks related to agriculture and rural livelihoods. Relevant laws could 
include those which cover intellectual property for plants, seed certification and 
control, biodiversity conservation, traditional knowledge protection, access and 
benefit sharing, food sovereignty, or others. 
• Where the kind of rapid reinvention of multiple legal frameworks that occurred 
in Ecuador from 2007 to 2017 is not possible, a country might consider making 
modifications in administrative rather than legislative regimes. That is, even 
where comprehensive law reform is not feasible, it may be possible to rewrite 
a relatively narrower set of regulations. 
• When adopting a strategy to structure relationships between people, 
institutions, and plants through a variety of separate legal instruments, 
governments should cultivate an awareness of the various external and 
internal factors that could limit the potential for innovative lawmaking. 
Furthermore, lawmakers should strive to understand how the various 
international obligations to which their country is subject intersect and overlap, 
and how these external factors intertwine with social, political, and economic 
factors that are internal to the country. Ideally, even while the various relevant 
issues may be addressed in separate laws, all pertinent regimes should be 
crafted according to a unified strategy for policy development.   
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Part 3. Conclusion 
The story that this thesis has told exists in the context of conversations and 
debates over the relationship between intellectual property and plants, which have 
surfaced in diverse settings throughout the world over the past two decades or so. The 
expansion of the conceptual intersection between intellectual property and plants may 
be attributed to numerous converging factors. These include the changing nature of 
agriculture worldwide, which is driven by forces including the development of new 
technologies, climate change and its associated environmental impacts, and 
demographic trends including a significant increase in the human population.  
At the same time, indigenous groups and their advocates have become 
increasingly organised and vocal about the need to protect customary ways of life, 
including ancestral agricultural practices. Additionally, consumers in many parts of the 
world are increasingly conscious about what their food is made from, where it comes 
from, and under what conditions its components are cultivated. Put simply, now more 
than ever there is a need to feed more people with more refined tastes using land that 
is increasingly scarce. Compounding the situation is the fact that intense disagreement 
exists over how to do so. The ability of different actors to access and use different 
types of plants forms a crucial part of this debate.      
While the nature of modern agriculture has become more complex, the ways 
that people think about intellectual property for plants have become increasingly 
narrow. It is now less likely than ever that innovative solutions for the regulation of 
plants as intellectual property will be developed at the national level. This is partially 
due to the spread of formal legal obligations that are embodied in the numerous 
international instruments to which many countries have adhered. However, another 
explanation is that one particular model of intellectual property for plants – that is, the 
system of plant breeders’ rights – has become dominant. Together, these formal and 
informal factors have limited the ways that domestic lawmakers conceive of new laws 
to regulate plants as intellectual property.  
Nevertheless, opportunities for innovation remain available, as this thesis has 
revealed. The analysis centred on exploring the nature of legal experimentation – what 
it is and how it may operate – for the making of intellectual property laws for plants. In 
contrast to prior studies, the thesis presented a hopeful story, one in which it showed 
that even in areas of the law that are often assumed to be fixed and static, space can 
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still be found for creativity. The study that the thesis undertook focused specifically on 
different kinds of laws that structure relationships between people, institutions, and 
plants, whether or not according to the logic of intellectual property. The exploration 
was guided by the recognition that a formal legal space exists in which lawmakers are 
able to innovate with locally appropriate solutions with when creating systems of 
intellectual property for plants.  
The thesis grounded its investigation of the limitations and possibilities of 
lawmaking in the experience of one country, namely Ecuador. The doctrinal and socio-
legal research conducted in Ecuador was motivated by a desire to recount how 
Ecuadorian lawmakers responded to the need to balance international obligations with 
national concerns during the making of a revised domestic intellectual property 
framework for plants. Furthermore, the case study explored how officials encountered 
innovative solutions to the regulation of interactions between people, institutions, and 
plants in a series of new, alternative legal regimes.  
Notwithstanding the existence of a formal legal space, in both Ecuador and 
other countries particular ways of thinking have shaped – and to a certain extent have 
limited – local experimentation in the design of novel intellectual property laws for 
plants. The logic of plant breeders’ rights, which is a form of intellectual property that 
was first formalised in the UPOV Convention and has since spread to countries 
throughout the world on the wings of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, has 
proven especially influential. The plant breeders’ rights model prioritises and promotes 
a particular form of agriculture, and more broadly a limited perspective on how different 
social actors relate to plants. By narrowly focusing on how to design systems to grant 
plant breeders’ rights – whether based on a perceived need to comply with 
international treaty obligations, a desire to serve certain local interests, or other 
reasons – lawmakers may obscure or neglect other important policy goals. As a result, 
alternative ways of thinking about how people, institutions, and plants interrelate may 
be marginalised. 
Notwithstanding the recognition of the extent to which the plant breeders’ rights 
template has shaped imaginaries for lawmaking, the rationality that this model 
embodies is not necessarily exclusive of other ways of conceiving of systems to 
regulate the usage of different types of plants. While prior academic analyses and civil 
society campaigns have pitted plant breeders’ rights against customary approaches 
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to the management of seeds and other planting material – creating the illusion of 
diametric opposition – the Ecuadorian experience demonstrated that multiple different 
agricultural systems and ways of thinking about the plants used therein can coexist in 
the same place. However, the case study also illustrated that a variety of tensions 
characterise this space, and for this reason it is important that legal scholars, 
government officials, and civil society actors alike remain well informed about the 
limitations and possibilities for the making of inventive intellectual property laws for 
plants.  
Thus, diverse social actors should educate themselves about the nature of the 
formal legal space that is available for innovative lawmaking in countries that are 
legally bound to the various international obligations discussed in Chapter 1 of the 
thesis. As described in that chapter, although the TRIPS Agreement and the UPOV 
Convention contain certain limitations on the form that national intellectual property 
laws for plants may take, numerous possibilities for experimentation remain available. 
Furthermore, it is crucial to recognise that for many countries, legal boundedness does 
not begin and end in the domain of intellectual property.  
Instead, the question for a majority of the national governments in the world is 
how to reconcile the logic of plant breeders’ rights with other ways of thinking about 
the interplay of people, institutions, and plants. In this context, types of plants beyond 
those developed by professional plant breeders have attained newfound legal 
recognition. Evidence for this trend may be found in the increasing popularity of 
instruments such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Nagoya Protocol, the 
Plant Treaty, and their domestic analogues.  
In practice, an assortment of solutions may be identified to reconcile 
overlapping or competing international obligations and simultaneously address local 
policy goals. Chapter 2 of the thesis explored a series of standardised approaches 
that governments could consider for the making of laws that delineate permissible 
activities related to different types of plants. At the end of the thesis, Chapter 5 
presented the variegated strategy that has recently taken shape in Ecuador. The 
analysis conducted in these chapters demonstrated that some countries – including 
those which are legally unbound or nations that are legally bound only to the TRIPS 
Agreement – could develop local, sui generis intellectual property laws for plants that 
need not follow the plant breeders’ rights model. Meanwhile, for countries that are 
  
  
   
247 
 
legally bound to the UPOV Convention, it would be possible to create a national 
system to grant plant breeders’ rights while also regulating the usage of various kinds 
of plants according to alternative principles in different types of legal regimes.  
Another conclusion that the thesis derived is that international obligations do 
not provide the sole explanation for why the plant breeders’ rights paradigm has 
proliferated in recent decades in so many parts of the world. Instead, actors from 
different societal domains in many countries have internalised a rationality that 
professes the need to incentivise innovation, support commercialisation, and 
ultimately reward investments made to develop new varieties of plants. The broad 
adoption of this paradigm likely provides an explanation for why lawmakers in some 
countries have chosen to adopt the UPOV Convention model of intellectual property 
for plants, even where they were under no formal obligation to do so.  
The operation of the logic of plant breeders’ rights was visible in the making of 
the Ingenios Act of Ecuador, as described in Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis. Although 
this law was conceived in a political environment that claimed to offer an alternative to 
conventional approaches to economic development, in reality the Ingenios Act never 
intended to radically re-invent intellectual property for plants. Instead, the new regime 
was designed to operate as a tool to transform the national economy.  
One senior official at the National Secretariat for Higher Education, Science, 
Technology and Innovation told me unequivocally that the Ingenios Act was designed 
based on the recognition that “agroecology can provide much added value to the 
economy.”815 Plant breeders’ rights were thus understood to represent a means by 
which the country might “incentivise innovation,”816 towards the creation of a 
knowledge-based economy. Therefore, even in the absence of the formal legal 
obligations to which Ecuador is subject, it is unlikely that government actors would 
have radically departed from the plant breeders’ rights model when designing the 
reformed system of intellectual property for plants. In the words of another high-
ranking official with whom I spoke, the new Ecuadorian framework for the regulation 
of plants as intellectual property should be understood as “disruptive, but not 
rupturist.”817 
                                            
815 Director level official at the National Secretariat for Higher Education, Science, Technology and 
Innovation. (15 June 2016). Personal interview.  
816 Id.  
817 Director level official at the Yachay Public Enterprise. (1 April 2016). Personal interview.  
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Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the recent history of Ecuadorian lawmaking 
has involved a kind of playfulness or experimentation with the limitations and 
possibilities for innovative solutions to the question of how to structure relationships 
between people, institutions, and plants. The new legislative frameworks that have 
resulted are not perfect, but the general process is laudable for its willingness to 
question conventional norms, open spaces for direct citizen participation, and create 
customised approaches to address local issues. Although Ecuador is a country 
endowed with certain advantages that facilitated the rapid pace of reform – for 
instance, the dominance of a single political party in government; a recent history of 
civil society activism; the election of indigenous leaders to leadership positions in the 
government – there is no reason to believe that its approach to lawmaking could not 
be adopted in other places.    
For some countries, the opportunities for experimentation with inventive forms 
of intellectual property for plants that would deviate from the rationality of plant 
breeders’ rights are limited. However, this is not to say that all hope for change is lost. 
To the contrary, and as demonstrated through the case study of Ecuador, an 
assortment of possibilities remains available to lawmakers with the audacity to 
innovate. Some of these alternatives were presented in Chapters 2 and 5, though 
claiming that one model is universally preferable would be antithetical to the 
fundamental argument of the thesis. While the experience of Ecuador may be 
informative, it is hoped that lawmakers who in the future are tasked with the regulation 
of plants as intellectual property will turn inward, imbuing the legislation that they 
create with rationalities that resonate most strongly with their constituents.  
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